University of Louisville

ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
1934

France and an international police force.
Homer Castle White
University of Louisville

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd
Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, and the European History Commons

Recommended Citation
White, Homer Castle, "France and an international police force." (1934). Electronic Theses and
Dissertations. Paper 1927.
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/1927

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator
of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the author, who
has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu.

UlJIVEH2 rpy OF LOUI2VILI,E

•,

FHANCE AND
Ari E'TERNI,'11 1'NAL POL:LC;S J:t'OEC i~:.

I
t;
I

A

Di~sertation

Submitted to t.l:;e Faculty
Of the Graduate 2chool of the University of Louisville
In Partial Fulfillment of the

(>

Requirements for the Degree
Of

~aster

of Arts.

Department of History

Horner Castle
I

,

(

.

1934

,

.

'*,

r--

;,

.-

~hite

!}
\u

~

-~
_:r}

•

hi~torical -- Fron

Chapter'
I
Page .
the Greeks to Gargaz-------- ----------------l

Chapter I I
Ei . . tOl·icc.l- - Fr·Ol:l Bentham to the orld o.r - ---- -------------- 21

.:S
t:

-;;J

Oh pter I I I
League of o.tions -- .. dnin;1.str ti0'1----- 43

':'11e F'rencl-t plan for

3.

The French plun i'

a Lea '

t;

_r ance . . .nd

The French

h

~r,-, lC'.

v

!'

i~sion

E

D ls ar~am

nt

...

pter IV
Jati us -- ;::;anctions----------t::8

~f

V
C apteron the Le ague of

~ati~ns ---------- 80

Chapter vI
of February , 1932---- -----108

propos~ ls

Chapte r' - II
Di::armament proIJo ....... ~ 0:: •. Tem

r, 1932----- -- --125

.. _ • El'TDIC S

Offici3.1 French Plan for a Lea ue or _:ation"',
June
1918--------------- 47
TT
-.

III .

fficia1

_1'

Official F

nch Di3armament Pro 0"
Fe ruary
en~'

Di3ar~a

,

~

...
~

~,

,

1932-- -- ------1 60

ont Propnsal_ , .
r~ovc b I' 14, 1932----------171

I "': IOCR! P Y

31 30

Cbmter I
Historical--From tl:e Greeks to Garp?cz.
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FRANOE AND
AN INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE
Chapter I
Historical--From the Greeks to Gargaz.
The basic principle of an international police force,
the imposition of international justice upon' nations by means of
an international authority, developed through the attempts of men
since the earliest stages of history to set up stable political
organizations.

their strength to save themselves from a condition of violence
and disorder in which their lives were "solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short", and characterized by a "continual fear and
danger of violent death. ttl

thority who will be charged with their protection.

A study of

the development of this principle in the history of mankind is
important to the understanding of the question of an international police force.

~~

By 600 B. C. all the peoples of central and northern
Greece had formed an association known as the Amphictyonic
League. 2 This league was a union of city-states which were
'amphictyones', or neighbors, in reference to the sanctuary of
Demeter at Anthela.

The members of the Amphictyonic League took

an oath not to cut off each other's water supply, and not to
destr'oy each other's towns.

.,.,'
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Therefore, it was necessary for men

to renounce all their rif,hts, and transfer them to a common au-

... ~

c

According to Hobbes, men were forced to pool

:t'~,'

1.
2.

The combined armed forces of the

F. W. Coker, Readings in Politi~al Philosophy, p. 305 •
Cambridge Ancient History, Volume III, p. 604. See also
W. EVans Darby, International Tribunals, pp. 1-9. This
interesting book contains a detailed ac~ount of, various
peace plans from the leagues of the ancient Greeks to
the Hague Conferences.

~:~.~~~_f_·__~~_"_,_____________________________________________________________________________
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,League were to be used against any
oath.

member~who

violated this

1

This early Greek league was enshrouded with the halo
of religion.

The members formed several religious councils,

comprising the representatives of the various cities, which met
periodically, and each city had a voice in the joint management
of the temples of Apollo.

"were
'

"These councils," says Breasted,

among the nearest approaches to representative govern-

ment ever devised in the ancient world.,,2
The members of the League did not hesitate to use their

0('

joint forces in assisting Delphi against Criaa.

was even considered a Sacred War, this name being applied to it.

3

These people were quick to apply the sanctions of armed force in
aiding a fellow-member of their organization, an effective measure which modern states still refuse to adopt.

The Amphictyonic

League was one of the first experiments in the pooling of armed
force, and the application of armed sanctions.
Two other Greek leagues are important.
Confederacy of Delos, was formed in 477 B. C.

The first, the

This Confederacy

possessed no definite constitution which outlined the duties and
obligations of each member; indeed, it was more like

an

organiza-

tion formed by a treaty of alliance between Athens, the predominant
Greek city, and the other cities.

Oaths were exchanged, and "the

casting into the sea of masses of iron which accompanied the exchange of the oaths was intended to be symbolic of a determination

.. ~
~

1.

l'.',
(

3.

iJ'~

In fact, the war

2.

David Davies, The Problem of the Twentieth centur~, .p. 61.
This work will be referred to hereinafter ,asavies.
J. H. Breasted, Ancilent Times--A History of the Early World, p. 291.
Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. III, p. 604.

which .should last until the metal floated to the toP.tt l
The object of the alliance was retaliation against Persia for the losses due to her invasion of Greece.

The allies

were bound to furnish their quota of ships and crews for the prosecution of the war against Persia, or if unable to furnish this
material, they were to give their quota of tribute.

A synod of

the allies met periodically at Delos where the treasury of the
League was also located.

Its duties were probably to review the

assessment of tributes. 2

The Athenians predominated in all the

activities of the Confederacy of Delos.

Athens was the great

builder of ships; an Athenian was to command the combined fleet;
and Aristides the Just was in charge of collecting the tribute
money. 3
The combined fleet of the Confederacy scoured the seas
of pirates, and the combined armies drove the invading Persians
completely out of the region of the Hellespont.

.

The League had

proved its worth; henceforth, Persia, or any other great Power,
had to reckon with the combined forces of all the members of this
combination if it dared to attack any city in the group.

Here

was lithe first example of the establishment of an international
navy and police force. 1I4
The League possessed internal, as well as external,
strength.

Naxos, a member of the Confederacy, attempted to se-

cede, but she was forced back into the .group.
1•

.i
i

,~

~

/

2.
3.
4.

Thus the union was

Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. V, p. 40.
Ibid, p. 41.
J. H. Breasted, Ancient Times--A History of the Early World,
p. 339.
Davies, pp. 62-3.

preserved.

Corystus, in the island of Euboea, whose inhabitants

were considered of a different race from those of the rest of the
island, refused to join the Confederacy, and she was forced into
it against her will.

Her inhabitants were treated kindly:

they

were neither expelled nor enslaved.
In spite of all the successful adventures of the Confed-

.

eracy, it had one serious defect--the supremacy of Athens.

This

great Greek city-state controlled all the activities of the League.
She decided which of the ,cities should furnish ships and which
should furnish tribute; she commanded the fleets and armies through
the selection of Athenian naval and military leaders; and she
dictated the policies of the Confederacy.

In the year 454 B. C.

the treasury was transferred from Delos to Athens, and the growlng power of this city transformed the Confederacy into an Athenian
maritime league.

Athens swallowed up the Confederacy of Delos.

There ought to be a lesson on this page out of the history of mankind.

Davies points it out:

"One of the lessons to

be learnt from this first experiment in the creatlon of an international police force is that no single State should be able to secure a monopoly in the manufacture or construction of any weapons
with which this force may be equiPped. lIl Such a situation is a
temptation to the great Power to use these weapons in her own defense, just as Germany, trusting in her great monopoly in the chemical lndustry to bring the Entente Powers to their knees, violated
a great international treaty.
1.
2.

Davies, p. 63.
Ibid, p. 64.

2

The last Greek league of importance is the Achaean
League.

It was formed after 300 B. C.

With the rise of power-

ful commercial States in the Mediterranean regions, and the corresponding decline in the lucrative trade of the Greek cities,
alliances became only natural.

In northern Greece the Aetolian

League filled the same need that the Achaean League filled in the
south.

The Greeks were making a last desperate effort to prevent

their submergence in the growiBg Macedonian kingdom:

it was a

losing fight.
Beginning with a membership of twelve cities, the Achaean
(.

League rapidly expanded into an organization of seventy members. 1
The League officials consisted of a General, a governing board, a
secretary, a treasurer, and an admiral, who were elected in midwinter and assumed office in May.

2

The General, elected for a term

of one year, commanded the combined army of all the cities, and the
other officials ha.d charge of all the matters of defence and foreign relations with states outside the League.

3

Any citizen of

any Greek city in the League could be elected to any of these
offices.
The League appears to have possessed both an Assembly
and a smaller Council.

The Council, composed of delegations from

all of the cities in proportion to population, decided foreign
policy, received and sent ambassadors, and conferred federal
citizenship.

1.
2.
3.

The Assembly, composed of the Council, officials,

Davies, p. 64.
Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. VII, p. 736.
J. H. Breasted, Ancient Times--A History 9f the Early World,
p. 450.

and all citizens over thirty years of age, had the power of declaring war and making new treaties and alliances. l
The cities in the League kept their internal power and
their own law courts.
League:

All private law was beyond the power of the

the internal sovereignty of each city was kept intact.

A real curb was placed on the external sovereignty of each city,
however, and no city had any power over its own foreign affairs,
all foreign policy being reserved for the League.

" __ No city

could send or receive ambassadors, make treaties, or wage war;
a real service done by the Greek Leagues was that each prevented
war between its own cities.,,2

The military service of every cit-

izen was due to the League alone, and every citizen paid the
League's property-tax, though apparently each city was responsible for its collection.
In contrast with the Delian Confederacy which fell because of the supremacy of Athens, 3 the Achaean League in southern
Greece and the Aetoljan League in northern Greece fell because
Athens and

S~)arta

were not members of their organizations.

The

Achaean League tr-ied time after time to force Sparta into its membership, but every attempt met with with defeat.
,

After 225 B. C.

this League began to break up, and although an Achaean member took
an oath never to secede from it, many of them left its fold after
the futile attempts to force Sparta into their membership.

Like a

huge tidal wave, the rolling masses of Macedonians swept away the

-,

last vestige of Greek alliances, and made themselves masters of all
1.
2.
3.

Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. Vii, pp. 737-8.
Ibid, p. 736.
See above, page 4.

Greece.

So ended the last of the great Greek Leagues amid the

rising glory of the Macedonian king and his great son, Alexander.
But even the splendor of such a personage as Alexander the Great
could not efface the political ideas left by the Greeks; and one
of these, the idea that the armed forces of a league can be used
to maintain peace and order, passed on to the Romans.
With the advent of the great Augustus to power in Rome,
the so-called pax Romana began:
by force.

Rome imposed peace upon the world

For some three centuries beginning with the advent of

the Christian era there was comparative peace throughout the civilized world. l The "ravages of civil war, and the irresponsible
exactions of partis.<'ln leaders,,2 came to an end.
Another historian writes thus about the Roman peace:
liThe benefits conferred upon the world by the universal dominion
of Home were of quite inestimable value.

First of these benefits,

--was the prolonged peace that was enfor)d throue,hout large portions of the world where chronic warfare had hitherto prevailed.
The 'pax romana' has perhaps been sometimes depicted in exaggerated
colours; but as compared with all that had preceded,' and with all
that followed, down to the beginning of the nineteenth century,
it deserved the enconiums it has received. ft3
Looking back over the d2rk ages of history, Dante was
struck by the wonderful reign of universal peace under the Roman
aegis.

He bases his political philosophy upon the proposition

that a universal monarchy, such as the Roman Empire, is essential
1.
2.
3.

Arthur Boak, A History of Rome to 565, A. D., pp. 243, 276.
Tenney Frank, Roman Imperialism, p. 353.
J. Fiske in The New Larned History, Vol. VIII, p. 7150.

to the happiness and tranquility of mankind.

He teaches the

theory of the necessity of a common superior, contending that
"there may be controversy between any tw; princes, where one is
not subject to the other,--between them there should be means

,-0'

of judgment,--there must be a third prince of wider jurisdiction,

I

within the circle of whose laws both may come."l

I

In the same century that Dante was expressing these political tenets, another group of political entities were beginning
to league together for the preservation of peace.

In 1241 Hamburg

and Lubeck made a treaty which is regarded as the basis of the
Hanseatic League. 2

By the end of the thirteenth century, nineteen

towns had adopted das lUbische Recht.

The purpose of this league

of German towns was to suppress piracy, protect the trade routes,
and above all ttthe maintenance of peace, indispensable to trade
and indus try. ,,3
The Hanseatic .League was very powerful for several centuries after its origin, and as its prestige grew, membership
was eagerly sought, and expulsion became a severe punishment.

On

one occasion a member was expelled from the League for refusing
"

to act jOintly with its colleagues. 4
and emerged the winne~.

It also clashed with Denmark

All European countries regarded it as a

political entity and negotiated treaties with it.

Thirty-five

towns were represented at a meeting of the League in 1418, and a
close alliance was concluded for 12 years for mutual defense.
The revived League was not able to regain its old power,
~/r"
'~;~

r~
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~
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1.
8.
3.
4.

F. W. Coker, Readings in Political Philosophy, p. 146.
Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. VII, p. 218.
Ibid, p. 219.
Ibid.

and it was doomed to split upon the rock of economic selfishness.
Vigorous competition between towns

~aused

the bond of

alliance to weaken, and in 1427 the League suff$red defeats and
losses in conflicts with the Danes.

It found itself surrounded

by powerful enemies--Denmark, the·Scandinavian countries, Spain,
the Dutch, the English, and the Russians.

In spite of its inter-

nal disharmony and the ring of powerful foes, the Hanseatic League
continued into the seventeenth century.

This fact proves the in-

herent strength of the organiZation, and the farsightedness of
its leader, Lubeck.
The great morning-star of the peace movement that still
survives, appeared during the seventeenth century in the person
I
of a Frenchman, Cruce.

In fact, one of the most striking facts

that presents itself to the student of peace problems is the outstanding work of the French.

In the sky of peace of the seven-

teenth and eighteenth centuries twinkle brightly the names of
Cruct, Henry IV, Sully, the Abbe de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, and
Gargaz.

1

,

Cruce proposed a union of the European nationa as early
2

as 1623.

His plan provided for a conference of ambassadors who

should meet at Venice and settle all the disputes which should
arise among the European monarchs.
1.

Force was to be used if nec-

Several authors of World War historiea have written long
chapters purporting to demonstrate the inherent belligerency of the French. For example, see Frederick Bausman's Let France Explain, particularly Chapters 1 and 5.
In contrast,.we have Von Moltke's statement, "Permarnent
peace is a dream, and it is not even a beautiful dre8m.
War is an element in the order of the world ordained by
God--." (S.P.Duggan, The League of Nations, quoted under
his picture opposite page 48); and in comparison to the
array of Prench names above we have only that of Immanuel
Kant, a German Jew, who or-fered the only peace plan that
came out of Germany during this period.
2. Emeric Cruct, a Pflrisian mon}e, wrote hls remar ' ,able book on
internp.tional organization, Le Nouveau Cynee, in 1623.(See
Hershey, ~. 493, and footnotes.)
---

p

/(

k~

essary to make nations fall into line.

All the kings of Europe

were to agree that they would tlswee.r to hold as inviolable law
what would be ordained by the majority of votes in the said assembly, and to pursue with arms those who would wish to oppose
~"t

• HI

I n maki ng such a proposal, Cruce' was emphatic in stating

that he was seeking no special aggrandizement for his own country:
his only concern was the establishment of universal peace.

It is

interesting to note that he was practical enough to see the necessity of using force to make recalcitrant nations keep their
covenants.

This great Frenchman was the forerunner of pacificism

through force, a principle which is still a salient feature in
F'rench foreign POllCY.

He was the one sent to prepare the paths

of peace--the voice crying out in the wilderness of war.
While Cruet was expounding his theories of an European
union, there appeared another great figure on the stage of human
affairs.

In 1625, Hugo Grotius, recognized the world over as the

Father of

~nternational

Law, published his famous work, De Jure

Belli ac Pacis--The Law of War and Peace.

This great Dutch scholar

had been forced to flee his native country because of his oolitic:al
affiliations, and es~aping from prison, he had come to Paris,
where, under the care of Louis XII, he had been able to Tinish his
monumental work on the laws of war and peace.
Grotius did not attempt to abolish war:
humanize it.

his task was to

"Violence," says he, nis characteristic of wild

beasts, and vlolence is most manifest in war; wherefore the !!lore
diligently effort should be put forth that it be tempered with
1.

See W. Ladd, An Essa.y on a Congress of Nations, introduction
by J. B. Scott, pp. xiii-xiv.

hUmanity, lest by imitatIng wild beasts too much we forget to be
human."

1

Although he recognized certain justifiable causes of

war, he appears to wish that wars could be abolished, and to this
end he provides for alliances.

He advocated the creation of a

Christian league provided with an international army made up of
national contingents.
tions.

This league was to possess coercive san-

"-_It would be advantageous, indeed in a degree necessary,"

he contends, lito hold certain conferences of Christian powers,
where those who have no interest at stake may settle the disputes
of others, and where, in fact, steps may be taken to compel parties
r·

to accept peace on fair terms.,,2

Grotius recognized the fact that

there would be nations who would not keep the peace, and he meant
to punish such offenders by armed force.
The idea of an European union with an international army
was further developed in the Grand Design of Henry IV.

3

This plan

looked forward to the establishment of a Christian republic in
Europe in which disputes would be settled amicably, and in which
war would be eliminated.
1.

2.
3.

L

There are two essential parts to Henry's

Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Book III, Chap. XXV,
Sect. II, p. 861. This work is edited by J. B. Scott,
and is in two volumes, the second being an English translation. This quotation and all those which follow are
from Volume II.
Ibid, Book II, Chap. XXIII, sect. VIII, p. 563.
There is much discussion about the true authorship of' Le
Grand Dessein. The general view seems to be that Sully,
Henry's minister, was its author, although he claims his
master conceived the project. F'or a discussion of this
controversy, see J. B. Scott's comments in his introduction to W. Ladd, An Essay on a Congress of Nations, p.xiv;
Davies, note on page 72; Henry Sedgwick, Henry of Navarre,
pp. 292-99; and Edwin Mead's comments in his introduction
to E. E. Hale, The Great Design of Henry IV, p. xi.

plan:

the first deals with the destruction of the House of Habs-

burg; and the second contains a scheme for the reconstruction of
Europe into a confederacy of nations.
After the House of

H~bsburg

had been overthrown and con-

fined to the Spanish peninsula, Europe was to be rearranged into
six hereditary monarchies, five elective monarchies, and four
l
sovereign republics--a total of fifteen States.
These State;
would form the European union, and their representatives would
Ifbe constantly assembled as a senate, to deliberate on any affairs·
which might occur, to discuss the different interests, pacify the

r

quarrels, clear up and determine all the civil, political, and religious affairs of Europe, whether within itself or with its neighbours ... 2

The larger Powers wOl)ld send four representatives, and

the smaller Powers "two, to the Senate, and the total number of
Senators would be sixty-six.

The combined forces of the league

would be under the control 6f this group of representatives of
the European governments.

The plan also providec for smaller

regional councils, possibly six in n1unber, which would handle cases
of less import, and from which such cases c')uld be carried to
the great councilor Senate.
One of the most interestinv features of Henry's plan
was its provision for effective sanctions.

~. ....

~'

A comhined army and

navy was to be established to enforce the decisions of the great
council--a real international army and navy.

Here was a prac-

ticable plan bearing the stamp of official approval of an Etlro-

1.
2.

:".;",,,:\
,

,-<".

'"

E. E. Hale, The Great Design of Henry IV, p. 33.
Ibid, p. 34.

pean king and his minister.

Hale says, "The plan contemplated

a grand army of Europe, of 320,000 men, and a navy of 120 vessels, to be provided in quotas agreed upon by the respective members of the association; and, from the beginning, the members of
the association announced that no secession was to be possible or
to be permitted.«l

According to Sully, several princes had agreed

on their contingents and were ready to undertake the first part
of the plan when the assassin's dagger ended the life of Henry.2
The Great Design died with its author.
William Penn, devout Quaker and lover of peace, took
r

up the work where Henry left it, and in 1693 he published his
plan for the peace of Europe.

He stressed the point that states,

just as individuals, must be "constrained to bound their Desires
and Resentment with the Satisfaction the Law gives. tt3 Men must
be constrained to obey laws,

si~ce

human nature is so depraved

"that without Compulsion some Wa",\T or other, too many would not
readily be brought to do wh[1t they know is right and fit, or avoid what they are satisfyfd they should not do __ • n4 Even this
great Quaker saw the necessity of pollce force to sanction law.
1.
2.
3.
4.

E. E. Hale, The Gre8t Design of Henrl IV, pp. 84-5. See
also pp. 23-4 for the list of quotas for the several
states.
Ibid, p. 42. See also Henry sedgwick, henrl of Navarre,
----Chapter XXVI, especially page 296.
William Penn, Plan for the Peace of Europe, Old South
Leaflets, Volume III, Number 75, p. 4.
.
Ibid, p. 5. The Quakers maintain there is a distinction
between force applied in a military sense and force
applied in a police sense. Killing a soldier fighting
in obedience to the commands' of his sovereign is not
the same thing as killing a burglar who malicious~y
breaks both human and divine laws. For further dlSCUSsion of this point see C. E. Merriam, A History of
American Politicsl Theories, p. 31; and Edward
Krehbiel, Nationalism, War, and Society, Introduction,
pp. xix, and xi.

He proposed a European Parliament in which all the
nations of Europe would be represented.

This body would meet

periodically to establish rules by which all the differences
smong the countries of Europe might be settled.

If any nation

refused to accept the decision handed down by the Parliament,
and resorted to arms, "all the other Soveraignties, United as
One Strength, shall compel the Submission and Performance of the
Sentence, with Damages to the Suffering Party, and Charges to
1
the Sovereignties that obliged their submission(sic).11
All
these decisions of the European Parliament would be reached by
a three-fourths majority, and its official languages would be
Latin and French. 2 Penn's plan fell upon stony ground.
The plan for some kind of European union received fresh
impetus through the efforts of the Abb~ de Saint-Pierre,3

who

took advantage of his opportunity as secretary to one of the
French plenipotentiaries to distribute his plan to 8.11 those
who attended the peace conference held at Utrecht in 1713.

He

proposed to all the Powers of Europe that they sign a Treaty of
Union and create a perpetual Congress. 4 He stressed the point
again and again that such a Union would provide perpetual peace

.

both within and without their borders, and that it would give

.,

I ..

1.
2.
3.

!
~.r

4.

William Penn, Pls.n for the P,jace of Europe, Old South Leaflets, Volume III, Number 75, p. 6 •
Ibid, page 10.
Charles Ir~n6e Castel, abb~ de Saint-Pierre, was born 1658
and died 1743. He wrote on politics and social institutions, and was elected to the Academy at Paris in
1695.
M. l'Abb6 de Saint-Pierre, Pro,jet pour rendre la Paix
Perp~tuelle en Europe, Preface, Volume I, pp. vj-viij.
This rare book wa:::. published at Utrecht in 1713.

them what all nations desired,--and still desire--absolute safety
or security.l
His plan is embodied in the proposed Treaty containing
twelve fundamental articles which can be changed only by unanimous
consent of the nations, and several other less important articles
which may be altered by a three-fourths vote. 2 The Union will begin the moment at least two Sovereigns sign the Treaty.

The

im-

portant, or fundamental, articles provide for a perpetual Union
to preserve peace, the creation of an European Congress, and the
establishment of strong guarantees of security.

An extremely im-

portant part of the Treaty is the eighth fundamental article which
forbids any member state to declare war, and provides for the
peaceful settlement of all disputes among the members of the Union.
Should any Sovereign take up arms before the Union has declared war,
or refuses to accept the decision

o~

the Congress, he "shall be

declared an enemy of the Union, and it will wage war on him, until
he shall be disarmed, and until the decision and rules be executed;
he shall pay the expenses of the war, 8.nd the terri tory which shall
be won from him shall forever be senarated from his doma1n."

3

An-

other article provided for the forcing of other States into the
Union if they refused to join it.

The richest st$es were to con-

tribute more money than the poorer States, but all were to provide
an equal contingent of troops.

Thus the pr'edominance of anyone

M. l'Abb~ de Saint-Pierre, Pro1et pour rendre la Paix
Perp~tuelle en Europe, Pre ace, Volume I, p. xij.
Ibid,
pp. 284-356: these pages contain the twelve fundamen2.
----tal articles. A translation into the English is ftruna
in J. B. Scott's introduction to W. Ladd, An Essay on
a Congress of Nations, pp. XXIV-XXVII, and in W. Evans
Darby, International Tribunals, pp. 70-97.
3. Ibid, p. 328.

1.

;:;;t>~'f~:i~;';:' ',-,

I': ":,,,-,., 1

nation in the international army· of the Union was prevented.
The sovereigns of Europe rejected this peace plan, and
refused to create an international organization.
might the course of events have been;"

"How different

Davies reminds us, "how

different the economic condition of Europe today; how much suffering and misery might have been spared to the nations; if the
emperors and diplomatists assembled in Vienna one hundred years
later had taken to heart his sage advice; if they had incorporated
in their Treaty one-fifth, nay, one-tenth, of the proposals adumbrated by Saint-Pierre."l
An illustrious compatriot, RousEeau, received the works
of Saint-Pierre from his nephew in 1754, and he set about to condense the good abbe1 s plan. 2

Rousseau,. like his predecessor, at-

tributes the original idea of an European union to Henry IV and
Sully, and he says, fI--assuredly Henry IV was not mad, nor Sully
visionary."

3

The great French

dense the work of Saint-Pierre:

philoso~er

did much more than con-

he added to it his own ideas.

Beginning with the underlying principle that the relation; between
nations is comparable to that of men without laws in a state of
nature, he attempts to develop some type of' international organization which will,uBite nations in the same was that individuals
are united under their national laws.
The Abb£ de Saint-Pierre would have had for his European
1.
2.

3.

Davies, pp. 88-9.
.
J. J. Rou~eau, Collection Complete des Oeuvres, Tome vl.ngt.
troisi~e, pP:-2-3.
In this letter, dated December 5,
1760, Rousseau says he received the manuscrips from the
Abb~'s nephew six years before.
Ibid,p. 72.

Union an international army composed of national quotas, but

...

Rousseau speaks of a great League army always ready at a moment's
notice to prevent any member or members of the League from destroying or resisting it.

This great army will constraln ambi-

tious nations, and hold them within the limits of the laws of
the confederation. l

Rousseau notes that such a league must

include the Great Powers; it must possess a great tribunal to
administer justice; and it must possess a great international
force to enforce the decisions of the tribunal and maintain peace.
In order to establish such

ac~;nfederation,

he follows the method

used by Saint-Pierre, that of proposing a Treaty which all the

•

European nations shall sign •
This Treaty contains five articles which provide for
the establishment of a permanent Congress of Eurone with an international' army.

-

The fourth article points out in no uncertain

terms who the offending nation will be--one who refuses to carry
out the decisions of the alliance, makes

prep~;rations

for war,

negotiates treaties contrary to the confederation, or takes up arms
to resist it or attack one of its members.

Such a country will

be called a 'treat y-breaker' (infracteur du Traite), and it will
be placed under the ban of all Europe and considered as an outlaw.

Here we have the first outlawry of war, and of the aggres-

sor.

The same article states that the armed forces of the confed-

eration, acting conjointly and at the common expense, will proceed
against any nation outlawed as a public enemy, until it has put
down its armE, executed the decisions and rules of the Diet, reI.

J. J. Rousseau, Collection Complete des Oeuvres, Tome vingttroisi~me,

pp. 27-8.

paired the wrongs, and paid for all the expenses of the war.
Rousseau realizes that thousands of details will arise
in connection with such a ;.cheme, but he says that is to be expected
of any plan, and that it is not necessary at the outset to answer
all the difficulties or to say how this or that will be, but that
the necessary and important pOint is to show that it can be done. l
He points out that such a confederation will provide absolute security for its members, a lightening of the burden of armament
expenditure, commercial progress, and the happlness of all peopIes.

Sovereigns who stay out of the union are blind to their real

interests, and are like a senseless pilot who IIwould rather sail
t

among the rocks during a storm, than to anchor his vessel in safeIf his project fails, it will not be because it is chimerical, but because "men are foolish, and it is a kind of madness to
be wise in the midst of foolish people. 1I3
While Europe was listening to the proposals of Rousseau,
another native of France was toiling wearily in the galleys, dreaming of some plan by which mankind might be able to live in peace.
In 1782, having served his sentence for a crime of which he says
he was innocent, Pierre-Andr~ Gargaz appeared in Paris, and presented a manuscript to Benjamin Franklin.

Too poor to pay the

expenses of a luxurious mode of travel, zealous for the cause of
Deace, he had made the journey from the mountains of Provence to
4 Thus came Forgat N,umero 13365 to Franklin who
Paris on foot.
1.
2.
4.
5.

J. J. Rousseau, Collection Complete des Oeuvres, Tome vingttroisi~me, p. 34.
Ibid, p. 65.
3. Ibid, p. 61.
J. Sparks, W~o~r~k~s~o_f__F_ranklin, Vor:-IX, p. 361.
Gargaz seemed to be proud-of this title which means Galleyslave Number 1336.

was so struck by the simple charm of the man and his plan that he
had several copies of the manuscript printed, and they were distributed to some twenty-nine representatives of other countries
in Paris. l
Gargaz

sug~ested

that each monarch should send a Media-

tor to a perpetual Congress which would meet at Lyons, or some
other convenient place, and proceed to pass judgment upon all the
differences of their masters, settling all questions by a plurality of votes. 2

He would allow each sovereign to maintain "an

invariable number of Regiments, Companies, Officers and Chaplains
for his Land and Sea services ll , but he proposed the limitation of
the construction of fortifications within countries to a distance
3
at least 2,500 "geographical paces" from the borders.
Here is
·the germ of the idea of demilitarized zones.
In reply to the objection that peace is not possible,
and that war is a sco'urge of God and cannot be avoided, he says,

•

"Experience and com:mdn sense demonstrate clearly enough to every

,

reasonable person willing to listen to them, that War is only a
very evil product of the free Will ,-": the aggressor Sovereigns;
just as Peace is an excellent product of the free 'v'lill of defendant
and pacific Sovereigns.---~-It is always true that they(aggressor
Sovereigns) are the sole authors of War, and that'they cDuld, if
they knew how and were willing, avoid it.
1.
2.
3.
4.

n4

Pier-re-Andrt Gargaz, A Project of Universal and Perpetual
Peace, p. 15. This little book contains both the English
and French texts of his peace plan.
Ibid, pp. 11-12.
Ibid, pp. 18, 19.
Ibid, p. 24.

As far as sanctions are concerned, Gargaz provided
that Heach Sovereign of the union shall furnish all the aid that
the Congress shall deem proper __ • ttl

It is safe to imply that

this aid would be in the form of both military and monetary contributions.

The international army of this proposed European

union would consist of national quotas.
1.

•

.

/

Pierre-l,ndl'e Gargaz, 11 Project of Universal and Perpetual
Peace, p. 17 •
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Chapter II
Historical--From Bentham to the World War.
In England, between the years of 1786 and 1789, the
great utilitarian philosopher Bentham was concerning himself
with the problem of world peace.

Believing that the happiest

of mankind are sufferers by war, he lays down two fundamental
propositions that shall form the basis of a plan of peace f:)r
Europe.
The first of these propositions provides for the reduction and fixation of the force of the several nations that
compose the European system; the second, the emancipation of
the distant dependencies of each state. l He thought that the
colonial systems of France and Great Britain were the source of
much war.

Upon these

im~ortant

propositions he builds fourteen

other proposals which concern chiefly the colonial and commercial
rivaly of France and Great Britain.

The thirteenth provides for

lithe establishment of a common court of Judicature for the decision of differences between the several nations, although such
court were not to be armed with any coercive powers."

2

As he

develops his plan, however, he wavers from this stand on sanctions.
Speaking of putting the refractory state under the ban of Europe,
1.

2.

Jeremy Bentham, Works, (Bowring editlon, 1843), Vol. II, p. 546.
His plan for an universal and perpetual peace is the
fourth essay in his work on The Principles of International Law, and is found on pages 540-60 of this volume. The manuscripts are dated 1786-1789.
Ibid, pp. 547, 552 •.

he admits that Ilthere might, perhaps, be no harm. in regulating,
as a last resource, the contingent to be furnished by the several states for enforcing the decrees of the court."

1

This ad-

mission is grudgingly given, and is supplemented by the statement that force might not be needed if ·there· were real liberty
of the press in each state to inform all peoples of the truth.

I"....
.

,

The gre8t utilitarian thought his plan was practicable,
and that it was time to adopt it.

Stating that the time is ripe

.~

for such a proposal, he calls upon Christianity for assistance:
"Who that bears the name of Chrlstian can refuse the assistance
of his prayers?

What pulpit can forbear to second me with its

eloquence,--Catholics and Protestants, Church-of-England-men and
Dissenters, may all agree in this, if in nothing else.

I call

upon them all to aid me with their countenance and their support. "2
Here was a practical apnlication of the philosophical teaching
of the Utilitarians and their school--the greatest good for the
greatest number--in the realm of international relations.
Over on the continent, the famous German rationalist,
Immanuel Kant, came to the assistance of Bentham, writing two
important essays upon the problem of peace.

3

Against the evils

of oppression and aggression, he cleimed "there is no possible

,.

1.

Jeremy Bentham, Works, (Bowring edition, 1843), Vol. II,

2.

Ibid, p. 546. There is also a good account of Bentham's
----proposals in W. Evans Darby, International Tribunals,

3.

The Principle of Progress, and Eternal Peace, which were
published in 1793 Stnd 1795 respectively. See Eternal
Peace, and other International Essays of Immanuel Kant,
translated by "Ii. 'Hastie, and published by the World Peace
Foundation at Boston, 1914. See also W. Evans Darby,
International Tribunals, pp. 150-163.

p. 554.

pp. 146-149.

.

•

remedy but a system of international right founded upon public
laws conjoined with power, to which every state must submit,-according to the analogy of the civil or political right of individua1s in anyone state."l

This view together with the prin-

ciple of inevitable urge towards international organiZation formed
.the basis of his peace propositions.

..."

He believed that his plan

was "founded upon the nature of things, which compels movement in
a direction even against the will of man. n2

Thus, according to

hi's view, Time in its ceaseless i'light will mold the world into a
huge international state, even against the will of men who may attempt to oppose it.
Kant argues that nations may be regarded in the same
light as men, and that limen living in a state of nature independent of external laws, by their very contiguity to each other,
give occasion to mutual injury or lesion.

Every people, for the

sake of its own security, thus may and ought to demand from any
other that it shall enter along with it into a oonstitution, in
which the right of each shall be secured.

This wOuld give rise

to an international federation of the peoples." 3

This federation

will possess a common tribunal, and Kant points out that no state
has ever been moved to desist from its purpose by arguments, and

,~

,

l~~l~')-;'

some legal restraint backed by force is necessary for the effective
working of a common tribunal. 4
1.
2.
3.
4.

W. Hastie, Eternal Peace and other International Essays of
Immanuel Kant, p. 65.
Ibid, p. 66. See also page 90.
Ibid, p. 81.
Ibid, p. 83.

The nations of Europe saw the need of such proposals
as Benthem and Kant had championed, and after the close of the
Napoleonic Wars they formed the so-called Holy Alliance in 1815. 1
The real power that kept the peace in Europe during the first part
of the nineteenth century was the Quadruple Alliance, but the
Holy Alliance with its reactionary principles overshadowed it.
Under the auspices of the Quadruple Alliance, Metternich convoked four great congresses--Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818,
Troppau in 1820, Laiback in 1821, and Verona in 1822.

These

congresses were called by the provisions in the famous Article
VI of the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, which reads:

"To

facilitate and to secure the execution of the present Treaty,
and to consolldate the connexions which at the present so closely unite the Four Sovereigns for the happiness of the World, the
High Contracting Parties have agreed to renew their meetings at
fixed periods, either under the imrr:ediate auspices of the Sovereigns themselves, or by their respective ministers, for the purpose
of consulting upon their common interests, and for the consideration of the measures which at each of these periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prospeDity of Nations,
and for the maintenance of the Peace of Europe."

2

At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, France was
received into the membership of the Quadruple Alliance, thus
1.

2.

The Holy Alliance was formed by Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and was reactionary in character. Its doctrine
of intervention was carried over into the Quadruple
and Quintuple Alliances. The three Powers above and
England. formed the Quadruple Alliance, and when France
was received into their membership it became the Quintuple Alliance. See Cambridge.Modern History, Vol. X,
p.H9; and C. J. H. Hayes, Political and Social H~story
of Modern Europe, pp. 11-13.
Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. I, p. n17.

forming the Quintuple Alliance.

At the same congress it was sug-

gested that the international army of the Alliance under Wellington should be kept at Brussels as a sort of European police force
to watch over the established order; but the British, suspecting
the reactionary designs of the autocratic members of the Alliance,
were not ready to go this far. l
The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle marked the highest pOint
reached in the dictatorship of the Concert of Powers.
came to it from all parts of Europe.

Appeals

Several of the German Sov-

ereigns sent anpeals, and Charles XIV of Sweden was forced to fulfill certain stipulations in the Treaty of Kiel upon an appeal
from Denmark. 2

Tser Alexander proposed an international fleet

in the fuediterranean to

~uppress

piracy and the slave-trade, but

Britain prevented its establishment.

The British, actlng accord-

ing to national interests, mistrusted any scheme that would bring
Russian warships into the Mediterranean.
At the Congress of Troppau in 1820, the three autocratic
members of the Alliance--Russia, Austria, and Prussia signed the
Tl<oPJaU Protocol which s2nctioned the principle of intervention.
Great Britain rejected the Protocol entirely, and the end of the
Alliance was in sight.

The next year at the Congress of Laibach,

faillng to secure the commitment of the British to the principle
of intervention, the other Powers:)roceeded to act alone.

Austria

received a mandate from the Alliance to intervene in Naples, and
an Austrian army restoreti the former rights of the King of the
1.
2.

Cambridge Modern History, Volume X, pp. 12, 18.
Ibid, p. 19.

Two Sicilies. l

.

After the Congress of Verona in 1822, a French army
under the DU.ke of Ango1Jl~e marched into Spain and restored the
autocratic Ferdinand to the throne. 2 This action was taken in
spite of a sharp protest by Great Britain, and this nation informed France that any attempt to restore Spanish dominion or
French authority in the American provinces would be followed by
war.

3

The Quintuple Alliance was drawing near its end.
On August 16, 1823, Canning aoproached Richard Rush,

American minister in London, with proposals for concerted action
by the United states and Great Bl'itain in regard to the problem
of the Spanish colonies.

Nothing came of this interview, but a

short time later President Monroe delivered his message to Congress which has since been called the Monroe Doctrine.

It aimed

at the prevention of the extension of the prlnciple of intervention
to the Western Hemisphere.

4

The :Monroe Doctrine combined with the

policy of Canning broke the back of the Quintuple Alliance, and
although another congress was called by the Allies in Paris in
1826, it accomplished nothing.

It was really the clever tactics

of Canning that split the Alliance.

He refused to attend the con-

gress called at Paris, and divided the Powers who did attend it,
especially Austria and Russia.
bers of the Holy Alliance:
1.

e

..

2.
'

3•

4.

He could truly boast of the mem-

III have resolved them into individ-

C. J. H. Hayes, Political and Social History of Modern
Europe, p. 45. (Vol. II)
Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X, p. 36.
Cambridge History of British Poreign Policy, Vol. II, p. 67.
Canning .nad succeeded Castlereagh as British Minister of
Foreign Affairs in 1822 after the latter committed sl1icide.
Ibid,pp. 71-72. There is also a cle3r explanation of the
Monroe Doctrine in Da1tid Muzzey, The United States of
America, Vol. I, p. 325.

uality.1I1

Later France joined the British in co-operation with

Russia, and the Quintuple Alliance was eplit into two camps-Great Brita.in, Russia, and France against Austria. and Prussia ...
It is interesting to note that these two groups became member's
of the twentieth century Triple Entente and Triple Alliance.
The Greek Revolution and wars of independence from
1821 to 1829 which aroused wide-spread European sympathy, and a
wave of European revolutions during 1830 in F'r-ance, Belgium, Italy,
and Poland, brought an end to the Quintuple Alliance.

These events,

coupled with the policies of Canning and Monroe, broke the back of
any successful intervention by its members.

The last effective

assertion of its principles was the intervention of Emperor Nicholas I of Russia to crush the revolt in Hungary in 1849.
Concert of Powers had come to an endj

2

The

the Balance of Powers was

in the offing.
The Quintuple AJ_liE.nce gives us three excellent examples
of the establishment of Dsace through force in nineteenth century
Europe--in Spain, Naples, and the Piedmont.
effectiveness of its a.ction.

No one can deny the

Unfortunately, however, it possessed

no definite constitution defining the duties and obligations of
its members, and it soon succumbed to the nationalistic policies
of its members.
4

•
bers, and was used to perpetuate autocracy
and to suppress liber-

alism.

,.

it collapsed with the divergence of these

interE:<sts.
2.

lo'

It survived only as long as the individual interests of

its members harmonized:

1.
I

It was a tool in the hands of its autocratic mem-

Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. II, p. 114.
Cambridge Modern HistOl'Y, Volume X, p. 39.

With the dissolution of the Quintuple Alliance, defective though it was,

~rope

plunged into new wars.

Great Britain

and l:4'rance fought the Crimean War with Russia(1854-6), ,B'rance
fOl:tght Austria(1859), Prussia fougbt Austria(186t3), and Prussia
fought France(1870-1).1

Evidently, there was need of some kind 6f

organization among the nations o.f Europe.
GermBny took the first step in the new system of organization--the Balance of Power.

After Bismarck had played badly the

role of 'honest broker' at the Congress of Derlin in 1878, spelling
the doom of the shadowy Three Emperors' League by snubbing Russia, he bound his other ally to him with bands of steel in a secret defensive alliance in 1879.

In 1882 Italy entered this group,

and rounded out the Triple AlliHnce.
somewhat the same way.

The Triple Entente began in

H'rance and Russia formed the Dual Alliance

during the years of 1891-3; lill-ance and Great Britain concluded the
Entente Cordiale in 1904; and in 1907 these two agreements blossomed into the Triple Entente.

2

Thus, Europe was organized into

two equa.l camps, and there was created an unstable condition of
equilibrium which was to topple over like

8

house of cards.

Ironically, while the BalE-nce of Power was being established in Europe, great peace movements were under way.

The In-

ternational Red Cross Society was formed a.t the Genev& Convention
of 1864, and it is estimated thpt some 160 peace societies were
formed between 1878 and 1914.
r

""
1'>, '

1.

2.

The First and Second Hague Confer-

C. J. H. Hayes, Political and Social History of Modern Europe,
Vol. II, p. 680.
Ibid, pp. 695 ff'. See alfo, G. B. Manhart, Alliance and Entente,
--for texts of the treaties of the Entente and Alliance groups.
Other references are W.L. Langer, European Alllances, and
Alignments; A.F. Pribram, Secret Treaties of Austria-Hun~; A.C. Coolidge, Origins of the Triple Alliance; and
s. B. Fay, The Origins of the World War.

snces were held in 1899 and 1907, and arbitratlon treaties grew
in number. l

How paradoxical it all seems1

While these events were transpiring on the European
continent, in America President Roosevelt faced the question of
co-ordinating international justice with international force.

In

his message to Congress, December 6, 1904, he looked forward to
the creation of an international police force.

"It is not merely

unwise, Ii he told Congress, H·it is contemptible, for a nation, as
for an individual, to use high-sounding language to proclaim its

•

purposes., or to take positions which are riciculous if unsupported
by potenti8l force, and then to refuse to provide this f'orce __ • tt2
He recognized clearly the inter-relation of the problems of security and disarmament, stating that lIuntil some method is devised
by which there shall be a degree of international control over
offending nations, it would be a wicked thing for the most civilized powers, --to disarm. 1/3

Complete disarJrlament is impossible,

he maintained, because "under any circumstances a sufficlent armament would have to be kept up to serve the purposes of international
police,fI and he looks forward to the time when "in a more advanced
stage of international relations" such a force will be established.
Roosevelt, due to his' role of peace-maker at the end of
the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, received the Nobel Peace Prize in
1906.

1.

I '.-~--'.
:

2.
3.
4.
";

..

In his speech at Kristiane in May, 1910, he was emphatic in
See Amos Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law and
Organization, pp. 89-100; C. J. H. Hayes, Political and
Social History of Modern Euro~, Vol. II, p. 684; and
W. Evans Darby, Intern8 tional T'ribun8ls t pp. 769 ff.
World Peace Foundetion, A League of Nations, Vol. I, p. 296.
Ibid, p. 28.
Ibid.

4

in regard to the establishment by the Great Powers of "a league
of peflce, not only to keep tJ:?e peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others."l

In the

same speech he pointed to the lack of both executive and pollce
power in the hague Tribunal.

"In any community of any size the

authority of the courts rests upon actual or potential force; on
the existence of a police", and "so it is with nations.

Each

nation must keep well prepared to defend itself until the establishment of :?ome form of Jnternational police power, competent
2
and willing to prevent violence as betV';een nations. tl
Several
great nations might form this league of peace, he believed, and
lithe ruler or statesman who should bring about such a combination
would have earned his place in history for all time and his title
to the gratitude of all mankind. fl3

It may not be altogether im-

probable that Roosevelt himself thought of being the Olle who should
bring about such an organization, since following his speech and due
to his influence, a World Federation League was formed in New York.
In 1914, during the early days of the War, he brought
forward a plan for an international police force which would egforce the decisions of
ness. ,,4

R

"world league for the Deace of righteous-

This league would guarantee the terr-i torial integrity of

each of its members, and would settle all disputes through an international tribunal.
1..
2.
3.

4.

11

Then, and most important," he remarked,

World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, Vol. I, p •. 29.
Ibid, pp. 29-30.
Ib id, p. 30.
Irving Fisher, America's Interest in World Peace, p. 78 •.
Davies give~ Roosevelt's plan in Appendix C, pp. 72l-~,
quoting from T. Roosevelt, 'Nhy America Should Join the
Allies, pp. 43-46.

lill
· ~·

"the nations should severally guarantee to use their entire military force, if necessary, against any nation which defied the
decrees of the tribunal or which violated any of the rights which
1n the rules it was expressly stipulated should be reserved to
the several nations, the rights to their territorial integrity
and the like." 1

As late as January, 1919, Roosevelt advocated
2
our entering the League proposed by Wilson.
The crest of public opinion reached its height in regard to the creatlon of an internatlonal force when a joint resolution was brought
Senate in 1910.

1]P

in the House of Representatives and the

This resoluti.on is as follows:

"Resolved, etc.--That a commission of five members be appointed by the President of the United ~tates to consider
the expediency of utilizing existing internatlonal agencie~
for the purpose of Ilmiting the armaments of the nations of
the world by international agreement, and of constituting
the combined navies of the world an international force for
the preservation of universal peace, and to consider and report upon any other means to diminish the expenditures of
government for ·tT!i~itary purposes and to lessen the probabilities of war." (H-J. Resolution 223)
In the discussion that followed, Mr. Bennet of New
York, who supported the resolution, pOinted out that this commissiqn might mean a considerable lightening of the tax burden
by its proposed work.
1.

2.

I
3.

Strange as it may seem, some of the very

Davies, pp. 721-2, quoting from T. Roosevelt, Why America
Should Join the Allies, pp. 44-46.
Irving Fisher, America's Interest in World Peace, p. 79.
J. B. Bishop, Theodore Roosev~l..t and Hi~ Time, Vol. II,
pp. 470-1 states that Roosevelt was diametrically opposed to a league of nations. Irving Fisher attacks
this view in his preface. See also W. R. Thayer,
Theodore Roosevelt, p. 203, and H. F. Pringle,
TheOdor.eRoosevelt, p. 603.
Congressional Record, Vol~ 45, Part 8, p. 8545. !his re~
olution is reproduced in Davies, p. 101, and 1n Martlnus
Nijhoff, War Obviated by an Internatio~a1. Pol~ce, p. 179.

,

'

men who perhaps had voted again and again large sums of money for
far less worthy projects, objected very strenuously to this resolution on the grounds that it would entail the expenditure of
some $20,000.

This objection was immediately squelched by Mr.

:B'oster of Vermont who stated that some di'stinguished American
citizens were willing to pay the expenses of the commis2ion if
Congress passed the resolution and made no appropriation.

After

much haggling by a body which some years later was to pour billions into the maw of war, the resolution Was amended in this
fa2hion:
"Provided, That the total expenses authorized by this joint
resolution shall not exceed the sum of :~lO,OOO, and that the
commission shall be required to make its final report within
two years from the date of the passage of this resolution. III
Here are real starvation wages for proponents of peaceL

Five com-

missloners working for the space of two years for the sum of $1,000
per year each, are called upon to deHl with the most difficult
problem that as ever confronted man.
Pointing out that the great defect of the Hague Tribunal
Was its inability to enforce its judgments, Mr. Bartholdt of Missouri declared, "--The world has no guarantee that some day some
nation may not refuse to bow to the judgment of that court, and
this points to the necessity of an international police force, to
be maintained by the combined nations and supolied by them in
proportion either to their population or, better still, to the
1.

Congressional Record, Vol. 45, Part 8, p. 8546. Davies
says in regard to this point, "It is a curious
psycb~logical fact that nations will willingly and
almost cheerfully bankrupt themselves in the Cause
of war, whilst they loath the idea of taxing themselves in the cause of peace.lf(Davies, pp. 483-4)

volume of their international commerce." l

He cited Roosevelt's

speech at Kristiana in which the former president had advocated
a combination of the great nations. 2
The resolution was adopted by both Houses and was signed
by 'the President on June 2B, 1910, but the commission was never
apoointed.

Taft first awaited the expressions of foreign govern-

ments in regard to their willingness to co-operate with the United
states.

Although the British gave a favorable answer to the in-

quiries of the American ambassador at London,3

~urope was in such

a hotbed of suspicion in 1~10 that such action was impossible. 4
There was no report in 1912, and the World War put a definite
stop to any further proposals.
It is interesting to note that even Senator Knox, later
a bitter enemy of the League, publicly advocated an international
federation of states with force at its command.

Speaking at the

University of Pennsylvania during the same month that the above
resolution was passed, he said, "We have reached a point when it
is evident the future holds in store a time when wars shall cease;
wle n the nations of the enrth shall realize a federation as real
and as vital as that now subsisting between the component parts
of single states, when by deliberate lnternational conjunction
the strong shall universally help the weak, and when the corporate
1.

2.
3.

4.

Congressional Record, Vol. 45, Part 8, p. 8546. The 'bareme'
method might be used to determine the quotas of each
nation, since it is based bn the relative economic
strenghth of each nation. The League uses this method
in determining the expenses of each member. Davies has
a good discussion of this method, see pp. 407-8, 516,
744-755.
See supra, pp. 29-30.
Davies, pp. 101-2.
World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, pp. 31-2., See
also Martinus Nijhoff, War Obviated by an Internatlona1
Police, pp. 182-3.

34

I"

I

I~
righteousness of the world shall compel

unrif~teousness

to dis-

sappear and shall destroy the habitations of cruelty lingering
in the dark places of the earth."l
Two American naval officers, Commander Kinkaid and RearAdmiral Goodrich, came forward with proposals for an international
navy in 1911.

The former outlined a plan by which an international

naval force would be formed by the twelve leading nations of the
world, each nation contributing an equal number of ships and men.

2

The latter proposed that real teeth be put behind the decisions of
the Hague Tribunal in the form of " a visible and powerful 801ice
force to execute them.

"All this may not happen for years to

come," declared Goodrich, "but the trend of events is in that
direction, for in it is the only practical path of advance if the
affairs of nations are 'to continue their development on lines

'~

parallel to those of the affairs of individual men--a logical and
consistent supposition.

It is hard tp believe that any of the

chief Powers could eventuallY decline to enter into such a compac t --. n3
During this same period two other famous names are added
to those who favored the use of armed force as an international
sanction.

Dr. Nicholas Murray
. . Butler, President of Columbia

University, stated that flso long as human nature remains human--

I.

~

the world at large will require an internatione.l police;--constituted of armies and navies .,,4
1.

Andrew Car:1egie, the great peace

C. A. Berdahl, The Policy of the United states with respect
to the League of Nations, p •.26.
2. Martinus Nijhoff, War Obviated by an International Police
Force, pp. 159-60.
3. Ibid, p. 171.
4 • . N. M. Butler, The International Mind, pp. 9-10.

•
advocate, speaking at the Palace of Peace in 1913, said, after
proposing an association of nations, "These great powers should
then engage to act in concert against disturbers of the World's
Peace, if any such should present himself which would hardly be
possible from the moment when such an association as I have mentioned became an accomplished fact." 1 Truly the period between
the years of 1910 and 1916 was the golden age of American approval
of armed sanctions to maintain peace.
The idea of

co~rcion

was carried a step further when

the League to Enforce Peace was organized at Philadelphia, and
held its First Annual Assemblage in

Wa~hington,

on May 27, 1916.

2

Ex-President Taft was the president of the League, and President
Wilson gave his approval to the movement by addressing the first
meeting.

The League included among its membership E'ome of the

most influential citizens of the United States.
President Wilson spoke these words at the first meeting
of the League:

"I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the

people of America when I say that the United states is willing to
become a partner in any feasible aSEociation of nations

for~ed

order to realize these objects and make them secure against
tion---.

in

viola~

I came only to avow a creed and give expression to the

confidenGe I feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a
great consummation, when some common force will be brought lnto
existence which shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interest of all neop1es r-:nd all governments, when coercion
shall be summoned not to the service of poljtical ambition or
1.
2.

Martinus Nijhoff, War Obviated by an International Police
Force, p. 185.
World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, Vol. I, p. 39.

.

•
selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a common
justice and a common peace."

1

One of the greatest presidents of

the United States thus gives the stamp of approval to the principle of "common force", "coercion", and flcommon peacert--in short,
an international pollce force.
The program of the League to Enforce Peace was embraced

.

·IIJ

. ,..

in kind of draft treaty containing four articles which all the
nations of

t~e

world should sign.

These articles provided for

the judicial settlement of all disputes, a council of conciliation,
economic and military sanctions, and the codification of International Law. 2 The third article, the important coercive one,
provides that lithe signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith
both their economic and military forces against anyone of their
number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against
another

01'

the sirmatories before any question arieing shall be

submitted as provided in the foregoing.,,3

The Executive Committee

of the League declared that "it has ben the general experience
of mankind that sanctions are placed behind public organs of order
as soon as confidence in their usefulness is established.

This

article makes that provision respecting methods of arbitration
and conciliation.,,4 The Committee noted that ln the past "the
1.
2.

3.
4.

World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, Vol. I, p. 39.
See also Robert Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace,
pp. 93-4.
For the full text of these four articles, see R:)bert Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace, Preface, 9p. xx-xxi;
and C. A. Berdahl, The Policy of the United States with
respect to the League of Nations, pp. 28-9. Also P. C.
Jessup,
arican Neutralit and International Police,
p. 159(Wor
eace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol. X , No.3,
1926~ •
Robert Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace, Preface, pp. xx-xxi.
World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series, Vol. VI, No.6, December 1916, pp. 17 fr.

employment of such devices has been difficult because nations unconcerned with the disputes were under no obligations to assent to
restrictions tt and that the League to Enforce Peace "proposes to
correct thJ.· s defect b y prov i dng
i ·J.n e. d vance f
. t' ac t lone ttl
or·JOJ.n
These proposals were endorsed ty

:~~enator

the Republican leader in the Senate at that time.

Lodge who was
In an address

before a convention of the League in 1916, he said, ttl think the
next step is that which this League proposes and that is to out
force behind international peace, an international league or agreement, or tribunal, for peace.---It was 'a year ago, that in delivering the Chancellor's address at Union College, I made an argument on this theory, that if we were to promote international
peace at the close of the present terrible war, if we were to restore international law as it must be restored, we must rind some
way in which the united force of the nations could be put behind
the cause of peace and law. . I said then that my hearers might
think that

.1

was picturing a Utopia, but it was in the search for

Utopias that grc.,at discoveries have been made.
low aims is the crime. lt2

Not failure, but

Is it not strange that this man later

advanced these very same arguments against the League of Nations,
declaring that it was too dangerous and entangling, and that it was
only an utopian dream of an impractical idealist?3
1.
2.
3.

World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series, Vol. VI, No.6, December 1916, p. 20.
C. A. Berdahl, The POliCr of the United states with respect
to the League of Nat ons, pp. 31-32.
Ibid, p. 32. Berdahl says that his change of heart does not
alter the fact that when he endorsed the program of the
League to Enforce Peace, he was speaking as the responsible leader of his party in the United States Senate,
and of his party in the country.

It is clear that the League to Enforce Peace looked forward to the creation of an international army.

Speaking in support

of the League, and in opposition to William Jennings Bryan, Taft
answers the objection that the United states would have to maintain
a large army to perform her obligations under the third article of
the League's program, by pointing out that we would not need a
large army since we would be one of many contributors to the Joint
force. l

Continuing, he said, "Now there are many who .say that

they are not in favor of this plan but they are in favor of an

..

international police force.

Well, what is the difference?

We do

not claim 8ny patent on this plan and. are quite willing to call
it an international police force, but it must be constitutea in a
practical way, and when the joint forces are united and are doing
the police duty of the world, it is true to say that they are not
carrying on war, but enforcing peace.---I do not think that we
have reached the time when force, as an aid to moral impulse, can
be dispensed with.«2
In the great Victory Program of the League to Enforce
Peace, adopted at a meeting of the Executive Committee held in
New York, November 23, 1918, it was declared that their proposals
would "ensure peace by eliminating cauees of dissention, by deciding controversies by peaceable means, and by uniting the potential force of ell the members as a standing menace against any
nation that seeks to upset the peace of the world."
1.
.'"

2.
3.

3

This VictCll'y

International Conciliation Pamphlets, No. 106, september
1916, pp. 237-8 •
Ibid, pp. 238, 241.
Iii'ternational Conciliation Pamphlets, No. 134, January
1919, p. 16.

F

Program was also adopted by the League of Free Nations Association
of New -J::ork. l
The Executive Committee of the League pointed to the
Supreme War Council of the Allies as a precedent for the organization of an international force, and to the Allied Naval Council
2
organized along simila.r lines.
In view of these examples it
declared that "organization of the 'major force of mankind' to
secure compllance with the law would be a very slmple matter __ • u3
America, however, was not alone in demanding some kind
of an international organization.

Several distinguished men in

Holland advocated the same idea.

Professor Vollenhoven of Leyden

University, addressing a Peace Congress at the hague in 1913,
stressea the fact that too often large national armies and navies
maintained for defensive purposes become aggressive.

"There is no

better means of rooting out this criminal appetite,1I he argued,
"than to root out the very instrument now at its disposal, that
is to say, to repla.ce the present national armaments by an international force.,,4
Baron Van Asbeok, of the Royal Dutch

~avy,

brought for-

ward a scheme for an international navy, in which all the lndividual powers should place their fleets under the mandate of the internation~l

authority.

A Dutch military officer, Lt.-Gen. J. C. C.

Den Beer Poortugael, a former Minister of War, rounded out van As-

e

1.

International Conciliation Pamphlets, No. 134, LTanuary

2.

Basis of Perml:iUent Peace, p. 12. This little pamphlet was
publi::hed by the League to Enforce Peace, W. H. Taft,
President, New York.
Ibid.
Martinus Nijhoff, War Obviated by an International Poll·ce
Force, p. 80. See also Davies, pp. 108-110.

1919, p. 18.

jfI>

3.

4.
~~

becks naval proposal by a like one for an international army.
This great international army would be under the control of a
permanent court of arbitration, or a special court composed of
statesmen nominated by the various national governments. l
Davies tells us of the formation of the L~ague to Abolish
War in Great Britain in 1916. 2 Its great principle was the establishment of

~n

international police force.

This English writer,

whose book is most comprehensive on the subject of E.n international
police, says of Herbert Stead, a founder of the League to Abolish
War, "Herbert Stead, founder of the Browning Settlement, was an
ardent and disinterested adv.ocate of peace, but he never wavered
in his conviction that without international sanctions treaties,
pacts and conventions were powerless to avert the crime of aggress i ve war. "3

Another prominent member of this League, G. N. Barnes,

was a member of the War Cabinet, and

9.

delegate to the Paris Peace

Conference of 1919, and had much to do ~ith the formation of the
International Labor Organization.

He gave voice to the ideals of

British Labor in a speech before the Peace Conference on February
14, 1919, after the sanctions proposed by the French and Italians
had been rejected in the framing of the Covenant, by saying, " __ I
•

"II"

should have been glad to have seen some provision for the nucleus
of Gn international force which would be ready to strike against
an aggressive nation.,,4
1.
2.
3.
4.

Even at the present time British Labor

For the proposals of these men, see Martinus Nijhoff, War
Obviated by an International po~ice Force, pp. 83-107.
See also Davies, pp. 105-110.
Davies, p. 113.
Ibid.
D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. II, p.575.

still calls for an international police force. l
The League to Abolish War sent a delegation headed by
Barnes to the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, in 1920 in regard to
sanctions.

Lloyd George and Balfour side-tracked the issue on

the grounds that no perfect scheme was offered, arguing that the
military commitments of the Great Powers were already so burdensome that none of them could spare any forces for the service of
the League of Nations.

IIThis interview,u remarks Davies, lIaffords

an illustration of the casual manner in which our rulers dispose
of these vital problems. u2 Colonel House spoke in a disparaging
manner of a peace delegation of ladies who visited him, and he
seems to chuckle in glee over getting them into an argument with
themselves. 3
There was a prolific outburst of writing on the subject
of an international force during this period.

In America there

appeared many documents for the organization of a world federation. 4
Another.writer suggests two proposals for the maintenance of peace
wf,en the War shall end; namely, the establishment of a Supreme
Court of Europe to settle all disputes, and the creation of an
internationf'l force subject to the orders of this Court.

He claims

that his plan seems to "prudent men, who try to base their reasoning about the future on past and present facts, the most promising
1.

~

:fA

"-

2.
3.
4.

A Laborite motion presented in the House of Commons in November 1933 was rejected after a bitter debate by the vote
of 409-54. The seventh point under this motion called
for the creation of an international police force.(See
the UP dispatch in Louisville C0'!:lrier-Joul'nal, No.v. 14,
1933)
Davies, p. 114.
C. Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. II, p. 96.
'rwo of these are interesting: A Constitution for the United
Nations of the Earth, by Edgar Brinkerhoff; and Magnissima Charta--The Great Solution, by Henri La ~ontaine.

method of protecting Europe from the recurrence of such a catastrophe as it is now experiencing. nl This author was writing in 1914.
A few years later, another American urged a program for
his country to present when the War should close.

It included a

World Tribunal whose decisions shcluld be enforced by an ·international army and navy.
prabtical.

He stoutly defends such a scheme as being

We have already seen the action of leagues in the past

to maintain pef'ce, he recalls, and tlit cannot, therefore, be said
that a proposition to combine the forces of nations against an
aggressor is a novelty in human history.fI 2
From this sketch of the events leading up to the close
of the World War, and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, it is
clear that there was a definite sum of public opinion in the
United States and in other countries in favor of real sanctions
for the proposed League of Nations.

It is extraordinary how such

public opinion was undermined by opponents of the League.
1.

2.

C. W. Eliot, An International Force must support an International Tribunal, published by the American Society
for the Judicia.l ;:settlement of International Disputes,
Pamphlet No. 19, December 1914, p.o. 3-4.
Everett P. Wheeler, A World Court and International Police,
published by the Alney·ican Society for the Judicial
Settlement of International Disputes, Pamphlet No. 26,
August 1916, p. 11.
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Chanter III
The It'rench plan for a League of ~;ations--j\.dmini8tration.
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Chapter III
The French plan for a League of Nations--Administration.
The loss of life and the cost of the World War has
never been accurately determined.

Various estimates, both mod-

erate and immoderate, have been advanced.

Reliable observers

have estimated the direct loss of life at approximately ten milliJn, the indirect at thirty-five million; and the direct cost
at $186,000,000,000, the indirect at $355,291,719,815.

1

The French bore the brunt of this staggering loss.

..

'l'ney saw their rich mining region of the north destroyed, their
t~wns

and villages laid waste, and their youth sacrificed at the

al~ar

of Mars.

They saw the introduction of new and horrible

meFhods of warfare, especially the use of poison gas.

Scientists

ali over the world were discovering new poisonous gases at an
alarming rate of speed.

2

France wanted no more war.

As early as 1916, when the war was still in progress,
PrAsldent Poincar~asserted his nation's "horror of war and its
p~ssionate devotion to those policies which would prevent any re-

turn of the conditions that now prevailed--. tl3
th~

In the same speech

President of France laid down three conditions of peace.
,

These

,

were the complete restitution of invaded French terr5tory includ-

~.

2.

3.

World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, Vol. IV, April
1921, No.2, p. 215.~e direct loss of life are the
actual losses of the War: the indirect loss of life includes the loss due to the declining birth rate and the
increasing death rate caused by the War. Likewise, the
indirect monetary loss is an estimation of the losses of
the ships and commerce of neutrals, the capitalized value
of human life destroyed, and t~e official reparations determined by the Reparations Commission.
See V. Lefebure, Scientific Disarmament, pp. 204-15; Fenner
Brockway, The Bloody Traffic, pp. 233 ff.; S. Madariaga,
Disarmament, pp. 187-98; and Frances Boeckel, The Turn
Toward Peace, pp. 26-9.
Cosmos, The Basis of Durable Peace, p. 36.

ingAlsace-Lorraine, adequate reparations for destruction of
property and violence to French citizens, and an international
guarantee of national security in the future. l For the French
the sine qua non of their program was the last point--national
security,2 and their plan for a League of Nations was built around this fundamental point.
No one Gan understand French foreign policy unless he
recognizes the underlying 9rinciple of national safety, or security, which permeates it.

The question of security runs like

a silver thread through all the dealings of the Quai d'Orsay with
other nations.

French security is a logical result of both her

geographical position and her

~ast

history.

An American delegate

,

to the Paris Peace Conference recognized quite clearly the peculiar
situation of the French.

"France," he says, "with forty millions

of people and a decreasing birth-rate, lying next to Germany with
seventy millions of people and an increasing birth-rate, required
one thing--safety; a guaranty that she might go on living as a
nation.,,3

Frank Simonds, a noted w:rl!iter on European affairs, gives

a clear explanation of the French view of security:

"Twice invaded.

in less than half a century, France had, as a consequence of the
first invasion,lost two flourishing provinces.

As a result of the

second, she had seen ten of her richest departments reduced to
ruins.

For the French people, on the morrow of the Armistice,

therefore, the first condition of acceptable peace was that they
1.
2.

3.

Cosmos, The Basis of Durable Peace, p. 36.
See R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. II,
p. 16, where he says, "Security, however, is always first
on the French programme--ahead of reparations." See also
F. Simonds, How Europe Made Peace Without America, pp., 92-3;
and Denys Myers, World Disarmament, pp. 69-70, especially
. note 1 on page 69-.-'
W. A. White, Woodrow Wilson, p. 399.

should have permanent guarantees against a third attack.

This

was the primary condition of continued national existence."l
This characteristic French policy is a natural one
based upon past and present history.

America, bounded on the

east and west by vast stretches of water, on the north and south
~y

relatively weak nations, secure behind her powerful navy, hyp-

ocritically points at the selfish policy of French security.

She

is seconded by Britain, another Power surrounded by stretches of
water and possessing one of the most powerful navies of the world.
It was the attitude of these two Powers which was to reject the
French proposals for a League of Nations, and which was to drive
the French back into the old system of alliances that had been
one of the chief causes of the World War.
With this background in mind we can proceed to the discussion of the French plan for a League.

The last of Wilson's

Fourteen Points enunciated on January 8, 1918, provided for the
creation of a "general

a~sociation

of nations--for the purpose of

affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. tt2 With the
prospect of victory the French set about to formulate their plan,
and before the Peace Conference met for the first time on January
18, 1919, it was completed.
1.

2.
3.

3

F. Simonds, How Europe Made Peace Without America, pp. 92-3.
See the same author's, Can Euro~e Keep the Peace?, pp. 154-6.
He says that French policy can e summed np in one word-security. For a German view of French security, see
R. Schmidt & A. Grabowsky, The Problem of Disarmament,
pp. 113-21.
C. J. H. Hayes, Political and Social History of Modern Europe,
Vol. II, pp. 763-4. See also Hershey, pp. 125-31.
D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. I, p. 10.
The French plan was drawn up during the summer of 1918.
It bears the date of June 8, 1918, and was in the hands
of Mr. Miller, a member of the American group, during the
summer of that year. See also W. A. White, Woodrow Wilson, p. 402.

The French Ministerial Commission that drew up the French
draft hoped to secure two results; first, "to protect the world
in the future against any recurrence of the employment of brute
force and attempts on the part of any nation to obtain universal
supremacy, It and secondly, "to e.stablish the reign of justice on
.

sure foundations throughout the world."

-

,..

dations" must be emphasized.

1

These words "sure foun-

Since the days when Saint-Pierre

"" / suffisante for
had advocated the use of force to guarantee surete
the members of his league,2

the French had sought for some means

of guaranteeing their national safety, and the national safety of
all those who would become members of their proposed league.

By

their attempt to describe this league that was to be formed as a
"contractual and permanent organization" it may be seen that they
wished an organization with clearly-defined duties and obligations.
Only with such definitions could the nations of the world "exclude
the existence of a mere dangerous truce and guarantee real peace."

3

The French wer·e accused again and again of attempting
to set up an international stete which would wipe out the sovereign
rights of its members.

The American and English delegated opposed

the plan on this ground.

White, one of the American delegates, re-

garded it as an attempt to estAblish a "superstate with a superarmy
and a superstaff--. tt4

Lansing, another delegate, even opposed the

guarantees later adopted in Article 10 of the Covenant; he was cer1.

2.
3.
4.

See Official French Plan for a League of Nations, Part I,
section 1. The text of this plan is found in R. S. Baker,
Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. III, Document 17,
pp. 152-162; D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant,
Vol. II, pp. 238-246; and an abridged reproduction in
World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, Vol. IV,
August 1921, No.4, pp. 340-342. The text is reproduced
in this thesis in Appendix I.
See supra, p. 14.
Official French Plan, Part I, section 1.
W. A. White, Woodrow Wilson, p. 402.

tainly not in favor of the French scheme. l

The English delegation
stood with the Americans in regard to this interpretation. 2
The French, however, state emphatically that "the object of the League of Nations shall not be to establish an international political State.

It shall merely aim at the maintenance

of peace by substituting Right for Might as the arbiter of disputes.

.
,.

It will thus guarantee to all States alike, whether small or great,
the exercise of their sovereignty.n 3 Much, of course, hinges upon
the meaning of the word "sovereignty".

It seems that modern states
have the habit of referring to the classical definition of Bodin 4
and his school of absolute thought when they wish to avoid international organization.

In practise such a position is untenable,

since every treaty or agreemEnt made between nations limit their
action to a certain extent.
Davies devotes an entire chapter to the discussion of
sovereignty.

He says, "Clearly, in the international sense no

nation is supreme:

in other words, it does not exercise sover-

eignty over its neighbours.

However confusing it may be, the idea

of sovereignty appears to have been imported from the sphere of domestic politics and suddenly pitch-forked into the international arena.----Aided and abetted by a fanatical nationalism, this con-

I

I
I~

ception of the sovereign State is based uoon the absolutism of
1.

-,.
2.
3.
4.

H. W. V. Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, Vol. VI,
446. R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement,
Vol. I, p. 228, says, "Even more strongly than House,
Lansing was opposed to the use of force as a sanction
for the authority of the League over recalcitrant members."
F. Morley, A Society of Nations, p. 14.
Official French Plan, Part I, section 2.
F'. W. Coker, Readings in Political Philosophy, p. 230. Bodin
defines sovereignty as "supreme power over c.itizens and
subjects, unrestrained by laws." Davies, p. 191, says
this idea has been carried over into international relations. Sovereignty has a double aspect--internal and external. See also Hershey, pp. 175-6, and notes.

'It·

self-defence, unrestricted competition and a complete denial of
the right use of force, all of which express the negative aspects
of international sovereignty.Hl

Under his classification of states,

Hershey points out that in confederacies, or leagues of states,
even though the Union has organs and functions of its own, including the conduct of foreign affairs, "each state remains otherwise sovereign and independent, and also enjoys international
2
personality.tt
After citing several instances under which the

..

sovereignty of a state is limited, the same writer concludes,
"It is generally held that the above limitations or restraints
are not legal restrictions on sovereignty on the grounds that
they are mere delegations of power, or that they do not really
bind the will or power of the sovereign who has thus freely chosen
to bind himself through auto-limitation or auto-determination.,,3
Among these limitations on sovereignty are treaties of alliance,
guarantee, and mutual aid.

contention that their plan did not limit the sovereignty of national states rests upon substantial grounds.
Al though the French re,varded the scope of their proposed
League as universal, they were not ready at that time to admit their
enemies to its membership.

They were not alone in this respeat,
4
however, for their allies stood with them.
Only states which
"solemnly undertake to be bound by certain rules in order to main1.
2.
3.
4.

,

~);i~'~;i,:,

Thus, it would seem that the French

'

Davies, p. 191.
Herspey, p. 180.
Ibid, p. 177. See also, E. C. Mower, International Govern----ment, Chap. VI, pp. 109-123.
Louisville Courier-Journal, January 25, 1919.

. ··'111.

peace---and provided with representative institutions such as
will permit their being themselves considered responsible for
the acts of their own Governments"l would be eligible to enter
the League.
The League of Natlons was to be composed of two bodies-the International Council, and the Permanent Delegation. 2

Every

State i,n the League was to be represented in the International
Council, which was to meet yearly in ordinary proceedure, but
whd.bh could be called into extraordinary session upon request of
any member or the Permanent Delegation.

The latter organ of the

League would be the same kind of an organ as the present Secretariat
of the League of Nati'ons, and would consist of 15 members chosen
by the Council.

Its duties would be to receive all communications

destined for the Council, prepare reports, keep the archives,
send cut notices to members of the Council, and propose the calling of special meetings.
Although the International Council was not to be a superstate imposed upon the nations of the world, it was to possess real
power.

It would be constantly on the alert to maintain peace by
3
"constant vigilance and the exercise of sufficient a:uthority.n

This authority would be derived from the reciprocal undertakings
,

I~
I

given by each of the member states to use thmir economic, naval,
and military power in conjunction with other members against any
nation contravening the Covenant of the LeRgue.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Official French Plan, Part I, section 3.
Ibid, Part V.
Ibid, Part IV.
Ibid.

4

The French sincerely believed that the public opinion
of the world demanded that a strong league be created, a league
capable of holding recalcitrant nations in check through force

.

if necessary.l

It was the idea of effective and powerful sanc-

tions in the French proposals that caused an American delegate
at the Peace Conference to declare that "their conception was

,..,.

that the League should be a superstate with a superarmy and a
superstaff which should always be ready to scare the superdaylights
out of Germany if she began mobilizing on the French frontier."2

...

It was true--and natural--that France feared a strong Germany on
her border, but this criticism with its recurring use of highsounding prefixes strikes at the very foundation of international
organization.

Furthermore, if such a league could maintain peace

between France and Germany, it would have an excellent chance to
maintain peace among all the other nations of the world.
The International Council shall be clothed with the
power to organize an International Tribunal before which all disputes among the members of the League may be settled amicably.

3

The Council shall attempt to settle any· dispute that arises by
means of mediation, and failing in this step, it shall refer the
matter to the International Tribunal, provided that the question
is of a legal nature. 4
1.

2.
3.
4.

If the dispute is not of a legal nature,

Charles Eliot in reviewing the book War Obviated by an International PoLice, by Martinus Ntjhoff, said, liAs the
War drags on, two facts become ciearer and clearer:
first, that competition in armaments, and therefore periodic war, will go on, unless a firm league of nations
competent to prevent war by force can be created when
the war ends; and secondly, that this indispensable league
need not contain any large number of nations."(American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, 1915, p. 760)
W. A. White, Woodrow Wilson, p. 402.
.
Official French Plan, Part I, section 4, paragraph (1).
See Hershey, pp. 457 ff. Disputes of a legal na~ure are those
to which more or less clearly established prlncip~e~ of
International Law can be applied: those of a polltlcal
nature are not m vered by such principles.

it shall be decided by the International Council.

This provi-

sion covers all disputes, both justiciable and non-justiciable;
the first being settled by the Tribunal, and the second by the
Council.

The Tribunal receives its cases from two sources:

first, the Council may decide that e dispute is of a legal or
justiciable nature, and may submit the dispute to it for a de-

.

".

...

cision; secondly, any member state may submit a dispute with
another State to it. l The Tribunal shall have power to decide
questions of law a.t issue between states "on the

basis of custom

or of international conventions, as well as of theory and jurisprudence", and in case of violations of International Law "it
shall order the necessary reparation and sanctions."

2

The International Council shall have power to enforce
its decisions and those of the International Tribunal.

At its

demand "every nation shall be bound, in agreement with the other
nations, to exert its economic, naval, and military power against
any recalcitrant nation.,,3

The French plan by this provision

gives effective and sure sanctions to the action of the Council.
It does not advise or recommend a certain line of action in a
given case, but it demands that the member states join in common
accord against the offending nation, and to use all the power that
they possess to maintain the peace of the world.
This part of their plan is the rock upon which all
1.

2.
3.

schemes~

Official French Plan, Part I, section 5. See M. O. Hudson,
The World Court, World Peace Foundation Pamphlet, Vol.
XI, No.1, 1928, p. 105. '£he statute of the Woy"ld Court
cites as legal disputes, (a) The interpretation of a
Treaty; (b) An~uestionof I~ternatio~al ~aw; (c>. The
existence of ~ny fect which, lf establlshed, woula constitute • breach of an international obligation; and
(d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made
for the breach of an international obligation.(Art. 36)
Official French plan, Part I, section 5.
Ibid, Part If section 4, paragraph (4).

-----

------------------------------------------

of international organization sulit.

Most nations are unwilling

to sacrifice, or limit, their sovereignty by placing their military forces, at the command of an international authority.

Wil-

son opposed the French proposals for a supervisory military commission, declaring that "no nation will consent to control-Americans--cannot--because of our Constitution.«l

.

He was the

president of the Commission appointecL to draft a Covenant for

'"

the League of Natlons, and, together with the British delegates,
led the fight against the French plan for a League. 2

Nationallsm

and Sovereignty, those twin enemies of vlOrld peace, combine at all
tim~s

to prevent any real durable world association.

"Unless the

desire for peace,rt says a writer on international government, "and
the degree of confidence in the similar desire of other nations
are strong enough in the proposed members of the League to induce
them to undergo a self-denying ordinance in the employment of military and naval forces, and to consent to place these forces at
the disposal of an International Executive for the preservation
of world peace, it seems unlikely that any treaty they may enter
will possess enduring power.----Never and nowhere has it been
found possible for a human association to dispense with the power
to compel its members to observe its
attempted it has failed."

laws.

Whenever this has been

3

The French plan intended to place a restraint upon the
members of their proposed league.

,

""'./

~

'1.
2.

D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. II, p~ 293.
and World
Settlement, Vol. I,
R. S. Baker , Woodro-w Vlfllson
.---------p. 280.
J. A. Hobson, Tow~rds Inte~national_Government, pp. 85-6.
,

/'

3.

The present League of Nations

is organized on the basis of a Confederacy with the member states
retaining practically all their sovereign powers;
real executive power, no sheriff, no police force.

l

This oonfed-

erate character of the League tends to emphasize the approach to
problems from a netionelistic standpoint.
of world peace states the case plainly.

·

...

i .. '

A writer on the question
"There is only one thing

that will make war forever impossivle between nations," he claims,
"and that is the centralizing of their armed forces under the con-·
trol of a

r~presentative

world organization, the prohibition of all

naval and air forces to the 8ember states, and the restriction of
their land forces to the normal requirements of an itt.ernal police.
A federation of nations is the minimum of world organization under
which

thi~

unification of armed forces, which is absolutely neces-

sary for effective 'common action' to enforce international obligations, can be eftected.

At the same time a federation of nations

preserves to the member states the largest measure of independence
and autonomy in the management of their domestic affairs that is
consistent with the abolition of international war.,,2

The B'rench

plan contemplated the establishment of this kind of a League of
Nations whose form would be more of a federal nature than a confederate one.

The French clearly expressed their willingness to

be bound in a federal world organiz8tion along with other nations,
a willingness which was lacking among the Anglo-Saxon delegates at
the Paris Peace Conference.

3

The French plan provides for the maintenance of peace at
1.

i
~

there is no

2.
3.

Oscar Newfang, The Road to Peace, pp. 25, 279-81, and passim.
See also A. W. Spencer,·· O~ganization of Internat~onal Force,
Amer. Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, p. 40. He says
that force is necessary in the establishment of international
law just as it is in all other law.
Oscar Newfang, The Road to Peace, p. 327.
D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. II, pp. 296-7.

all times.

With the creation of the proposed league, there would

be three instances of trouble.

First, peace must be maintained

among the member states; secondly, peace must be maintained between any member state and non-member states; and thirdly, peace
must be maintained by preventing the spread of conflicts among nonmember states to member states.

The French plan attempts to de-

fine the duties and functions of the International Council in regard to all these possibilities.
In order to keep peace among its members, the Council
shall use and develop the legal institutions created at the Hague,
and in addition, shall organize another permanent international
tribunal. l Should any dispute arise between member states the
judicial machinery swings into action.

If neither of the dis-

put ant states is willing to submit the dispute to the Council,
third States may ask the Council to intervene.
draft does not stop here.

But the French

Should no state ask the Council to set-

tIe the dispute which is menacing the peace of the League, the
Council itself "shall be bound to take the initiative as regards
such settlement.,,2

It may begin its work by dispatching a com-

mission of inquiry with power to investigate, gather material,
and report the facts of the dispute.
1.

"

2.

Such commissions had been

It must be admitted that the French plan is somewhat vague
in regard to the judicial machinery of its proposed
league. It speaks of the Hague, a Court of International
Jurisdiction, and an International Court. PossiblY the
latter two terms refer to the same court, and is tm international tribunal mentioned in Part I, section 4, paragraph (1) of the French plan. If this view is correct,
it corresponds to the" action that was taken by the members of the Commi8sion who drew up the Covenant providing
for the creation of a Permanent Court of International
Justice--the World Court.(Art. 14) It must be remembered
that the French plan is only a rough outline that was never
discussed in the meetings of the Commission, and therefore
these vague provisions were not clarified. "
Official French Plan, Part IV, section (i), paragraph 2.

au· .

provided for the Hague Court. l

The Council may dispense with

the commission of inquiry, and use its good offices and mediation,
or remind the disputants that the Hague is open to them.

If all

these attempts to settle the dispute fail, the Council shall take
steps leading to a certain settlement.

It shall decide whether

the question is of a legal nature, in which case it shall then
Horder the disputant states to submit their difference t® the
Court of International Jurisdiction.,,2

The decision of this In-

ternational Court shall be enforced by the Council, if necessary,
by resorting to diplomatic, legal, economic, and military sanctions. 3
The French plan contemplated, thus, the creation of a
World Tribunal whose decisions should bear real weight, inasmuch
as the united force of the League would be behind them.

It is

the kind of court that has already been established within nations,
and which has been the only means of maintaining internal order.
Many American peace societies had advocated the establishment of
such a court before the Paris Peace Conference met.

4

liThe prob-

.

lem of the right use of force," Davies reminds us, Ifl~as still to
/

be solved in the realm of international relationships.
of the Covenant evaded the issue.

I

The framers

They refused to recognize that

amongst al·l ci'Ji1ised and democratic communities force can only be

il.~

:1

morally expressed in the performance of a police function.

They

failed to distinguish between this function and the right of self,
-'

1.

V~/
•

2.
3.
4.

J. B. Scott, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899
and 1907, pp. 45 ff. See also Hershey, np. 461 ff. for
a discussion of commissions of inquiry.
Official French Plan, Part IV, section (i), paragraph 4 •
These sanctions are discussed in the ·following chapter.
E. P. Wheeler, A World Court and International police, American Society for the Settlement of International Disputes,
Pamphlet No. 26, Aur:ust 1916, pp. 15-16. See also sU1)ra,
the last part of Chapter II.

defence.

Consequently, their. projected scheme of disarmament was

still-born, and the right to make war remains. nl .
. If the dispute between member states is not of a legal
nature, the International Council shall deal with the question
"directly.

It shall at first proceed along friendly lines by of-

fering mediation.

Should this method fail, it shall them proceed

to "define the terms according to which the dispute shall be settled in a manner which shall respect the rights of each state and
the maintenance of peace. n2

After having reached a decision whic.q.

it considers just, the Council shall notify the states concerned,
and call upon them to accept the decision.

At this stage

of~

the

process, the dispute is considered as being between all the members of the League and the member which refuses to accept the decision.

nShould the

St~e

concerned refuse to accept the decision

after having been summoned to do so, the International Council
shall notify to it the coercive measures of a diplomatic, legal,
economic, or military nature to be taken against it within a
specified time. n3

Here is an international executive body which

has the power to demand the settlement of all disputes, either by
means of its own decisions, or those of the courts, and to enforce
all these decisions reached.
The Interp.ational Council shall also have the power to
settle all disputes between a member state and non-member

states.

It shall first attempt to settle the dispute in an amicable manner
by using all possible means of conciliation.
1.

2.
3.

F'ailing in such at-

Davies, p. 358. See his entire chapter on liThe Right use of
Force", pp. 340-358.
Official French Plan, Part IV, section (i), paragraph 6.
Ibid.

tempts, it will decide what further steps shall be taken, and
shall place all the forces of the League at the disposal of the
member State if no settlement is reached. l
In disputes and conflicts between non-member States the
International Council is bound to prevent their extension to concern members of the League.

It is difficult to localize wars be-

cause of the ramifications of commerce, and the interdependence of
nations, and there would be f.ew instances in which such conflicts
would not menace the peace of an international organization. In
such a case, the International Council shall be bound to use all
its power to prevent the extension of these conflicts, and to use
its influence to settle them in a peaoeable manner.

2

Thus all possible disputes are provided for in the French
plan for a League. of Nations.

There is, however, one important

point on which the draft is silent; namely, the question of voting
in the International Council.

The plan provides for representation

of all Sta; es on the Council, but it does not say whether these
decisions shall be reached by a ma.iority, three-fourths, or unani'mous vote.

Of oourse, if the alan had been discussed by the Com-

mission which drew up the Covenant, these defects could have been
corrected.
1.

2.

Official French Plan, Part IV, section (ii).
Ibid, Part IV, section (iii).

ri'he }'rencb plan fop

Ch2pter IV
8. Lea.0:Ue Of,u;ltions--Sancti on8.

Chapter IV
The French plan for a League of Natlons -- Sanctions .
The French plan makes
sanctions .

A sanction is renerally regarded as a means of en-

forcement similar to t he
armed

VI i

adequate provisions for effective

th coerc i ve

~e~a lties

1

OVler . -

of municipal law-- a oenalty

The Executive ComT'littee of the League

to Enforce Pe""ce had deflnec1 a s'-'nction as "the justlfled employment of forceful methods to insure the observance of law or to
2
enforce it when an attempt to disregard it is made . "
Some authorities consider coercrlle sanc ions as unnecessary to the main tena r c e of pea ce, while others hold the
opnosite view .

Profes~or

Dewey, of Columbia University, holds

that sanctions are both lmprRcticpoJe and undesirable . 3

In answer-

ing this argument, Ra''1Tlond L . Buell , rese:1rc h director of the }<'orei'"n

Polic~T

Aso-ociatio n , states , "Except for the raJidly disap -

nearing nhilosopbi c Rl anarchists and a few religlous sects suqh
as the 1 ennonites and Shn{ers , all schools of po litical and ethlcal
thought recognize t at 'dlthin the state force is a necessary corrol l ary of law .---Unlike the use of force within the state , however , force in

lnternation~l

of lnternational law or of ,n

relations has not been a corollary
internatio n~l

organizatlon WhlCh

compo"'es differences between states , as dif'ferences te tween Individuals within a state are composed .---I<'orce harnessed to l aw
meRns order; force exercise o in the absence of law means anarchy . "
1.
2.
3.

4.

4

E . C . Hower , International Go v ernment , Chan . XZX , "Q'J . 521 -39 .
See also C:-Eagleton--;-rntei~atlo-:'Yl-al Governm9.1 t , Chap . III ,
p • 66 - 86 ; and Hershey , np . 7 ~ 11 .
World Peace Foundation , Pamphlet Series , Vol . VI, No . 6 ,
December 1916 , Pp . 17 - 18 .
Foreirrn Policy AssociatioL , Are Sanctlons,Necessary to Intern8tional Or~ani~atlon ?, Yes -- R. L . Buell : No -- John
Dewey , Pamphlet No . 82- 83 , Series 1931- 32 , June 1932,
pp . 23 ff' .
Ibid, P . 3 .
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the necessity of effective sanctions .

It devotes two parts , 1.1

and III , to the diseus8ion of four types of sEtnctions-- d1plomat1c ,
legal , economic , and military .
,"hen the International Coun'} 11 , or" the Court , arri ves at
a decis1on , and one of the lartles to the dis Jute refuses to ac cept it, the CCJUncil sh211 D1'oce ( to apply the s8nctions PI"Ov1ded
in the plan .

It shall begin, with diplomatic sanctions , placing

the delinquent state under tbe ban of &11 the member C'tates lJntil
it is willing to accept the decision .

The diD.1omatic sanct10ns

fall under t hr ee herdinfls :

seve~ance

first , the

of all diplonatic

ties ; second , the withdrawal of all exequatllrs granted to the consuls of the offending :tate; and third , the exclus10n of the offend,

ins State from all the henefits of any 1nternational conventions
to which it may be a party . 1
effects .

Such action would have far - reach1n,g

Unde r the appliCation of these measures , all the ministers

and ambassadors of the offending 'ta te wou_d be dismissed by the
:-ilembers of the LeBgue"

and all the representatives of the various

member state s would be reCalle d .
cut off from all the

pl~lic

[11he

d" Ilnquent state would be

opinlon of the woild ; its national s

VTould not hav e any diplomatic representat10n in the territD ry of
the mer!'1ber s t ates and t~-:ey would be left to the mercy of pre,iudicec.
foreign courts ; and its trade relations would suffer .
Such a nation would be a pariah among the other nations
of the worl d .

Rus~ia Vias in such a position 1I!1. mediately after

the introduction of the Lo lshevist reGime , and although she was
later recognized by most of the European nat1ons , she hailed with
joy lunerican diplomatic recornition , and the exchange of d1plomat1 c
1.

Official French Plan , Part II , section (1) .

relations which finally came from the Unlted states in-1933.
There is no doubt that she suffered many losses because of the
lack of recognition prior to that time. l
The withdrawal of diplomatic offlcials is usually regaTded a.s a form of protest which indicates stralned relations.
It shows a strong sense of disapproval, and in many ins.tances is
followed by war.

2

The French intended that this step shoull bring

the offending nation to the realization that it would be followed
by more serious consequences if it persisted in its refusal to accept the decision of the Councilor the Court.
The withdrawal of the exequatur would also seriously affeet a state.

Consular officials, unlike diplomatic representatives,

are stationed at every important cornmercial city in the world.
United stat ~s has over a hlmdred in Canada alone. 3
have many lmportant duties.

The

These officials

Whereas the Qiplomatic representa-

tives deal with the governments of foreign states on matters of
diplomatic interest, the consular agents deal with private individuals in foreign states on matters of economic and commercial
interest.

They are probably the most important commercial repre-

sentatives a nation has in foreign countries.

Among their duties

are the protection of their nations1s abro.ad, acting as arbl trators
or judges, gather-ing trade statistics, performing a host of notaria1 functions,
1.

2.
3.

overs~eing

the execution of commercial treaties,

For a good discussion of the effects of non-recognition, see
Chesney Hill, Recent Policies of Non-Recognition, International Conciliation Pamphlet, No. 293, October 1933,
passim.
Hershey, p. 541, see note'17.
C. EagJe ton, International Government, pp. 202 ff.

and engaging in a vast number of shipping duties. l

All of their

rights, privileges, and 'immunities ar-e granted by the country to
which they are sent thl'ough the issuance of an exequatur, a' document which recognizes their comrds sion from their own country, and
permits them to exercise their duties in the foreign country. 2 Every state has e.,right to refuse the exequatur to consuls, or to
withdraw it at their pleasure; but the withdrawal of an exequatur
is considered as a serious step, and should be taken only after
"ripe reflection".

3

Thus, these sanctions in the French plan

would effect the great economic interests of the offending state,
.(

,-

and would paralyze its foreign trade and investments.
The third step in the application of diplomatic sanctions is the exclus ion of the offenaing stat e from any benefits
it may receive from international c6nventions to which it is a
party.

Every modern State of importance is a party to nLlmerous

conventions of an international charecter, such as, the Universal
Postal Union, Telegraph Union, Monetary Union, and certain conventions respecting patents, copyrights, weir,hts, snd measures.

4

Many benefits accrue ,to states who are members of these conven-

I~

tions, and the French plan would certainly provide a means of
depriving these St8tes of such benefits if this diplomatic sanction were applied.
A modern illustration of the effects of this type of
sanction may be found in the case of Nlanchukuo.
1.
2.
3.
4.

The Advisory

:f!'or the duties of a consul, see Hershey, pp. 419-21;
C~ Eagleton, International Government, pp. 172-3; and
E. C. Mower, International Government, pp. 203-4.
See Hershey, p. 418, note 6. An exequatur may be an offlcial
document, 01' the consul may merely receive word that he
is recognized.
Ibid, p. 418, note 8.
For a list of international conventions, see C. J. H. Hayes,
Political and Social Histor'V of Modern Europe, Vol. II,
pp. 682-3; E. Krehbiei, Nationalism, War ana-Society, PP.
132-4; and E. C. Mower, International Government, pp. 242 ff.
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Committee of the Assembly prepared a report recommending steps

...

which should be taken in consideration of the non-recognition of
this puppet state, and sent it to the members of the League on
June 7, 1933.

1

The report of this Committee contained instructions

to prevent the accession by Manchukuo to various ·international
conventions.

Members of the League were to refuse to agree to

the admission of ManchuKuO to the benefits of these conventions.
The Advisory Committee reminded the members of the Leagu:
that Manchukuo was not a member of the Universal Postal Union, and
was not entitled to'its privileges.

It recommended to them the •

request of China that "the Univers8.1 Postal Union--notify all
Member states that all postal service in Manchuria was temporarily
suspended, that 811 mails destined for Europe and America would be
forwarded respectively via the Suez Canal and the Pacific Ocean
and requesting all post offices to do the same with mails destlned
for China,. and that all stamps issued by lVlanchukuo would be invalid
and all mail' matter or parcels bearing these stamps would be charged
pos tage due. 112

The Cormni ttee also advised the members of the League

to pass legislation prohibiting transactions in currency issued
by Manchukuo, and to prevent the quoting of such currency on their
official foreign exchanges. 3 No passports issued by this puppet
state was to be accepted or recognized.

lIlt is impossible," con-

cludes Professor Hill, lito predict the results of these measures,
in case states agree to apply them, but they do not appear sufficiently drastic to destroy M::mchulruo, though they will doubtless
1.

•. -

2.
3.

Chesney Hill, Recent Policies of Non-Recognition, International
Conciliation Pamphlet, No. 293, October 1933, pp. 389, 455.
Ibid, p. 389.
Ibid,
- pD.
.- 389-90.

I

have

so~e

Apparently hL= conchu: ions 8.re

injurious

s()unCi, ::;ince this ~'tc.to, tl~ou(~h ha.1.oic8lJOed to a certt"in e;:tent
by tLo non-recor~nition pcJ.ic~;r of the iF')Jortant nations of tl'e
'~ucL:

world, contlnues to exi::;t.

an excltls:Lon fI'or:1 the nrivJ.leges

of internr"tiour 1 convontions wonlG be· far more in.iuriolJS to ("re8t
::,tater:"

however, tbflc to ~Ul undevelopec 3tste 11;',e [,q:mel11).!mo. 1"ur-

assur[.l1ce t.t~[lt more cJrt3< tic ,~teos wo'~J.d tollow if it C1iCt not vielci.
2Lould t.L1.G~: e din 1 O::;'la t.ic : :.: anctions fail, the ~<'rench plnYl
~rovide~ for further sanctions of

8

leGal nature.

Aecorcl1DS to

these nrovisions of the Yrenc~ ulan, [.ny offenses eomltteu, enof t~1e F1er.ibe1's of the Lea[\1),e 8[~alnst

conrnp:ed, or tolerato(i [''(

;-;n'

Convention of October H:,

1~}07.

2

Ti,e ler:81

8~,-nctJ,or1S

also ED')OSe

8.1 t':.o';,r:h tney will not be de')rivea of tLe advantf:'.[~es of COrl"on
law, nor

nn1sh£d for ucts for whic - they [.1'e not resnons1ble,

~ll article~ of association,

Lt.

:.,.681' nrivate intcrnctio:'f:,l 18Vl~

1.
~?

11.

v!rl1e\~ are :Ln effect

etl,'F'::<')H t

e

CLe~ne~'[ Hill, EOC8clt [011eie2, of ,on-ReCO'''Ylltlon, Int1.
Concil iu t ion P8cmprltef;- ':·:0-:- -'2g3-;--6('~f.--'l
390.
(Ole ,T.
2cott, fj1j,e Ef,r'118 'JonventlOnE.: 8.no Declsrationc: of'

933--;-n--:

=3.

189~) c.nd 1907, D-~--1-Ci3-:· "C~')iio-arev,;itri-O{i'fG-fal~'rench-,) l-;"-n·-u·"'-1'-t"· -I-I'"
c.' CO C t-. 1 0'11
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Gl_,
~
~ee below, D. 6~, footnote 2.
ller~j1BY, nJ. 1:-0.
In'~oJ·natj.onal 1:'T·~lvate LeVi o()cicies confllcts
bCtV:88J1 t':JO systoY:Js of natione.l law 111 GSses aftectlllg
·:)}:iv[~to ri.hts; sHc.ll. a~, the vslidjt:: of :(o1'ei
mao:·r1as'''s,
',:'1118, [·'nel cODtr~·'cts, o.nestion2 of reSl08nce, dOlnlc:i.le,
and Dctionnlity.
..l.
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will be suspended.

l

The ne.tionals of the faithless state would

also have no recourse to the courts of law in the member states.
Ordinarily, under the rights of states in

Interna~ional

2

Law, no

country should exclude foreigners from the protection of its
courts.

The International Council cree.ted by the French draft

would be able to bring real pressure to bear upon the recalcitrant state by revoking these rights, and by ordering the member states to refuse to execute any court judgments in favor
of its nationals.

Member states could also seize any real es-

tate or movable property belonging to the nationals of the offending state.

All of these measures are in addition to the

ordinary rules of criminal jurisdfution, or to any other measures
the League might take.
More important than either diplomatic or legal sanctions
are economic sanctions.

For these the French plan makes full

provisions which will nlace the

r~calcitrant

state under an ab-

solute commercial, industrial, and financial ban.

The present

League of Nations has this effective weapon for maintaining peace
in its hands, but it has no power to insure its execution~

Article

16 of the Covenant provides for the severance of all trade relations with the covenant-breaking state, but the Council of the
League can only recommend such action.

Under the French plan,

the International Council WQ11d demand the member states to apply
these sanctions, and they are bound to comply with its orders.
A Committee, headed by Nicholas Murray Butler, made a
study of economic sanctions, and concluded that they were a very
1.

-'

2 •.

Official French Plen, Part II, section (2), paragraph (b).
Ibid, see Part .11, section (2), paragraDh (b). There is ~ certain vagueness in this section of the French plan. It
states that they will not be deDrived of the advantages
of common law, and also that they will be excluded from
recourse to theC,:,.urts of Law.

effective meanf' of InRintrlnlng peace .

Thelr chief advanta ge is

due to the fact t nat they act as a threat .

"General knowledge,

in any country consie ering agrrr:ssive actlon, th[;.t world- wHie
eco.loml c sanct lons H1igJ:- t be invo ed agalns t it , " concludes the
COll

1

ttee , 1I':rr uld certr .!-nl ~T c·-II lnto actlon the fears of busi-

ness ,and ,lndustria l interests in t at c~untry ; and tnelr lnfluence ,
exerclsed entlrely di rectly and vlithin tne
c ~8 es

~oun try, w

uld ln (rany

sufflce to turn the sCRle ag-inst the contemplated' aggres-

sion . 1I1

These Eanctions , ObVlously , w)uld boar more heavily u oon

greut indust rl[ 1 nations than on backward or agrlc111 tural natlons .
The French

~lan

attempts to deal with

t~e

difflcult

question of the enforcewent of economic sanctions by urovidlng for'
a blockade and a hostile embargo .

2

It has been pOlnted out

thr~t

the Covenant of the Leaf.ue of Kations provides for an economic bo;cott in Article 16 with no means of insurlng lts enforcement .
economic
nlic~tion

bO~Tcott

3
An

is und 1 ubted1y a parn1yzlnc weapon, but its ap -

calls for concerted action, and oollce ships are needed

to make lt effective and to prevent smuggling .

4

The CO Lmercial losses caused by the blockade would , of
course, depend not only upon how long it la s ted , but also upon
1.

2.

3.
4.

Evan::> Clark, Bo/cotts anG. eece, A Report by the Co nitt ee
on Economic '::anctions, 11 ichola8 Lurr?y Butler , chalrman ,
page 257 . This work is an a~lirable, lntelligent s tudy
of econoTIlic sanctlons , and is a fruitful source of informatlon for those interested in thi s subject .
The French plan(Part II , sect . (3), pararraphs (a) ana (b) ~ )
contemplates a pacific blockade of the ports of the offendin r ::tate to prevent all cOllID1e rcial intercourse with it .
This blockade would be more of a hostile than a pacific
nature . 'rhe emhargo is of a hostlle nature. also, since
it provides for th~ seizure of the ShlPS of the offending
nation in the ports of the member states .( ~ee Hershey , pD .
539 - 41 for an explanation of blockades and c','1hal'e;oes . )
Davies, P . 464 , footnote 1 .
S . D_-CcCAn, League of ::ationf' , pD . 120- 1 . For difficulties
0.1' e.1.forcer(1ent , see also €vans Clark , Boycotts and Peace,
Chap . 1 3 , liThe Difficulties of 3'1forcementll ,- pp . 247 - 53 .

the self-suffic i ency of the boycottea
0tates such

R8

1

State .

RiChly industrialj.zed

England , Japan , Bnd perhaps , Bel r,ium , would suffer

much if their food su 'ply

VIas

cut off ;

01'

even if tneir corn"1'ercial

intercourse alone were stopoed , and food we r e all owea t o ent er ,
On the other- hand, the Dni teet
to such a

gre~t

'tates and Russia would not suffer

extent because of their

and ar;ricultural dlctricts . 2

~reat

natural resources

~)uring the Norld War , Germany , through

sub) larine Dolicy , had Great BI-i tain on the verge of oj easter .

her

3

Germany also suffered greatly all through the 'Norld War fr om the
blockade of the .11ie3 .
Althoupp the United states eXDorts but some 10% of her
total pro due I· ion of croods , this 8111::.11 percente.fSe is enough to make
the difference botween prosryerity and
cycle . 4

de~ression

in its business

Due to the fac t th8.t the index nLUnber for 1.<11 goods In

the lTnite r 8tates rUI'el;T falls or rises more than ten points l' ''''om
the base nruilier , a loss of

10~

depression she ~as eve r seen . 5
might happen :

of her trade would create the worst
Here are some of the thlngs that

loss of lncome from the

~17 , 000 , 000 , 000

vate foreign investments ; cr-isls on the .stocl(

Exchan~e ;

In pri cotton ,

two cents a pound ; the c ollapse of the fertilizer trade; wheat and
hog prlces l owest in nation(l history ; farm mortga~e foreclosures
and bank 1'211ure8 ; coffee , tea , and sugar prlces rlse to femlne
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

The term "boycotted U is used ln a general sense rather than
in its tecbnical sense in this worle . In lts general sense
it refers to the state excluded from all cOIn.l'1ercial intercourse by the menber ~tates of the agreement .
Evans Clar1{ , Boycotts and Peace , p1""1 . 330 rr . These tables
rive the natural res"urces and d:"Dendence on food supplie~ of the great nations of the world .
C. J . Ii. Fayes , Politi c al and 30clal History of ..o dern
7urope , Vol . II , p . 7 47 ; ~avies , D. 322 ; and ~vans
Clark , Bo .7cOtts and .eDuce , p . 238 .
W. L. c-,pahr ; -Economic Pr_nciples and Problems , Vol . I , p . 601 .
EVans Clark , Boycott~._ apd Peac e , p . 207 .

heights; rubber price incre~ses 500%; overseas steamship lines
""

ruined; tin-plate industry forced to shut down; and a huge numl
ber of unemployed.
If our own cOlJntry, probably the most selfsufficient one in the :world, should suffer such hardships, how
much more must other nations suffer 1

The boycott of one nation,

China, affected Japan so much that she sent troops into Shanghai;

I,;:.

how much more would the comined efforts of the members of the
League of Nations have affected her.
The economic sanctions proposed by the J:i'rench plan
would reach the proportion of' complete non-intercourse with the
offending state.

Such is the state of modern blockades by bel-

ligerent powers, whereby the distinction between contraband and
non-contraband reaches the vanishing point, and all goods are excluded from the blockaded State.

Nations would be brought face

to face with the fact that isolation is a myth, and although advanced industrial nations could replace imports with substitutes,
they would find their economic system in a confused

state.

Numerous objections have been made to econotic sanctions.

It has been argued that they are impracticable, inasmuch,

as to insure their success, universality of action is necessary.
~

In view of the fact that many large nations might remain outside

t

i

the League, it could not act with unanimity and
-;;

effectivenes~.

2

The temptation to trade with the boycotted state would be great,
since the rise in prices would make such trade lucrative.

In

studying this queEction, the International Blockade Committee ap1.
2.

Evans Clark, Bo,rcotts and Peace, p. 210.
E. C. Mower, International Government, p. 528.

pointed by the Council of the League of Nations upon request of
the Assembly in 1920, held the view that the members of the League
who declared the blockade had the right to mal{e it effective against all states, 'including non-members. l The economic blockade
proposed in the French plan could be made effective by the extension
of the definition of contraband to cover all goods entering tne
blockaded state.
Such a definition might draw a sharp protest from powerful non-member states who might regard such action as interference
with their rights of commerce.

On the other hand, the International

Council might regard this action as unjustifiable interference in
its endeRvor to maintain peace.

It is unlikely that any non-mem-

ber state would care to risk a war with the international forces
of the League that the French draft proposed to create, while it
is very conceivable

~hat

non-member states might even co-operate

with the League In its work of maintaining peace.

It has been

suggested that the United states should co-operate in this man2
ner with the present League of Nations.
Universality of action
among the members themselves would be insured because the French
plan provides for previously arranged plans to protect the member
states, and binding obligations which force them to comply with
the demands of the International Council.
Another objection is
, 1.

P. C. Jessup, American Neutrality and International Police,
World PeaceFoundation Pamphlets, Vol. XI, No.3, 1928,
p. 75.

2.

made to economic sanctions on the

Ibid~

pp. 106-7. Jessup suggests that the United states con----sent to a revision of the existing rules of neutrality,
and to ratify a general treaty by which she could cooperate, passively, or actively, in reprisals against
an offending state.

ground that some nations suffer more than others in their application.

Those states whose trade with the boycotted nation

is relatively slight would suffer less than those States whose
trade with it was large. l

This suffering would be especially

intense if the blockaded State were the source of important raw
ma~erials.

To this argument, we may answer that few nations are

absolutely sole sources of anyone raw material, and the members
of the League may be able to supply it during 'the blockade.

There

is no doubt of the validity of the argument that enforcing nations
would bear an unequal burden in the application of economic sanctions, but as the Committee on Economic Sanctions points out, "a
selective program of economic pressure could be devised which would
seriously embarass the treaty-breaking state without imposing excessive hardships or inequities on the enforcing nations.,,2

The

French draft permits of such alterations in its contents, since
.

it states that it presents only "this rough out11ne".

3

A third argument has been advanced against such sanctions;

..

namely, that by cutting off the food supplies of the blockaded
state, the civilian class must suffer from starvation.
argument on humanitarian grounds.

4

It is the

"I greatly doubt," declares one

of the members of the Committee on Economic Sanctions, "that, un-

I~
ti
i
i
l

,~

der such circumstances, the public opinion of the world would
countenance measures which would require the wholesale starvation
of a civilian population." 5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

This argument is worthy of considera-

E. C. Mower, International Government, p. 518. See also,
Evans Clark, Boycotts and Peace, pp. 19-20.
Evans Clark Boycotts and Peace, p. 22. A selective program
would ailow' a certain amount of trade to continue.
Official French Plan, Part II, section (3), paragraph (d).
W. I. Hull, International "S anc tions il p. 9. This little pamphlet
is published by Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Friends.
Evans Clark, ~oycotts and Peace, p. 20. The Committee on
Economic anctions was financed by the Twentieth Century
Fund founded by Edward Filene of Boston.

tion, since aggressive warfare usually results from the existence
of powerful military cliques, and since public opionion is usually
controlled by a subsidized press.

Hence, it is desirable that the

}'rench plan be modifiecL in some way without weakening its effectiveness.

If food were not

exem~ted

altogether from the boycott, it

might be restricted to a certaln extent by allowing limited amounts

-

to enter the offending state.
lose 'its

Any system of penalties must not

severity; neither must 'it

become inhumane.

It may

be added, too, that all such arguuents overlook the deterrent ef-

..

-

feet of the boycott •
The last part of the economic sanctions of the French
plan outline certain credit restrictions imoosed upon the recalcitrant state.

Such restrictions include the probibition of the is-

sue by the offending

~)t[te

of public 1:)an8 in the territories of

the member states, and the refusal to allow the quotation of its
stock on the official exchanges of the member states.

1

These pro-

visions strike at both the private and public interests of the offendlng nation.
The member states may enforce these sanctions in various
ways.

They may rule

adversel~

...

on the eligibility to discount or

to holding, by banks under their sUDervision.

Thus the eligibility

of bills to discount can be used to keep foreign countries out
of the financial markets of any state, and would be a hard blow
to an aggressor nation. 2

..

i

!
~

/
f~

,i~
'

1.
2•

The flotation of loans in the member

Official French Plan, Part II, section (3), paragraph (d).
EVens Clark, Boycotts and Peace, pp. 309 ff. Chapter 18
deals with the--qu(-ostion of the effect of credit
restrictions on various nations. The subject is
thoroughly presented in this fine study.

~

7£

States by the offending nation could be prevented, thereby impairing

its

ability to wage war, since it is generally believed

that a modern war cannot be waged by a State deprived of all economic assistance from the outside. l In this modern age when business supersedes nationalism, and the dollar is more venerable
than the flag, it is not unlikely that the commercial class would

I

•I

bring strong pressure to bear upon its country to accept the decisions

I..

of the International Councilor the International Tribunal.
The effectiveness of credit restrictions would, of course,

..

,
-

depend to a great extent upon the need of the recalcitrant State •
Attention has also been called to the fact that modern governments
have great resources of credit within their own borders when their
2
people are whipped up to a high pitch of enthusiastic patriotism.
We will recall how our own country responded to the Liberty Loans
during the World War.

In spite of all these weakening influences,

the economic boycott and restriction of credit would be a powerful factor in maintaining peace among nations.

3

The most important part of the French plan is the section containing the provisions for military sanctions. The French
draft has a detailed account' of the organization, strength,

an~

duties of an international military force to insure the execution
of the decisions of the Council and Court.

This international

force is the heart of the French plan for a League of Nations, and
1.
2.
3.
)

I

•

t .,.

C. Eagleton, International Government, p. 80.
W. I. Hull, International "Sanctions", p. 8.
One writer has summa.rized economic sanctions thus: flIt would
mean refusing to recognize the nRtion, its officials, its
acts, papers, stamps, citizens, .. hi}s, goods, declining to
trade with it, refusing loans, cancelling bonds and stocks
listed at boards of trade, putting discriminating tariffs on
its goods, etc."(E. Krehbiel, Nationalism, War and Society,
p. 237)

when the League of Nations Commission refused to accept such a
drastic provision in the Covenant that was adopted, the French
felt that their feet had been swept out from under them.
The F'rench idea that sanctions are neces sary to international organization raises the much discussed question of the
analogy of national and international laws, and the necessity of
force as a coneomi tant of law.

The li'rench maintain the force

theory which tb8ches that in the last analysis government and
law rest upon force; international government is no exception
to this rule, and its laws must bear enforcing sanctions or penalities. l "What has the ordinary citizen to say to these proceedings?" says Davies.

If

He may not be a legal expert, but he

understands that courts of justice do not function properly unless
the services of the policeman can be requisitioned.,,2
With this idea in mind, the French provided that the
decisions of the International Council and Tribunal should be
enforced in two ways; namely, by an international force, or by
one or more great Powers members of the League, acting under a
\

mandate from the Council.

3

The military force placed at the dis-

posal of the Council will also be used to overcome any forces
which may be opposed to the League of Nations in the event of an
armed conflict. 4 Thus, it would have to possess superiority in
both numbers and armament.

"Unless this superiority exis ted, (I

Davies argues, "no State-member---and especially those which were
1.
2.
3.
4.

See E. C. Mower, International Government, p. 232. Also
Davies, Chapter IV, "The Evolution of Sanctions", pp.
154-77.
Davies, p. 177, and Section X, page 176. See also S. Duggan,
A League of Nations, pp. 113-4; and E. Krehbiel, Nationalism,
War and Society, Chapter XIII, pp. 105-13.
Official French Plan, Pa~t III, section (i), paragraph (1).
Ibid, Part III, section (i), paragraph (2).

neighbours of non-member states---would enjoy a sense of security
nor would they be

able to repose any confidence in the international

authority for protection against outside aggression."l

The same

writer, who tackles the problem of an international police force
in a practical manner, suggests a means by which an international
force may be provided with superiority in armaments.

After calling

attention to the fact that there are three categories of organized
1'orce--municipal constabularies, national pollce, and international
police--he points out that each category may be distinguished by
"..

its weapons:

tiThe constable, as we have seen, is armed with trun-

cheon, sabre and revolver.

The national policeman, rehabilitated

in his pre-war quarters, is equipped with rifles, machine guns,
armoured cars, artillery of pre-war types and a naval force, comprised of the older vessels, sufficiently powerful to police his
coasts.

To the international noliceman are allotted the new

weapons evolved in the war--submarines, poison gas, aeroplanes,
and tanks, together with the newer types of naval craft and artillery.,,2

In this way, superiority for the international force

proposed in the French draft could be secured through the differentiation .of weapons. 3
An international force may be organized in several ways.
i

First, an international body may levy and maintain an international

I.

land and sea force directly; secondly, an international body may

,~

t

~

draw quotas, or contingents of forces, from the several member

f.

t ~.

l

! ..
i

1.
2.
3.

Davies, p. 362.
Ib i d , p. 329.
For an excellent study of this principle, see Davies,
tl
Chapter VIII, "The Differentiation of Weapons ,
pp. 296-339. Note especially pp. 332-3.

states; and thirdly, a combination of the first and second--that
is, an international force levied by the international authority
plusc a reserve composed of national contingents contributed by
the member states.lThe F'rench plan contains the second :p1ethod.
According to its provisions, "the International Body shall determine the strength of the international force and fix the contingents which mus-t be held at its disposal.,,2

A similar scheme for

an international police force was drawn up by a former Minister
'if{

of War of Holland.
,...

-

He provided that "each state would be obliged

to supply and to pay its own contingent, the size of which, as
regards the army, wruld be determined by its population, as regards the navy by the extent of its sea i:::;orders, and by the importance of its ressoIrces."

3

The quota system, advocated in the F'rench draft, has
several disadvantages:

(1)

There would be no real guarantee

that the member nations would honor their obligations to furnish
the quota when called unon to do so;

(2)

This system does not

eliminate competition between the War Offices or Admiralties, and
National Staffs may scheme to upset the arrangements of the International Authority;

(3)

Secession of member States is too easy

under this system, and they may denounce their treaty obligating
them to provide a contingent for the international force without
incurr-ing any serious disability; and, (4)

This system does not

provide for the important principle of the differentiation of
4
weapons.
1.

2.
3.

4.

s. Duggan, A League of Nations, p. 124. See especially
Davies, Chapter X, ilAn Internatlonal Police F'orce ll ,
pp. 360-82. F'or the various means of organization see
ibid, pp. '368 ff.
Official F'rench Plan, Part III, section (ii).
Martinus Nijhoff, War Obviated by an International Police,
pp. 100-101.
Davies, pp. 371-3.

On the other hand, the quota system has certain advantages.

These are:

(1)

The recognition of the right use of force

as a police function in the relationship of states with each other;
(2)

This scheme would probably serve as a basis for real disarma-

ment among the nations, according to the degree of security it
afforded;

(3)

This system would involve fewer and less drastlc

changes in the national war establishments than the introduction
of other far-reaching schemes; and, (4)

It would be bound to af'-

ford a certal.n measure of security for the members of the League.

1

Norman Anp;ell, noted British author and economist, believes that
nations should organize such an international force to maintain
peace.

"Now,

fo~

the purpose of this war, seven nations have

combined against Germany and Austria.

Why," he argues, IIfor the

purpose of a permanent peace should not eight, or for that matter
eig;hteen, undertake to combine against anyone nation that commits
aggression"upon its neighbours."

2

The French draft provides for the determination of the
strength of each contingent by giving the International Council
the authority to fix the number to be contributed by each member.
Each member state, however, settles all matters relating to their
recruitment.

3

The strength of the national contingents would de-

pend UDon the scope of their duties.
at various times

~o

They would be called upon

assist the local authorities to maintaln order,

they would garrison dependencles 2nd colonies of their ~tate, they
would be callec; upon to resist any sudden invasion or aggression,

2.

The most of ~hese advantages and disadvantages are noted
by Davies, P1"). 369-73. He explains fully both sides
of the ~ub.iect.
Martinus Nijhoff, War Obviated by an International Police,

3.

Official French Plan, Part III, section (ii).

1.

p. 211.

and they would constitute the national contl·ibutions to the international force.l

It would have been impracticable for the

F'rench to nave attempted to determine the strength of these contingents in their draft, since the Council could settle this
question and work out some equitable method of apportionment to
each nation. 2
The French plan provided for the

.

a~Yoointment

of a per-

manent international Staff to investigate all military questions
affecting the

Lea['~ue

of Nations.

Each member of the League would

be represented on this Staff, and all the members would submit a
list from which the Council would appoint the Chief and Deputy
Chiefs of Staff, who would serve for a ceriod of three years.

3

The duties of the Permanent Staff are fully outlined in the draft,
but all its action is under the supervision of the International
Body, or Council.

It would be charged with inspecting the inter-

national forces to be recruited by each member state, and recommending measures to procure uniformity in the armaments and train-

.f

.

Its recommendations may be imposed upon mem. 4
ber states by the Councll.

.,.

. The Permanent Staff would naturally be interested in the

\

11

ing of these forces.

Davies, pp. 384-2.
See Davies, pp. 407, 516-18, and 744 ff. He suggests three
principles by which the ratio of national contingents
may be determined. These are: (a) On the basis of population; (b) On the basis of the stat~s quo, or existing armies; (c) The tlbareme" standard of measurement.
(see page 407) The first two are inequitable because
of the large populations of backward c mntries like India
and China, and the disarmament status of the Central Powers.
The third method, used by the League of Nations to determine th~ annual money contributions of its members, takes
into account the economic irrlportance of the various states,
and has been worked out for the League by a body of experts •
It is obviously the best met6od, Davies thinks.
Official
French Plan, Part III, section (iii). This Per3•
manent Star'f is similar to the Supreme War Council of
the Allies during the War. The League to ~nforce Peac~
approved the creation of such an organizatlor:,.(See Basls of
Permanent Peace, puldished by the League to E.P., p. 12)
4. Official French Plan, Part III, section (iv)

1.

:,

2.

t

-.,
~

I.. .'
..

,

••

..

.... 'Its

character of the troops, the extent of their training, and other
military factors, since it would be responsible for their conduct
after mobilization has been declar~d.

I

,~

This valuable knowledge

"can onJy be acquired through the closest liaison between the
national and international staffs." l Since the national contingents are destined to act in concert, and since a heterogeneous
force labors under a disadvantage in comparison with a homogeneous
army, the French draft is 10m cal in providing that ffmili tary instructions shall be given in each member state ln accol'dance with
rules designed to procure, as far as possible, uniformity in the
armaments and trAining of the troops destined to act in concert. ft2
Any scheme of inspection

is bound to create a certain

amount of friction between the n£ttional
ternational Body.

~overnments

and the In-

When the French delegation attey",ted to create

a 8upervisory commission for the League of Nations they ran up
against the opposition of the American and English delegations.
This commission was lIu.nacceptable fl and was voted down by the
Anglo-Saxon group, 3 b1.1_t authorities agree that there must be some
4"
method of supervision in any disarmament scheme.
There is no reason, however, why the investigations of
this Permanent Staff proposed by the J:!'rench draft could not be
carried on with

I')

minim1.lm of friction between the national govern-

ments and the International Council.

Bourgeois, one of the French

delegates to the Peace Conference, stressed this point when he
advocated the supervisory commission.
1.
2.
3.
4.

t

i~:i~:~:/;, .

Pleading for the passage of

Davies, p. 414.
Official French Plan, Part III, section (iv).
D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. I, p. 243.
See Davies, Section XV, pu-; 419 ff--:--

his amendment, he stated, "I wish to add that I did not speak of a
commission that wOllld go round to these countries to do its verifying.

We can leave to one side the form under which this verifi-

cation will be carl'ied out----we do not prescribe any form; we cio
not use the word 'inspection'; we avoid the word 'control'; we ask
only for proof that the declarations are made in the general interest
of the Society.---We all have"good faith, but there may be
,
some country who fails in the compact---."l

Davies believes that

supervisory commissions should not be inquisitorial, but they
should assume the character of a close liaison between the respective staffs which are enp:aged in the task of mutual protection. 2
To accomplish this task tithe national governments may appoint
liaison officers to the staff at

internation~l

headquarters, whilst

the latter would send military attach's to be accredited to the
national gover~ents.tl3
An International Army must have a

Con~ander-in-Chief,

and the question arises--how shall he be appointed?

We will re-

call that the Allied Forces did not function well until Foch assumed supreme command.

4

Much criticism has been directed at the

French draft in this connection, and critics have accused France
of trying to dominate the International Army that their League
would possess.

Baker is among this group.

"If the B'rench, for

example, could get a league which was a mili tar'y alliance with an
international army(commanded, of course,"~~rench generals) and
the possibility of universal compulsory military service--which
1.
2.
3.
4.

D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. I, pp. 248-9.
Davies, p. 421.
Ibid.
See C. J. H. Hayes, Political an9- Social History of Modern
Europe, Vol. II, p. 752. See also p. 734 of the same work,
where Hayes points out that the early success of the Central Powers was due in part to their unity of command.
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they tried to get _ _ , " he claims, "they would the more than glad to
have 1 t t1ed up va th and knit into 2..ny tre ty that m1ght be made . II 1
The French draft , however , st tes that the "Internat1onal Body
shall appo1nt , for the duration of the operations to be undertaken ,
a Commr::lnder - in-c h i ef of the intern. tional fOI'ces . ,,2

Ev ery nat10n

would be repre sented on this Inter'nationa l body , 01' Council , and
wuuld hcve

C'

ch::mce to se c ure this post for :me of its general s .

France c erta1nly did not dominate 1n the proceed1ngs of
the Commission on the League of Nations . 3

Her dr8ft was ignored,

and all her attempts to amend the articles of the Covenant which
the .American and British deler, tions rapidl v
Commission were futile o

ushed through the

In vie 1'! of these facts , hovl could France

dominate an Internationl11 Body which was 1 n tended to 1nclude AmeriCc

n and British

repr0~'ent8tivee ,

and h['ve her generals appointed to

head an interna tional army ? 4
The manner in whic,h the Commander- in- Chief 1S selected
is indeed important .

A plan champi )ned by a former Dutch Hinister

of !lar , provided that "the Corr.mander - in- Chief VTould be chosen by
lot , and taken from a list of generals , up on
co - operating

t r tes would place the

n~2

In 1ch each of the

of a general , who, in

turn , would be the commander of the army during one year , wh1le
1.

R. :: .

Baker, 700drow /llson and vlorld C'ettlement , Vol . I ,
277 . l The paren thes is bel 11gS to the quotetion, but
I bave underl1ned the words in it .-- ·J.'he author)
Official French Plan , Part III , section (v).
c'ee bel ow c hap t er V, pp . 83-108 .
The French do not dominate the present Le t.gue of Nations t o
such an extent as to insure them the elect10n of a
Commander - in-Chief , if such an office eX1sted . There are
bloc s in the As sernbly lY'01 e po' erful than the il'ranco Poli eh-Li ttle Entente o;roup . See F . r,~orley , A ~-oc lety of
Nations , pp . 882-4 ; and '~J . 'P. . Rapparci , Int::>l'national Re lations a~ viewed from ("eneva , pp . 163- 4 . ~Jorley rates
these blocs 1n this o~der according to their Dower :
(1) Briti~h Empire; ( ,~) Latin- 1 I'ican ~rollp ; rnd
(3) l"ranco -P..oli s h - Little H:ntente croup . lIe thinks the
pO'J'er of t.t.e last ITroup 1S diMinishing .
P .

2.
3.
4.

each state would give at least one officer to the general staff
and at least one to the commissariat. ttl

The High Constable of

the International Pollce Force proposed by

Davi~s,

whose office

is similar to that of the French Com.rnander-in-Chief, "would be
appointed by the international authority, to which alone he would
be responsible for the conduct of the duties entrusted to him.--The High Constable should hold office for ,a limited period of,

(.

say, not less than three and not more than five years.

At the ex-

piration of his term he shouLd not be eligible for reappointment
and would then retire from the force.,,2
Thus, it would seem, that the aDpointment of the Commander-in-Chief by the International Body, as the :£i'rench draft
proposes, is the most desirable method of selecting that officer.
On the other hand, Poortugaelfs. proposal that each state should
be representeci on the General Starf is more desirable than the
provision in the French draft that the Commander-in-Chief shall
nominate his Chief of General Staff and the officers who are to
" t
aSSlS

h"lm. 3

Evidently, the :£i'rench plan does not contemplate a

permanent Commander-in-Chief, since it states that he is appointed
for the duration of the operations to be taken, and his powers shall
cease when the International Body so decides.

4

Critics may think the French draft is too drastic; radicals
may think it not drastic enough.

President Wilson had argued that

"a force must be created, a force so superior to that of all nations

--*'

1.
2.
3.

4.

l\i1artinus NiJhoff, War Obviated by an International Police,
p. 101.
Davies, pp. 457-8.
Official French Plan, Part III, section (v). See also Martinus Nijhoff, Wa~ Obviated by an International Police,
p. 101. Poortugael is a retired Lieutenant-General, and
a former Mlnister of War of Holland.
Official French Plan, Part III, section (v).

I'"

I

or to that of all alliances, that no nation or combination of
nations can chailenge or resist it. Hl

The French answered with

their plan, and Wilson and the British rejected it.
1.

40
1

~

,

~~:,o;j'~r;;;:.,

D. H. Miller, The Draftin~ of the Covenant, Vol. II,
English Minutes, p. 2 2; French Minutes, p. 460.

Ch[!pter V
l<'rfr.tce ['Dd th(; Cornr:ission on the League ()f ],!ations.

r,-'

,

•

Ohapter v:
France and the Oommission on the League of Nations.
The J:I'rench draft for a Leac;ue of Nations, WhlCh we have
discussed in the two preceding chapters, with its emphasis upon
armed sanctions in the form of an international army, was distasteful to both the American and English delegations.

Nilson

Lad thought of the possibility of using international police as
late as December 10, 191.8, ['ut thin}ang that such a pla.n could
not be worked out in one conference, he had turned to the economic
boycott as the most effective sanction for a League of Nations.

1

Oonsequently, the French scheme was discarded beJore the First
Plenary Session of the Peace Oonference met on January lB, i9l9,
~

and it was replaced by Wilson's ~maller list of subjects.the princioles of the

Frenc~

Even

plan were utterly disregarded by both

the American and English delegations, who proceeded to put throurfl
'5

their own program.'

At the Second Plenary 8es:::ion of the Peace Oonference,
Jenuary 25, 1819, the Comrnission to draw
of :Natlons was a'Ooolntec. 4

11'0

a draft for a Lea/iUe

This Oommission, comoosed of 19 mem-

bers, 2 fOI' each of the five Great Powers and 1 for each of the
nine smaller Powers, chose Presicient Wilson as its chairman.

In

sni te of his early views, and perhaps due to the imluence of his
advisors, President Wilson led the fight against the F'r'en(~h type

1.
8.

3.

4.

O. Seymour, The, Intimate Papers of Oolonel H_<?.l1_~~,' Vol. IV,
pp. 280-17 -This wor.k-will-be ci te.d hereinafter as Sewmouy'.
H. if/. V. Temperley, A Ihstory of the J:'eace Oonl'erence,
Vol. I, p. 8:52. ThiS-work wiiT -her;efrlaffer be' ci ted as
Temperley.
R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilc:;on and World SettlE,:ment, Vol. I,
p. 280. See -also-'1<~.- -I.lo-rley ;'Y-2o-cietyo-[l'Jatlons, p. 14.
Temperley, Vol. I, lJ. 256; Seymour, -'v;i-.-Iv~'--;p-.290-l; and
D. H. IVlil1er, The Drafting of the Oovenant Vol. I P. 76
'11his last work wiiY'be cited here-:lriaffera~ Miller:•

l----________________________________________

of a League of Nations with strong military sanctions. l

f

The French

draft was presented to the COl~]ission when it began its meetingsj2

t

but only the Hurst-l\,iller draft, as its name implies, an ,Anglo-

f

Americ~n

comoromise, was used as a basis of discussion at the

meetings of the Co~mis8ion.3

Critics may say that France won the

lion's share of advantRgeS at the Paris Peace Conference, but she
certainly did not do so in the League of Nations Commission.
An Italian drAft was also nresented to the COYlll'nission.
ffhis document provided for strong sanctions which as a la2t resort
included" joint war on the ·"Acalcitrant state by all the loyal mem-,4

bers of the Society of Nations.' -

It also stated that the Contract-

lng Parties I'shall be bound to comply with t:le request ll of the International authority.

5

It was also brushed aside by the dominant

Anglo-American group.
At the Second Plenary Session of the Peace Conference,
after seconding Wilson's resolution pertaining to the establishment of

A Lea~ue

of Nations, Lloyd George made a stirring speech.

"Had I ths slightest doubt in my own ml.nd, II he said,
1.

.~

:2.

3.

4.
4.

if

as to the

F. !ioorley, A ~'.ociety of Nations, p. 35. he says, f1President
itiilson'swTfT:C.-ig-ness to out almost unlimited authority
in the hands of a smflll grou) of PoWel"S--a wilJ.ingness
whlch went so far as to envisage the establishment of an
international armY--l'esultedfirst in causing acute anxiety to his advisers, and later in giving substantial
arguments to the forces opnosed to Ameriean membership
in'· the League." See \,Vilson' s statement in regard to an
international force, above pages 81-2.
Miller, Vol. I, p. 132, says that despite.the fact ~hat the
F'rench and Italian drafts pre appended to the lillnutes of
the F'irst Meeting of the Commission, they were not submitted that day. They were orobably submitted by ~he
Second Nleeting, since Bourgeois refers to them durlng
the Third Meeting.(Miller, II, 261) At the Tenth hleetlng,
Bourgeois refers to the fact that th~y ~ad no~ been us~d
as a basis of discussion by the Com...mlsslon.(Mlller,II,;.;18)
Miller, Vol. I, pp. 130 ff. See also H. S. Baker, Woodrow
Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. I, p. 280.
Miller, Vol.· II, p-;" 253 ~ .Art~ 29, paragraph (m) of Italian plan.
Ibid, Vol. 11, p. 253. Art. 28 of Italian plan.

wisdom of this scheme, it wOlJld have vanished before the irresistible
aDpeal made to me by the spectacle I witnessed last Sunday.

I

vis-

lted R reglon which but a few years ago was one of the fairest in
an excGptionally fair land.
I

8

I found it a ruin and a desolation.---

aw acres of graves of' the fallen.

And these were the results of

the only method, the only orgAnl_zed method, the only organized. method(si~)

that civilized nations have ever attempted or established

to settle disputer, amonr;st eAch other.

And my feeling was:

surely

it is time, surely it is tre that a SBner plan for settling disputes between peoples should be established than this organized
savagery. III

These are stirl'inp: words, but the speaker was not wil-

ling to organize en effective League with effective sanctions to
maintain the Deace of the world.
The Comraission on the League of Nations held ten meetings
between February 3rd and February 13th, and five
March 22nd and ]\pril 11th.

2

meetln~s

between

Its work during this period of time

was confined to a critical re-working of the Hurst-Miller draf't
Ul)On which the British and Americ8n delegations were in agreement.

3

Working rapidly, and laying aside certain qu~stions in regard to
armed force for later cisc1J.ssion, the Commission was [,ble to lay
a draft Covenant before the Third Plenary Session of the Peace
1.
2.

3.

International Conciliation Pamphlet,;\~o. 139, June 1919, p. 37.
American JOlJrnal of International Law, Vol. XIII, P. 185; Seymour, IV, 305; and 1'em-perley, II, 2b. Miller, Vol. II,
contains all the English and most of the French hiinutes
of the meetings of the Commission. The members of the
Commission were:
U.S.--Wilson, House.
China--Koo.
Brit. Emp.--Cecil, ;:)muts.
PortuR~al--rteis.
J:l1rance--Bourgeois, Larnaude.
~)erbia-- Vesni tch
n
l'
lOJ"a
Greece--Veniselos.
It a 1 y- - 0 r 1 and 0, v('. a . •
- ;' k'lno, r:blnd
Poland- -Dmowski.
~ a.
J apan--ka
Belgium--Hymans.
rtoumania--Diamandy.
Brezil--Pessoa.
Czecho-Slovak Republic-Kramar.
E'or names of members of Com,'TIission, see Temperley, III, 54-6;
Miller, II, 696-7, 816-7; and 1". Mor·ley, op.__ cit., p. 79.
Temperley, VI, 440; and Seymour, IV, 305. See above p. 84.

Conference on February 14, 1919.

·• .

During the discussions of this

COlmnh'sion, the only recourse I,'rFJnce had was to attempt to insert
amendments into the Anr:lo-lJ.m(~ric8n dreft, since her own draft had
been rejected.

1

At the fourth meetin9: of tl1.e Commi:Jsion, the discus::: ion
centereci : bout Article 10 of the Hurst-Miller draft

,-'
0

which provides

that no natlon shall resort to war without previously submitting
the ques tions involved either' to arbi tra tion or to t}:le CounCil.

I~

Bourgeois took the opportunit,r to raise the point of clearing up

I

the obligations of members of tl1.e LeBgue in cases where sB.ncti ons
would be applied.
gard to his
II

The Minutes of the Commission are vague in re-

n~"oPos81s,

but j\iiller, in his notes, says that he

advocated a more stringent, perhalis an absolute, agpeement against

war.,,3

In fact, notes the same observer at the Conference, "Bour-

geois raised the DOlnt of no__war. il4

Thus, it would seem, that

the French delegate was proposing responsibilities in the form of
effective sanctions and clearly-outlined obligations to prevent,
as l'ar as possible, all futllre wars.

This view accords with the

spirit of the French draft, and the statements of the leading
.b'r'2nch delegates made again and agaln at the meetlngs of the Commission.

..'"

The :B'rench expressed their desire to prevent future
throughout the meetings of the Peace Conference.

2.
3.
4.

war~

Clemenceau struck

R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. I, p. 2HO.
See also, 1:111er, --·,:io-l-.--I-;- D.-' 246; -ir1dlviOi';-ley, L~oE~?:.EJ..ty
Of Nations, p. 121.
l'dller ·-.flas au'-excellent key to the comparison of the various
articles of the Hurst-Miller draft with those of the Co~
enant 01 }:"ebruarv 14.(See Miller, ViI. I, ~'. 129.
]ldlLer, Vol. I, p. 174. See also Minutes(:B'rench), Ib}Ci,
Vol. II, pD. 431-2.
Ibla." Vol. I, p. 174. ('rhe italics are mine--The author)

the keynote in his opening speech before the

,-

First Plenary Ses-

sion of the Peace Conference on January 18, 1919, when he stressed
the importance of security, and the need of lleffective guarantees
agalnst an active return"l

of the old war splrit.

':-:econd Plenary Session, January 25,

B01crr~eois

Again, a~ the

had called attention

to the need of creating an organization with sufficiently powerful
sanctions !Ito assure obedience to the common will of civilized
nations. 1f2
At the fifth meeting of the Commission, l"ebruary 7,
Mil~er

notes, in regard to the discussion of Article 14 of the

Hurst-Iviiller

drRft~ that the nrinciole of sanctions received unan-

1mous assent. 4

Lord Cecil proposed. an amcnament substituting the

words IIbreak o:r disregard'i for lito be found by the League to have
bl'oken or disregarded. ,,5

Al though of Daramount imnortance, it

passed without comrlent, and the question as to what 2tBte is the
agvressor, and Low the que::;tlon of aggression is to be determL'led
in a given CBse, was left onen.

This particular point is still a

thorn of contention in any Droposed scheme to outlaw war by aggressor nations.
At this same meetin.i:\, the f'rench supported the amenClments
offered by the Belgir-:!D delegate to the Commission.

'l'hese amend-

ment~; woula have bound League members not to go to Wbr with 8ny

1.

International Conc iliation Pamphlets, No. 139, June 1919,
p. 26.

3.

4.
5.

l

1o;;il1er, Vol. II, p. 162.
Article 16 of the }:t'ebrnary Covenant, and also of the present
Covenant.
1\1iller, Vol. I, p. 1;:-30.
11:?..i_~, Vol. I, nn. 180-1.

party. c9mplying with the reconnrend3tions of a ma.iority report from
the Council, and would have pledged League members to execute
fr:ithfully decisions reachec by the unanimous report of the Council, exc}uding the disputants. l
not

onl~

These'proposals had the sup 1 0rt

of the French and Belgian, but also of the Greek and 8er-

bian, delegations.

Lord Cecil and nresident Wilton opposed them,

2

and they were passed over at tele moment, and referl'ed to a subcommittee.

.

Bourgeois did not think well of the articles concerning

sanctions, expressing the hope !lthat a clearer statement might be
made of the cases in which the sanctions of the League would be
,·,

apD 1 1eo---.

1,3

Throughout the meetings of the

Com~1lssi(m

the struggle

between France and her continental allies on the one side, and
the dominant

An~lo-American

pronounced..

The former group had suffered most from

combination on the other, is vry
t.~le

war, and

were still surl'ounded by their fOl'mer enemies whose Dotential war
4
.
resources were great. Bence, they demanded a League with powerful
sl'Jl1ctions:

one which would be able to guarantee real security

from war.

The latter group had not seen the invasion of enemy

troops on their own soil, and they were orotected by vast stretclles
of water patrolled by the two largest fleets in

t~l.e

world.

!ience,

they demanded a loose confederatlve League which would nnt embroil
them in the disputes of the continental states;
8u ar8n tee

t~;e

maintenance
of
'

0,

one which would

eace throuIT,h
the exercise of less
h

str1ngent sanct ons than the8'rench prooosed.
1.
2.
3.
4.

hiller, Vol. I, D. 17'7. See 8.1so F. Morley, LS_oc_~~_ty of
Nations, pD. 93-f.
rv,iller;rvifiintes, Vol. II, p. 269. America and England did
not wish such binding obligations.
Ibid, l':,inutes, Vol. II, p. 270.
"PStenti.slvi;:;:r recources 1"1c1:.K1es EEct1..'r'1J. re~ ')l'I'ces o.11(i !i1ennower. G8r1Y1 ,:"ny, of C('l~r:'e, ':78.S Cieprived of ; \11 C \"1 of DO I'
Dctuul

vtnr'

rJD..terial--vJtlrG11.:Lps,

me11,

S11.d.

EtI·rnD"(t'~c~nts.

Temperley has called attention to this strugr<le.
natur~3lly,

If

"Very

he says, "those stptes which by bitter experience knew

most of the sufferings of war,andy the accident of position were
most ex:-,osed to them, were n)t

;2

rlxious to give

UD

the protections

of the old order, such as they were, except for deflnlte promises
of assistance under effective sanctions.

No less naturally the

great non-contlnental st<'tes, with their less inti-nate knowledge
of the horrors of land-wal'f8re ana their tre.dition t'gainst iClterference and alliance, were less in bondage to fear, and, while
full'JT intending to meet the demRnds 01" ciuty and honour, prefE:rr-ed
to leave the narticular [,eci2ion8 to posterity.
comDromise---./ll

The result was a

One mi~ht add that if there were a compromlse,

it was between the Americen and English delegatlons; not between
the two groups we have named •

..

Their draft having been disc2rded, the French came

£'01'-

ward with Bmendments to Articles 6, 8, and 14 of the Hurst-I';iil1er
y

draft~

at the eighth meeting of the Commission.

Bonrgeois read a

lengthy paper, amd asked that it be inserted in the minutes.
esnecially

,.

stre~'f'ed

He

the fai111re of the Covenant as drafted to pro-

vide for the certainty of execution of its decisions, even in case
of unanimous agreement.

1/

In view of the neces sary conseqlJ,ences, II

declared Bourgeois, !litis imnerati ve that stronp:i:n'" provisions be
introduced in order to nrotect a st8te acting in good faith against
a 3te.te which

:LS

acting in bad faith.

Otherwise it would haDpen

that nations fail.hful to their international obligations would suffer as the result of an organisation effective in aopearance , but
1.

2.

rremperley, Vol. VI, pD. 441-2.
Articles 7, 8, and 16 of February Covenant. For the text of
the February Covenant, see Miller, Vol. II, pD. 387-35.
It is annexed to the minutes of the tenth meeting of
the Commission.

in reality a tr8p for nations of good faith.

Our Commission cer-

tainly does not want this--_. 1I1
He then DToceecied to :Jffer the three amendments.

The

first one referred to Article 14 of the Hurst-I, iller draft which
concerned the

ap~lic8tion

of sanctions.

that after one of the contestin

The French proposed

parties had refused to accept

the verdict of tne trlb 11 nlOtl,' or the unanimous deCision of tne
Executlve Council, the latter should

a~:olr

the Associated. Govern-

ments to aoply RDDropriate sanctions from among those listeQ in
tbe same article.

2

This amendment was referreci to the drafting

committee.
The second .b1 rench amendment drew down unon it the bitter
opoos i tion of the

An()~lo-American

group.

In re[J:ard to the redllction

of national arm8ments as envisap;ed in Article 8 of the Hurst-1',iller
3
draft, Bourgeois proDos8C1 that the Executive Council Hestablish an
inteJnationRl control of' troons end armaments, and. the "Ugh Contracting Parties agree to SUl/Yrli t

themselves to it in all good

faith.

It will f'ix the conditions under which the permanent ex-

istence

~nd

organisAtion of an

in~ernational

force maybe assured.

n4

The French were facing the Droblem of war in a realistic manner,
1.

-.

2.

3.
4.

Miller, Minutes, Vol. II, D. 290. For the ~oaper WlllCh BourgeoisreB-d, and which was _'nserted in t'c-i.e mlnutes, see
Vol. II, 1m. 290-3(English), and Vol. II, pp. 458-62(French).
A con:parison of the English and F'rench binutes of the ei."'hth
meeting of the Cormnission which contain the naper submitted bvBourgeois reveals certain discrepancies. Under the
parap;~aph beginning with the numeral 1, the English Lcinutes
1
begin If Article 1111 o,1illor, rl, 290), while the B rench Minutes begin llL' article XlVii (jdller, II, 459). Again, under
the second amendment~ the last naraPTa1)h i~ the J~nglish Minutes reads, If I offer this as a new amendment to Article
8.iI(Nlilley" 11,292), while the corresponding French Mlnutes read, II I offer this new ameneJrl1ent to article XIIi. tI
(Biller, II, 461).
It would seem that in the first case
the Prench Minutes are correct, and in the second, the English. It is easY to understand such discrepancies in the
numbE:;rlng of the' articles, si ce they were being changed
from time to time~
Article 8 of February Covenant.
Miller, Min~tes, Vol. II, p. ~92.

while Wilson was facing it in an idealistic manner.

The former

considered SOHle form of supervision necessary "to put a stop to
preDarations for fresh wers on the Dart of nations acting in bad
faith, and to protec t honest na t-lons agai:ls t ever'Y sudden attack-J,l,
while the latter believed that "the onl:T method by which we can
achieve this end lies in our having confidence in the good faith
of the nations who belong to the League. 1I

2

The third L,'rench amendment was of little concern to the
Commission.

It was inclllded in tbe Covenant of February 14, and re-

mains in the present Covenant.

3

Article 6 of the Hurst-lvliller

drett was to be amended to forbld the edmission of' any ne.tion which
tioes not possess renresentative instltutions and a responsible
government, and which has no sincere intention to Ablde by its
obligations.
The second amendment drew the ,_ ire of op)osi tion in the
debates which followed its presentatlon, because of the fact that
it contained the elements of 8U1Jervision or armaments and international force.

Larnaude, the second Prench delegate on the Com-

mission, was afraid that 811 the sacrifices of the war would be
vain if a stronp; Lef3gue of Nations were not created.
thought,1I he

contend~ti,

"Can it be

"that we shall pass imrrediately from the

state of intensive mllitsrism in which we Ilve to a state of practical dis(,Jrmament?

To-day we are in a period of transition.

We

must have national contingents alwBYs ready to reassure the states
within the L~ague.

The sacrifice which is asked of each state will

he negligible beside this.
-'-

.

2.
3.

't'he idea of an inter·national fore,,' 12

I:iller, Mhmte2, ~rol. II, y::. 292.
Ibid, Vor.-fL-p. 297.
Ibid, Vol. I, p. 208. These notes are Miller's. Article 6 of
--the Hurs t-Miller draft is Article 7 of the flebrnary Coven8.nt,
and Article 1, Dar8vra~h 2 of the Dresent Covenant.

bound up with the very idea of the League of Nations, unless one
is content that tl1e LE?ague should be a screen of false security.lfl
Wilson replied that "we are ready to f'ly to the assistance of those
who are attacked, but we cannot offer

mOY'e

than tbe condition of

the world en::lbles to rdve. ff2
Bour·geois evincea li'rEtllCe' s wiLLingness to [Jave her armies
controlled by the League, but Wilson countered with the statement
that "any control, by whatever name it may be called, will be too
offensive to be a60pted", and then added a verbel nromise in these
words, "All that we cn promise, and we uo nromise it, is to maintain our military forces ln such a condition that the world will
feel i tsel£' in sRfety.
we will help

:'.TOU,

When danp:er corles, we too w ill come, and

but ;Ton must trust us.

our mutual good f!' i tho 11

3

'Nilson

W2S

'.fie mll.st all ce'lend on

op"osed to sny control of

national armaments by the League, 2.1 tho1..1J<:ll bO'urgeois had declared
that he used the word 'control' in the sense of 'surveillance' or

•

'vel'ii'ic:;:;tion' .4

The 1,lrench regarded the proposed

:I

controllingll

Commission as the co-ordinatinr. factor in at;fmbling the national
5
contingents, and using them against agp:rcEsive stetes.
Wilson

s~rmpathized with~he

E'rench to a certain extent,

but he was thinldng of the great difficulty of gett-in:' the rni ted
states into the League.

he attem)ted to straddle the question.

After stating that America could not consent to such control by the

.
-

J

•

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

T"iller, Nlinutes, Vol. 11,('. 296.
Ibid, Vor.--II ;--:9])' 296-7.
Ibid, Vol. II, p. 297.
Ibid, Vol. II, p. 29;".
Compare this sunervisory Corrrrniss ion with thePermrnent International ~taff nroposed in the Frencr) Plan fol' a League
of Nations, abo~e ~p. 77 ff.

League because of her constitution, he admitted, "Some plan must
be worked out by which every country sha.LI have a suffIclent i'orce,
first, to mRintain its nRtional security, secondly, to contrlbute
to international safety.----I know how France has suffered, and I
know th:::rt she wishes to obtain the best guarantees oossible before she enters the Lep,pJe, and eT;erythinp: ttwt we ce.n do in this
direction we sh211 do, bnt we cannot 2cceot DI-OPOS81s which are In
direct contradiction to our c:onstitlJ.tion. 1I1
As far as control of her armaments is conce.ned, .J:I'l'ance
does not consider U:8t she is losinv any degree of (;lgnity Hl accepting it, spo lee 130urgeois.
guarantee,

II

If

It is a corn on 1[,easure of mutual

he contHlUed, ilwllich has nothing offensive in it, since

it would apply equRlly to all Hie Grea.t Powers, and. since it is
made by common acco:-c"d amongs t them all.

We are de81ing with every-

one on t.he footinr: of y)erfect equa.li ty, and we do not think tbat
this step would involve any sflcrifice of independence."
assayed the role of arbitl"ator, offering to the French

2
B

Cecil
proposed

permanent comJlllnission to iladvise" the League of Nations on mili-

.

t ary end nava 1 questlons.

,.

3

Cecil's proposal later became Article

9 of the February Covenant, and is Article 9 of the Dresent Covenant.
'rhe French amendments were placed in the hands of a drafting committee composed of Cecil, Larnaude, Veniselos, ana Vesnitch, along
4
with tile otl'.er articles thst had been passed by the COrnYrllssion.
f1'his drafting committee met on February l~, 1919, and
the :£I'rench again insisted on the adoption of their qmendrnents into
1.
~.

3.

hlller, :Minutes, Vol. II, po. 293-'1.
Ibio, Vol. 11, p. 297.
The League has Sl.Ich 8. body at the "()resent time--rrhe Permanent
Advi20r"'r COrnYl 1is 8 ion anpoJ.nted. in 1920. An additional Commission~ the 'J.'empoI·ary Mixed Commission was created in
the following yeer. This second COIYl.l1lission was reorganized
in 1924 under the name of the co-ord.ination Conm"lission.
(See Hershey, l1p. ;:'08-9, footnotes.)

the draft Covenant.

Lord Cecil, opposed to binding obligations,

was willing to grant only a Permflnent Comrlission to aClvise the
League on militar'Y and naval questions.

Wilen the :£tlrench showea

little interest 1n this sop, Cecil reminded them that 1f the
Leecl'ue were not sUGcessful, Great britain ana. the "futed. states
1
woulG. offer an allisnce trest:l to guarantee them security.
r1'he
drexting cormni ttee finished its wor·k tbat ,same day.
On the following day, B'ebr1.1al'Y 13th, the Com:nllssion held
an all-dey session, its ninth and tenth meetings.
noon
I

se~sion,

the tenth

meetin~

At the after-

of the Cormission, the Prench aga1n

"

argued for their .international Arrr.aments
an International General Staff.

~::'upervisory

Commission and

]vliller says in 'nis notes that the

afternoon meeting besan with "a ver'Y long debate on the lilrench
amendments to Art1cles 8 and 9; these modified somewl1at the eal'lier
~irench

prop6sals, but still contained the idea of an International

General Staff.
down, the only

rl'hey were unacceptable and necessarily wer·e voteu
conce~sion

made by Cecil being the. insertion of a

few words in Article 9 ___ .,,2

It was the last stand for the French

delegates, for they knew th8t on the next day the Covenant would
be presented to the Pe.ace Conference in plenary session, and they
debated at great length.
Uouru:eois 'Oointed out that his commission would not run
around snooP1ng into the affairs of the different countries to do
its verU"inp.

An international cm;imittee cam make arrangements

for· tlle manner in which the supervisory Commission shall work.
maintained that nations
1.

2.

lI

He

are obliged to foresee trlat certain states,

Miller, Vol. I, pp. 216-7.
See also H. Lansing, J'h~_. Peace
Negotiations, a Personal ~arrative, p. 179. He regards
the proposed -Trreaty of Alliance - as 1ntended to remove
the Prench proposals for an International Military Staff
ano. an independent Rhenish hepublic.
Ibid, Vol. I, p. 243.

· v o --

even those that are in the Society, may fail in their agreements;
I '"

if that were not the case,

~e

would not have to make provisions

a8ainst those who violate the compact.

We all have good faith,

but there m8y be some country who fl?ils in the comnact, whether
It vio18tes 8n article of the q;omnact, or conc8[,12 its or-eparations.
---It is indisDens~,ble that so e verific8tion be made. til

Other'

delegates, notably KrEm2r of Czecl;oslovakia, urged mili tery control
of LJermany, but the L"ren;;h did not as sociate themselves with this
group.

France urged that aJl nations, including themselves, be

subjected to the

S~):r1e requirement~. 2

During hls verbal duel with Wilson, bourgeois spoke these
challenging words,

"Now if you do not establish a control--I don't

use tl:e word in the sense 'which shocks you--if' you

C10

not establish

sn inspection, if you let nations organize in sllence and in secr-et
unlmown forces or war mes sures, whlch will rB-:oidly uevelop; then
in place of decreasinp the risk of war, on the contrary you encourage war.

,,3

Disregarding this wHrning, the Comrnisslon by a

1

vote of 12-3 smotl1ereci tre French attempt to insert a ol"ovislon
4

for their supervisory COIT'.TI'ission into the Govenant.
'[Ihe other }:<'rench nro'nosal w01Jlo bave created an International General ~~ taft, although J)ourr,eois aid not call it by that

...

1.
2.
3.
4.

Miller, Vol. 1, nne 248-9.
Ibid, Vol. I, nn. 247-2.
Ibid, Vol. 1, n. 21>(' •
Ibid, Vol. I, p. 251; Vol. II, lilinutes, p. 319. Bourgeois,
--Larnaude, and Kramar(czechoslovakia) voted for tne amendment. B'or the text of this amendment, see .i iller, Vol. I,
p. 260. It pr)vided for ilune co:mrnis~_~.2!l char'gee des.
'constations necessaires. 1I See also Davies, pp. 4i::::!O-1.
rle also thinks-tbe t---some kind of supervis ion is neces sary,
even tr ow<h it is admitted to be lneffectlve and unsatisfactory.
1

'do

name.

'Phe l"rench delegate argued in this fashion:

certain eventualities be "re-o:'reo. against'!

ItMust not

IVi\.lst not the existence

of a permanent o"ganization, which I will not define, and which
1 do not call a genernl steff, but a permanent organism charged
wi th anticipating; and preD8rinp: the military and naval means for
the execution of' tr-_e ob1i?atlons imposed

[)y

the ore2ent convention

on the contrscting sartie2, be considered and Drovided?
F';anization FlUst be able to leeep

1)

,

a continual

This or-

corre~'nondence

with

the diffel'ent countries and to call the attention of all of them
to what it is necessary to

~rovlde

menace become:: certain, and lf ble
no time will be

108 t,

and preDare, so that, if the
agre~\~'lOn

actually occlll'red,

arld all ' ;, ill be done which s[\[';11 0e neces sary

to block the ap;r:re~ ~'ion.lIl

This Dermanent ol'f,anJsm to study and

pY'eD8re plans which will insure eJ'fective Lea.r:ue action In cese of
aggression was intended to be a separate article in the Covenant,
and Larnaude thou,,~ht it was very nodest In comparJ.20n wi til the
2
earlier ,-,'rench demands for an international army.
Thus, it r'18~r be seen t[ at t_e'I'eneh were being

pushed

back in all their atte~;cpts to insT.ltute

;11

v/ere forced to moderate their- dem8n(ls.

.l"'ailini' in their attempts

to ~ain the internationtl force,

Hl,;ernational army, and

chey d~sirea permanent machlnery

for bl'inving sanctions into force '/11 thout cjel:::,y.

,'his maelll.nery

was contemolated in tile 8bove f)nkndmen t 'Nillen -ol'ovided

1'01'

ttle

creation of a body VlhC?se Ciut," W01-'_LO be to work 'Y~Jt sehelne~, of' co3
'
ooerh t lon 1n aavaTIce.

1.
2.
3.

,'.

·,'L;"J'V:'."T

-

~iller,

':lere hole.inv
- trlelr C',xound do [';p;edly,
--

Vol. I, p. 254.
Ib iel , 'j:) 1.. I, p. 255.
rrenroGrle~T, Vol. VI, ·0'. 447-f~. The tex~,2 of this. al1lenQI.~ent
and the other one ereatin~ 2 supervlsory conW1SSlon are
fO"1IlcL in the l: r<:311ch linutes, liller, Vol. II, }l~. 491.
i

but they were fiphtin n '
'.

losL)rr~
,

f.

Chair l , reJ.11seet
-",
,.
conClllCGlon.
si tU2:.tion,

l)!lttle.

Sseing the hopelessness of tLe

c::::11eo for a vote on the amend ent.

.'.J8.I'l1;I'ci.S

t.t!e ';"'rencn reg8rded their EJnenoment
thell' J..'l.rst proposFls and Cecll' s

mlssion

conside~ed

Cec iI, who was in t:ne

88

In consideration of the

a haPDY mechurr betweEli

:~):l"o"'oseQ

it too drastic ;nd

,h.l thouSh

(;OI11~is,,;ion,

re5ec~e6

~rench

It.

the Com-

2

trctics, it

~JJst

be re-

membered that they ','fere forced to act 8 t a great dis8.dvantr.c·).
3Jur~eois

,"

called attention to this fact:

"PleRse n:te that we

are in a 8o':11ewhat delicate situation, for Vie arB

only by

3mendin~ t~e

our lnterruptions an

text

Dr0')~sed

a~pect

r:;1':1"78

in the

by the Chair, and that gives

ttat 1

mission.
The re:.:: t of t[,eJoV6!lant was ciuly acwpteo 8.t this meet-

~)1'[lctiCI:l1 and a humane ,jocurrrent i1

1.

:'iil"'oll",aC' ",b"e11t
o

2.

"cau~e~'h~

had

f'PO,'1

,

and Inade tne sti tem()nt ttlot

the after:10,:;n neetir1C\ of' Peb. l;~i, bo-

t~- atte~1d a rJ1eeting of the'::::oul1cil of Ten.

Cecil took his place in the Chair', Uilley', Vol. I, p. 840)
Liller, Linutes, Vol. 11, p. 321; and Vol. I, p. ~5':). 'l'h\:?
number '-voting for and agalns t is not c-:i ven.
'Cbl'Q' , Vol ..1..T , P • 94?~
"e
.L
~
.~.
..;; '" ,')130 J:. 2. i,::a]{el', ~,70odro·:r:;1l3()n
- - .• ".- -.- ,,- - - - ._. - - a n d JOl'ld E'ettleiu.mt, Vo1. I, D' 2f:?,O.
r

_ , _ _ _ ~_..-.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ,. _ _ " _ _ _ ••

~

. .v _ _
•

vV

the
-.

~-

physical
force of trw
VJorld
-..--.,.- - .-----------.. shall. III
-._~._._~--"-

-.-~-

--,~--

..

In spite of the fact that certain Amer:ican dele";ates
t~;8

cud not wish that he spesk or
C)

Confel'el1J~e,

::'oul'J~eois

did so •.~,

Frellc.h L1nend1:1.onts 1),;1"o1'e the

He exnressed the hope that sorne

consideration for the ~rench propos~ls mi~ht be secul"ed, and thAt
they mipbt be brouc:ht
with tr:e Coveu2nt.

~.jefore

:,::'.8

ou.blic oninion of

t~le

'flOrId alone;

He also 8tres~:ed the ooint tlwt ~n,e8.S1Jres must

be pre Y' ped beforehand to put a b1'a:(e on the

8.C

tion of 8gr:,res si ve

nations, and ttu;.t l;'r~'D.ce re2GY'ved the ril.ht to Dy·opose her two
arnencunents !Jt

future time.

8

3.

I~3ny

members of tt,8 Confer-ence er:-

:Jected him to ilF1G.ke a drGmatic prot'3st agai'lst the failure of the
League Covenant to ;')rovidf: for an international standing army for
policing the world. ,,4
111'. White tells us,

These men were sedl,! disappointed, for ~1 s

"He lit no oratoricel fire.---Ho heat of debate

was in the ceremony; nothing ofL'.8 ~-lJU:::- l,"J~1.en the F' rench threatened
to block the whole scheme because Fl'ance was left without nn inter-

'"

'
na t iona 1 s t en d lUg
army---. "c'

L1'. Barnes, noted British Labor leader, expressed the
pOJ.nt that the s:,nctions in tLe Covenant were vague.
have been glad,

II

ill 8h:'1'.10.

he said, lito have seen s:)nle provlslon for

tile

nucleus of an international forGe which would be ready to strilce
against an aggressive nation.

This, ~ know, cuts into the ldea of

the soverei nty of nations, but I hope that---the affiliated states--1.

2.

3.
4.
5:

1\Jiller, lhinute~, Vol. II, p. 562. (I have added tue italics)
Seymour, Vol. IV, ~. 317. -Colonel House says, ude trie0 to
get :ou1'geois not to mention nny of the reservations he
had made concerning the Covenant, but our efforts were
f'utile-w--. tI
Americ8.D <TournaI of Intern5t ional LavI, Vol. 13, ,?p. l8fi-6.·
For Bourgeois'
speech see Miller, "l\aE.~te_s_, Vol. II, pp.
568-73.
W. A. ~:\'hite, 'Hoodrow WiL::on, or). 408-9.
IbiC!, 1). 409.---------·-
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can adjust their national life so as to

a~nit

of co-operation than is in this docurr~ent. "I

of a greater degree
?he

0::

2JTIe \vish was

expressed by Veniselos in these words, fiI should be glad if this
constitutional op )osition could be removed and if a contingent
could be fixed, which each state would be
a view to intervention, if necessary."

obli~ed

to keep up with

2

The next day, :8'ebruary lfith, VVilson sailed for the United
states witiJ. this Covenant for a Les.0:ue of lifations. 3
fr-om Paris for

8

month, from February 14 to March l·b.

rie was aiJ"ay
Iv;ennwhile

the ¥rench were looking in other directions for security.
same day that Clemenceau

WDS

On the

shot and wounded by a Communist, Foch

insisted on the limitation of the boundaries of Germany to the
Rhine for the protection of F'l'ance. 4

A few days later, Clemenceau
5

urgeo. tHe creation of' a Rhenish Hepublic.

Wil son l"eturned in early 1"arch bringlng with t1lm the demand of American public ooinion for
the IVlOnroe Doctrine in the Coven!1llt.

f~ome

reservation concerning

There were several other

1)roposed changes, but the important pr'oblem was to nlease the
people of the United 8tates. 6

The British and American delegations

imrnedia tely put their heads together, and worked out several changes
in the Covenant on ~,1arch IFl, before t.lle Comrnission resumed it s meet-

.

lngs.

1.

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

7

The Anglo-Saxon stearn-roller was beinp; oiled up again.
Miller, Minutes, Vol. LL, p. 575. UnfortuD2tely for the
:B'rench~'" Bernes was not appointed on the Commission.
:b'or
the view of British Labor, see above, p. 41, note 1.
Ibid, Vol. 11, D. f76.
Ibid, Vol. 1, p. 276. ,See also, Seymour, Vol. IV, p. 319.
~eymour, Vol. IV, Pl). 3~'S8-3, 3;')1.
Ibid, Vol. IV, p. 334.
MilTer, Vol. 1,- P'l. 276 ff.
Ibid, Vol. I, ~p. 279 ff. See also Vol. 11, Document 24,
---- -- pp. 580 ff-.
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The Commission resumed its meetings on March 22, 1919,
holding its eleventh meeting on that day.

Throughout the Covenant

the words "E;tate:.:: ?Iembers of the League" were substituted for
those of "high Contracting Parties".

Toward the close of the

meeting, as the discussion centered around Article 8, the

~rench

brought up their proposed amendment concerning a supervisory commission to inspect national armaments.

Bourgeois reported that

this amendment had been unanimously adopted at the recent international meeting of League" of Nations societies in London. l

He

reiterated that such verification was necessary to world peace,
/'

and that it could be arranged in such a way Lu!t it would not be
offensive to the suscentibilities of any state.
Veniselos tried to offer a compromise plan for the French
and Anglo-Americl'l1. delegations

(,y

proposing that the Council of

the League undertel{e t>'le necessary investigation instead of the
commission proposed by the

9.
French.·~

His efforts were in vain, how3
ever, before the unyielding opoosition of Cecil and WJ_lson.
Cecll
argued that such. a commission was

unneces~'ary,

since no natlon

could hide its military activities, but Larnaude replied tnat at
a certain battle in the World 'Nar the French army had been surprizect
by a larger number of Germr:ill soldiers than had been exoected.

He

al so reminded Cec il of the secret deadly WeA1JOnS of tf1e Germans
"
"d f"lre ana, 1_arge cannon. 4
during the War--llqul

'i'hese arguments

were unavailing, and when the arnendment was not accented, Eourgeois
1.
~.

3.

Miller, ~viinu..~e2' VoJ. II, p. 343.
Ibid.
Ibid, Vol. I, n. 320: see also, French Minutes, Vol. II,
--~OD. 509 iT.
Wilson seems to have opposed thlS amendment
the r:rc'und that it smacked of a super-state. he also
had in mlnd the prlnciples of the American Constitution.
Ibid, French Iviinutes, Vol. II, p. 510. Ivliller's own notes are
--both-concTs-e-- and significant: IlFrench amendJ:1ent pl'oposed.
President obiects to it. Veniselos proposes a comnromise---.
President ag~in objects. Cecil objects.H(Vol. I, ~. 320)

on

4.

..
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reserved the right to present it again to the Cor;lmission and the
next plenary session of the Pe~ce Conference.

1

At the twelfth meeting of the Commission on lVlarch 24,
the French carLe forward with a mOCiified form of' their old amenoment for rm international general staff. 2

The permanent organi-

zAtion that the French proposed to create would concern itself
wi th preparing plans of mili tar~T and naval action which would be
suLmitted to the Council in C8se of a threatened attack or any
danger of a warlike character.

Its chief function would be the

prevention of surnrise attacks by Covenant-breaking Powers.

Such

a body is contempJ.ated by David Davies in his elaborate scheme for
an International Police :B'orce.

He calls it an Operations Board,

and makes it consist of representatives of all the military branches-Naval, Nali tal~V, Chemical, and Air--under the chairmanship of' the
High Constable.

"---'rhis Board, II he explains, "would be Y'esponsible

for the preparation of the

tactic~-]l

schemes and policing strategy

to be employeo by tJJ.e composite force.

When called upon to do so,

they would submit these schemes to the international authority for
approval. ,,3
Wilson replied that inasmuch as :B'rance had a member on
the Council, she would be 8ble to give the danger signal, and Insist u')on some plan of action or co-operation:

Cecil clung to his

so-calleo. comprorrise Article 9, uroviding for an advisory commissior:.
At this stage of the proceedure, Hymans of Belgium attempted to play
1.

2.
3.

1\1iller, Minutes, Vol. II, p. 343.
Ibid, Vol: II, pD. 344 ff. ~,ee also ):<'. Morley, A .'3ociety
- - o f Nations, pp. 1;:)5-60, especially note 42. Bourgeois
accused the ner'spapers of misinterpreting his amendments.
Davies, D. 456.

.lut::!

the role of conciliator: he fared as badly as had Veniselos during
l
the eleventh meeting.
The British and American delegates were
absolutely "opposed to the idea in any form of words.,,2
again made a reservation in

re~ard

The French

to this amendment, as they had

done at the previous meeting.
The ¥rench delegates also proposed to anply the sanctions
of Article 16 to the International Tribunal of Article 13.

This

proposal would have put real teeth behind the decisions of that
body.

Such a strong potion was too powerful for the Anglo-American
3
group to swallow, and it was not accepted.
This proposal was by
4
no means a new one; it had been sug~ested before by the ~rench.
After a two day Bdjournment the Commission held its
thirteenth meeting on

~arch

26.

There was a long discussion be-

tween the Prench delegates on one side, and the British and American on the other, concerning withdrawal from the League.

The

former desired a Leap:ue {rom which withdraw 1 would be dlfficult,
while Wilson argued that such
•

of nations, and

th~t

3

League w,)uld impair the sovereignty

the TTnited states Senate would reject a Cov-

enant which d.id not provide for easy

withdl~8wal. 5

Toward the close of the meeting, as the revised text of
the Covenant wes about to be referred to a draftinG'; co,[;1ittee,
Bourgeois reminded the Co mission of the two B'rench amendments

...
I

'"

providing for a "verifying" disarmament commission and a corn:missian to pre9are tactical ~easure2.

1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

He was prevailed upon, but not

I'1iller, Iilinutes, Vol. II, p. 347. See above, p. 100.
Ibid, Vor:-r;-p. 324. See also, P. I.orley, A ;3?_cie~of
---Nations, up. 155-60.
Ibld, Vol. I, po. 33~-4.
Seyrllour, Vol. IV, DO. 314-15. At the ninth and tenth meetings House notes that the French w~nted to put somethlng
in the Covenant about the. Hague rI'I'~ bunal. One is struck
with the distrust of the Fre~ch by House.
lViiller, Minutes, Vol. II, P p. 357-8.

.L.VO

without some difficulty, not to demand a final vote on these proposals.

1

The last two meetings of the CommisslOll, the fourteenth
and fifteenth, were held on Aprll 10 and 11.

The Covenant which

had been in the hands of the revising committee was presented and
discusred:

the Prench amendt!lents were not included in the document.

When, at the fourteenth meeting, the discussion reachecl Artic.Les
8 and 9, Bourgeois a:':r:>ln reserveci the right t') bring forward his
amendments before the plenary session of the Peace Conference which
was to be held in a few days.

At the same meetlng Wilson and Cecil

pushed through the Commission the honroe Doctrine amendment, even
though the Ii'rench op"oseci it.

A British amendment Vi ving League

members liberty of action in case the Cmncil rendered no unanimous reDort

re~2rding

ing in snite of French

a disDute was adopted at the fifteenth meet?
opposit~on.-

Baron Mankino of Japan made his plea for the recognition
of the

~)rinciDle

Covenant.

of race equality oy amending the t'rearnble

of' the

His proDosal was well-received, and in spite of the fact

that it received 11 of 17 votes, 'iiilson Geclared it not adoptea for
lack of a nnanimous vote.
1.

2.

r"

V.

3

'l'he liberty-loving British and the dem-

P. Morle:!, 1\ 20ciety oflJations, n. 175.
Miller, IVlinD_te-S;-V6T~~-iT,--p-.--3t30. See also Vol. I, p •.. 4fib,
where-Miiler notes tlH'.t this amendment was accented.
Ibid, Vol. II, p. 392. See also Vol. I, p. 464. house and
._- -Wilson refused to vote on the Japaneese amendlnent (Seymour, Vol. IV, p. 428). The eleven votes cast in favor
of the amenrunent were by the follovling states: Japan (2),
France (2), Italy (2), Brazil (1), China (1), Greece (1),
Yur:oslavia (l), and Czechoslovakia (1). Two members of
the Commission, Smuts and Hymans, were absent. The negati ve vote "as not taken, but the British se'~;m to have
be~n the chief opponents of the amendment, and the AmeriC2n delegation abstained from voting.

.LV':!:

ocratic Americans were not among the group voting for the ,TaDanese
amendment.

In fact, Wilson made a special ruling that a unanimous

vote Was necessary WhOll an

objectio~ WhS

pressed by a Power.

Lar-

naude dissented from this rultng, claiming that it was not in accordance with previous rulings, but Wilson over-ruled him.l

In

accor-dnnce with this rulinp:, the B'l'(:nch cc,uld have blocked every
attempt to leave out their- own amendmsnts if t.bey had wished to
do so; yet we fiEd that they yielded to the opposition of the Anr;loAmerican group, 8.nd rather than disrupt the meetings of the Commis;:;ion they prefer-red to lose the].r amendments.

2

Is it little

wonder that Japan has withdrawn from an organ zation whicb since
its very be["inning has regarded her as an inferlor member of society
because of her race?

3

The Corm is E ion renortr)cl its Covenant to t.he Fonrth £'len8.ry bession of the Peace Conference on April 28, 1919.
agBln sDoke in favor of his

80

Baron l,akino

ondnent, exnressing the deep regret

his people felt 1)ec811se the Comrris sion had not acce·sted their ·OY'ODosal of race eauali ty. 4 Bourgeois also c.:n·esented the F'rench emen6ments to Articles 8 flnd 9 providing for a super-visor:v arr l 8.n,ent commission and a commis2ion to prenare tactical measures.
great length, he f1rvued th=tt the sovereiv!.)ty of

,•
...

solute, but limi teo. by the rivhts of otl'er
1.

2.

3.

4.

Stete~1

state~:;,

8nd

Speaking B.t
is not abtr.i.at limits

Killer, Vol. I, p. 464. Wilson claimed that the French had
not made deflnite objections in regard to the rejection
of the ir amendments. fI In other words, Ii says 111i11e1', u'Nilson ruled in this case that unanimlty was necessary when
an objection was finally pressed."(Ibiti)
Se-;rmour, Vol. IV, p. 428, see footnote.
Even Iiouse was 1'orce6.
to ad.mit that the ;"rench c uld have blocked tIle revising
of the Covenant if they had pressed their objections. See
ibid, Vol. IV, pn. 430~l for the final attitude of the ~rench
in-removing all objec'ions to the Dass8ge of t.he Covenant
even though their proposals had been rejected.
F. Morley, A 00clety of N~tion2, p. 206, footnote 59. In
I<"ebr~l.Bry,-1932,-a-,Tap2.nese representative on the CO\l.n?il
remarked on the inferior treatment of Japan by otner Powers.
Miller, llinute.l:.., Vol. II, pr:. 708-4.

-~----
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-------~.----~~
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ought to be fixed to tte absolute sovereip;nty of states by effective
and sure sanctions being Dlaced in the Covenant.

l

The object or

the League of l'lations is to assure the ma~mten.ance of peace, he
contlnued, but the Covenant Dlaces no j'eal obllcation upon the member stl':tt(c)S to furnish mlli tary

contln~

ents whj.cb will be neces sary

to accomnlish this end.i he 1 ill'i tatlon of ar R.Irents is a necessary
condition to world Jeace , and

.courF'~eois

showed how ttl js end would

be ei'fectlve1y accomplished by the proT_)osed commission nrovlded by
thel';rench amendlnents.

Denvlng that the gener'a1 staff nroposed by

his nation would tske the form of a dangerous super-state, the
French delegate declared that it would ore!)are military measures
and be on p;11Prd for

I'D'!

source of trouble.

IIThis Cr)!]1..rnission, VIe

repeat, will work Olll.IT under the instructions of the CouncIl; its
studies will always be directed toward a purely defensive end. u2
Bourgeois also reminded the Peace Conferenoe that two
meetlngs of great 82sociations advocating a Lear:ue of l'Jations held
at London and -t'arls hEd endorsed hlS amendments.
included English, j\Jl1erican, Ltalian, 1. elc:lan,
_ and Chinese delegations.

1'1'les0 assoclations

hOUl11aIll

an, Yvgoslavian,

'1'he British Labor Party and 'frede Union

.had advocated the control of' nrr~aY'!ents. 3

Casting the spotlight

back on the hOI'rib.Le str 1.uu"le that had just ended, h.e proceeded,
"We can S8_y that tbe spirit of Tilankind thro:'lf:hout the entire worla
looks forward to that certainty that such horrors shall never again
be ex:)erienced, and therefore, the time is favorable to arm powerfully the guardian institution to which we wish to tr'ust tue defence

1.
G.

3.

l,jiller, Linutes, Vol. 11, pn. 706-7.
Ibid, Vol-:-·-·~I-I-;--p. r/lO.
Ibid, pD. 710-11.

See also t1ershey, pp. 17b-6.

--
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of civilization.---WhBt responsibility will be that of tne authors
of the great Char-ter if, throuph so e lack of foresif;ht, the absence of guarantees which are ef1sy to secure, or the refus8.l to
make some sacrifice, they increase, be it in the smallest measure,
the risks of sucL a catastropheL"

1

striking at those who accused France of acting entirely
in her own behalf in advocating these amendments, bourgeois concluded his speech thus:

"We li'rench do not spe& I~ merely in the

name of our seventeen hundred thousand dead, but in the name of
those innumerable dead who gave thelr Ilves for the

cau~,e

of hight

on all tne frontiers 01' E'urope, and who wished that their children
and tJ:1elr children's children be safe from such slaughter---. 11

2

His pleas fell upon deaf ears, 2nd the Covenant was adopted without the }:t'rench proposnls providing for effective international
action in case of

a~gression

and breach of obligation.

.3

France was defeated, but she went down with colors flying.

Colonel House

great spirit.

,I

hi~self

was forced to tiay a tribute to her

---Clemenceau allowed nothing to interfere with

the pr-ompt ratification of the Covenant, not even the scruples
the l"rench deler'ates themselves," says the Colonel.

of

liThe objections

of the French delegates, which might have spelled ruin for the American prop:ramrae, were fitHlly sVJept as ide by the ll'rench PrEne l\lnlster himself. n4

We will recall that the Italians withdrew their

delegation when their demsnds for certain territory were refused at
1.

2.
3.

I

,.

4.

Miller, Minutes, Vol. II, pp. 711-12. His speech is entirely
in Pre-nch in the r.dnute s •
Ibid, Vol. II, p. 713.
See F. Morley, /, ~'ociety of Nations, pp. 213-16 for a good
discussi~n of'lhe -1Fren-ch-a-ttitude in the meetings of
the Commission.
Seymour, Vol. IV, pP. 430-31.

the PeAce Conference:

ttl.e French, however, yielded when their

demands for a stronger League were rejected.
Thus ended one Dhase of work at the Paris Peace Conf'erence, and each nation thought its renre:::'entatives had sacr-ificed
the most.

lIIn F'rance, it has been seid the.t Clemenceau was the

dUDe of Wilson and of Llovd Georp:e; in the United states that Wllson was the plaything of Llo.Fd George. and in England j'r. Eeynes
has v!ri tten that hi. Clemencecu tvrned the trick 810ne ."1
same great .B'rench statesman fliops out this challenge:

The
IILet them

ask themselves what they would do if' they were placed lD her position.
Then they will understand our state of mlnd."
1.
2.

...

Andre Tl'lrdieu, rl'he __Tr~u.!~~bout
Ibld, p. 472 •

2

th~_~rea~1.'

p. 102.

Chanter VI
The Pre ncb Disarm8F,ent ProV)ospls of Febr"ll'ry, 1932 •

..
>,
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Chapter VI
The Prench Disarmament Proposals of February, 1932.
A brief survey of tho period from the beginning of the
League of Nations until the Disarmament Conference of 1932 shows
that France never gave up her fight for a stronger League.

1

The

.B'rench demand for guarantees was anproved in pr'inciple by an Assembly resolution considering disarmament and international guarantees as closely connected,

ar~lcL

the principle of ttte famous Res-

olution XIV were embodied in a Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance
which was SL1.i:'mi tted to the League As semely in Septer.lber, 1923.

2

'l'his Treaty provided security for those states WhlCh disarmed,
but its obligations seemed too binding for Great Britain, and
she opposecL it.
The Draft Treaty was followed in 1924 by the Protocol
for the J:iacific Settlement of International Disputes, or the soThis document emDhasi~ed the principle

called Geneva Protocol.
of obligatorv

arbitr~tion
~

a step toward security. c·

and indicial settlement of Cl.isputes as
It was adopted. by tbe League As seifJbly on
A

October 2, 19;:;4, ami 1',.'a8 s ir:ned by seVeral small nations inunedi8.tely.·~
This great pact which correlated arbitration, security, and d1sar:rlament wes oT)posed by Great Brj.tain, and it followed the Dr2.ft
Treaty into oblivion. 5

1.
~.

3.
4.

b.

A. E. HinOrllarsh, H'or-ce in Peace, p. lIS.
League of Nat ions -;-PYe.n~fY-lTi9c:.t_~Q.g.s___
1~hird As s embly, 1923,
P. 291. Por text of the treaty see, A. E. Hindr.larsh,
;'orce in Peace, Appendix 11, plJ. 198-207(This work will
be -re1'er-red. to herinafter as llindJ'Jarsh).
G. Hosono, International Disarmament, np. Ib3-4; rtlndmarsh,
Pp. 117 ff.;-D-.--H. Idller;-TheGeneva Protocol, passlm;
and Hans Wehberg, The Outlawry of :j1iar;-- "pp. 26-()2.
League of Nations, ?ley!"~r]!~J:_~~e_t)n~i"s--oj~~Er!j:.h _fi-.~s.em1:?lx" 1924,
28th lV1eetinp;, pp. 10-11. See a180 D. 1L. l\lller, ~e
Geneva Protocol, p. 5.
Hans· ?lehberf~ l'tle" Outlav'lry 0f:Var, pp. 30-1; and Hindmarsh,
p. 120." For text of ~ i:ot"oc'oT see lIindmarsh, Apnendix III,
np. 208.-20; and Davies, Appendi~L, pp.,~74-84. _S~era~~?~
D. H. I'i:iller, Annex B, pp. 132-Eb(Both .:.'rench and l.:JDt,ll...,nj.

or

-

..L\...I.:7

These futile attemnts to attain security for the continental countries of ."2,'"ln'ope were followed by the Locarno Tre[, ties.
l1'his ssrles of pacts practic;,lly 81'ar8.ntee the terl·itoriEil status
quo resul ting fl'om the frontiers between Germany, l:<'rance, and BelGium, and YJrovides for t~le 8rbi tration of disputes. 1

Entering in-

to force on September 14, 1826, soon after the adt;ission of Germany
into the League of L'[Jtion:::, t]-lese tl'eaties were helled as a new
(;>

era in the besinning of re!l peace.~
~n

1927, Briand, F'oreip:n

I\~j_nister

of Blrance,

adore~.;sed

a

n'essage to the American people on the tenth anniversary of the en~f

trance

the Dnlted

,
tstes into the Eorld :lo.r, and this seed crew
·~r

into tno :ar1s Peace Pact the next yem'.

3

r1'hi2 instrument provides

ttl2.t each 0i2;n8tory shall renounce vtar as 3.n instrlunent of' naticrlal
DollC~,

and as the solution of int9r~ctiona1 contro~erSle~; ~ d caca

Sicnatory agrees that it will nevor se:1:: to settle

dit'.pute~l

or eon-

fIlets except by pacific means.
Jlave~hese

How ef. (:Jctive
a leedinc; p&.rt, beEm';

attempts, in which 1,'r8.nce played

Dr. Eindr;larsh ;)f ;:arv2rd T}nl versit:!

2hYS,

t.ho Geneva Prot)col, f::; iled; a t.hirci, the Locarno trsat:Les, a'~'l)lies
4
only to a limltec: recioD of t':c ':,rorld a.nd to only 8, few states .11

obli~~tion lD the Pact of Paris upon the United states or any other
~ower to join in police action_a~ainst a ststo whicn runs 81~lCk ln

1.

2.

3.

Einc;.lc:tl.l'sh, )l). 121-1; a:lC'lHans ';Jehbers, l'he Out~8wry of War,
pp _ 32 ff.
Ibid. :blor text of Local';10 t:e'8aties, see Hindrr'lGrsh, Lr:,enc:i:::,:
- I V , pp. 221-25; :-lans ';:eblJer::, .22- cit., Appendtx 3, pp.
131-3~Z,; and 5,1 Le&..:;u8 of' J\ations Treaty :::'eri93, ''''1). ·;~gn fi:'.
'l'he m:'st ir::,oortant tl->eaty of this e:rJup is t;:le Treaty of
l~tu&l Guarantee signed by Great Britain, Prance, Germany, Italy, and Belgium.
D. ~ 1 iller PeD~C Pact of' Paris, DV. 7-9. For text see
~"Iii~ilin;"rsh, AP};~ndiX V ,-lJ~D~~' 226-28; and Leaglle ()t' i18.tions
rrr'eaty c:el---l" e'" '''''''')1 94 1" ..'0.
)
~p_ ff'
.
Hindmarsh, PD. 122-23.
~~}

4.
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~
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the 'Norld, ::mc' no external body is called to point out the duty
to the sie:n:"tories in cese vioL-tioYl occu~s. III

~c

1":)1'

Dni t(;;>c1

~.ta t(a~;

f~pe8king

of P;urooe, when

before the Ls ~::embly

vinced thet, ')oli ti::: 11;T and socially aL:o, this 1'eC!el'al link
micht,

Y:ri:::~lOU t

of't'ec tL'.r; the

.
t
0 "
SUCLl an
b e 1 on~~lng

sov~rei'"nt~T

~~Ssoclatlon,

d 0 useful

'1£t in l"ebruar,'! 1938, the l"renchhad
Internntionnl Police ':'o.1'ce f'or

t~le

of F'ny of the nations

dr~)WD

·1l,"lOl'(~--·.

"12

/.11 tJ:lese

un a scheme for an

Le8 ('1..1e of Nntio'1s. 3

'.L'he first 'oPl"t of the L"1'8DCi,oronos<::Js of J:<'ebruar-y,
concern

t~e

nlacin'

of oi vil and bombinp; aircr8ft Ht the

lS corlSidered one ot tile most urroortant factors in the DHtion!?,l
:~

Germc.l1 8xpert

cLims that the d:2structtve force of the airplane is

8

hunQred

times greater now thtlD it was d1J.rlnc; the ','iorld 'X8r, 8.nd thnt the
next war will feature lare-scale air ettacks in which civilien

.,
~'~

.

<;;.

3.

p.

~221.

Leap.;ue of Na tion:c', Hecorc1 s of Tenth Ordine·1'Y Ses :0 ion of
-As sembl;T, 1 9~29, -6tl;~'T~e-e-t i!1,C; ~- -:D·.-6~--·-t;ee· -s-fs'6- EdoU8 :rd
Herriot;- The Un:Lted states of. Eurone, -OD. 49-fil.
For an accolmt-oI"tb-e-:r5isarn-anent -C'on~fe'rence see Le8::,:ue of
ITatiollS, 'fhe LeD p:ue from Year to Year, (H,l31-32), Dp.
28-46. }'or -a--Ge'i:;TIan-a-cc-ollnt--s-e-e' -I~. 2cfrm:Lcff-a-nd l~.
GrabOVlS 1 (y, The Problem of Dlsarnal11ent, pn. 55-112,
especially pn :---68-9-"\vhich -gi ve-s- -an e lCcellent c118.rt
showing the orgr.H1.ization of the Conference--the Bure!",.u,
tlle General Commission, and the six 3ub-Cornr'lissions.

...L...L...L

populations will suffer Yrru,ch. l

']lhe French plan views IIthis war

arm whose ch8racter is ttl,e most specifically offensive and the
:r:lost threatening to civilir:ns" as an instrument which offers Uthe
aggressor a

=
""1 t ~')
_• " 2

cruel we)Cpon for use against non-combat-

1)~irticu18rly

I n or d er t

0

solve the problem, the French propose tw6

lines of action.
The first line of action calls for the internationalization of Civil Air
League.

3

Trans~Jort

under a regime to be orgf:nized by the

Although it is almost univers' lly recognized that no

disarmament plan which

disre;~ardshe

of civil aviation can be succes2ful,
peatedly side-steppeo.

4

limitaticm and. re{'ulation
this question has been re-

Both the WashiGgton Conference of 1921,

and the London Navel Oonference of 1930 evaded the issue.

5

'l'he

Prepa;'atol"y Disarmament Oornrnission reflched the conclusion that
ilthe possibilit' of using civil aviation for' Durposes of war
renders the li, itation of the latter lnoperatl ve if the former is
not l.Lmited in respect of numbers and allow'able features
,1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

6
.11

The

Fenner Brockway, The BloodY,Traffic, pp. 224-5. This is a
quotation fromLt .':-Gen-.---Von h1etzsch, a war-time member
of the German General Staff.
French Disarmement Prooosals of Bleb. 1932, Ohapter I. The
text of these prooosals may be found in Appendix 1J of
this work.
A scheme for such an air transport company anpeared in France
in a !t'rench monthly Dublication on November 15, 1931. It
provided that each country should have a representative
on the administr'ative board of the company, and that the
subsidizing of international air lines may only be made by
the company. The League may requisition all alrcraft.
An international air trans'Jort company with a capital of
50 million Swiss francs is provided for, and each state is
to receive the same share of this capitalization which will
give each state the same influence in the company. , '1'he
aircraft equipment of this company is to be subject to the
complete supervision of the League of Nations.(see R. Schmidt
and A. Grabowsky, The Problem of Disarm?-ment, 'Jp. 173-4.
This work will be referred to hereinafter as Schmidt &
Grabowsky)
K. W. Colegrove, International Control of Aviation, pp. 127 1'1'.
This work will be cited hereinafter as ColegrovG.
Ibid.
.
.
.
League of Nations, ObJ~5~_t_ive __s_tudL_~~,_;the Internatlopallsatlon of
Civil Aviation, Official No.: Coni. D7c.A. 9, p. 45.
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French fear the menace of the ryresent German development of civil
l
aircraft, and her fear is shareci by other countries in Europe.
England is considered verv vulnerable to an eerial attack, and
she has not fOl'R:otten how the Zeppelins v ..Lsi ted her during the
last war. 2
The French nropose that individual r1etions agree to forbid the construction of aircraft caDsble of military use by their
nationals; 'lnles C 3uch

8

ircrp!'t is intended for tr'ans:oort use, in

which case, it would come under the regulator-.'! 'owers of the League.

3

The maximum tonnage of authorized aircraft is to be determined by
the Contracting Parties.

The plan further proposes the creation

of an internation81 civil air trRnsport service which shall operate
under the auspices of tbe Leap.:1Je. 4

The League alone has the 8uthor-

ity to build and use nach1nes of greater tonnage than prlvate aircreJt, and it must give its a"')nroval to the number, type, and ton5
nage of machines used by the various countries.
All orders for

I

•

material for the internRtional civil aViation service a~e to be

•

distributed fairly and in accordance to conditions fixed by a convention of the Powers.

The League is to be given the "exclusive,

permanent and inalient::,ble l-ip:ht ll to requisition all machines foe the
Internationel Cl viI Air 2,8rvice, and all Powers agree not to eml.

•

-::
"'
.> -

2.

"
3.
f

"

4.
5.

Schmidt i~~ Grabowslzy, p. 13;~~. Montgelas, who writes this article, holds the argmnent untenable thflt l~crge air tral1s))orts can be ea~ily changed into bombing machines. Other
authorities hold otherwise---Davies, p. 260 and footnotes;
Colegrove, '91). 127, 135; :B'enner Brockway, The__.?}0<2..d y'
'I'raff ic, p. 226; and Le ague of Hat ions, 9~~j e~t:i.:..ye S tudy ~.E:.
the--internationolisation of Civil Aviation, Off. No.:
Conf. WC. A. 9, pD. 45-=-6.
------ - - - - - Cole~~rove, p. 1:.::5. ~;ee also H. Il. Knicker-oocker 1 s article in
I,01.usville, Heral&-;'Post, ;\"arch 24, 1934. He pOlnts out that
both England-and F'rance fear the Dre2ent Heich Air Defence
League and the German commercial air fleets.
1"rench Disarr":'ement ProDosals of :b'ebrmn-y 1932, C'apter I,
Part 1, Section (a).
See above, page Ill, footnote 3.
1"rench Dis armament ProDo 881s of l<'ebrF2 r'Y 1938, Or1a-·)ter' 1,
Part 1, Sections (b) and (c). This provlsion refers to
lines between the home country and its colonies.
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bargo or sequestrate these macrunes, but to facilitate the League's
right to reql,is i tion them by all means in their power.
These French nroDosals for the international control of

An

aviation are not entirely new.
,-

In~cernational

Aerial Congress

iet at Paris as earl :,T as 18b9 to study qu.estions of' aviation when
the balloon was the oi11y succe,si'ul means of flight. 1 The question
Vfas studied at tL,e Paris .f' (0aCe Conference of 1919.

2

Every consid-

eration of international control runs cOl.mter to the nroblem of
national sovereignty.

Only the French face the problem boldly,

and base their c1isarI'f'ment nroposals U')on th,.::' internationalizBtion
of civil aviation.
The second line of action calls for the limitation of
bombing

<-!

ircraft, and the

certrin

ton~a~e

8

greement not to i·uild machines above a

for nationnl use. 3

flrst, to give t,_e

Lea~:ue

These provisions have two aims:

of llations a sU'Jerior air force;

~md

secondly, to llu1i t tile bombing aircraft of tne contrac tlng partle s.
'rhe

l~'renGh

aircraft.

plAn distinguished between two cate?ories oj:' bombing
rrhe first

cnte~ory

included bombers capable of carrsing

great loads of eXDloslves whose

tonnar~e

will be fixed by the Con-

tracting Parties. The Contracting Parties are to ar;ree that they
will not build such machines

lYl

the future; and should, they ovm

theIl at the time this plan cones into force, they agree to transfer
them to the League of Nations.

These heavy bombers will form the

nucleus of an International Air Force.
1.

2.

c.

p

Golef':rove, P'). 40 1'1'. 2e.e also, League of i~ations, Obje(~tive
study on the Internationalisatie,n of' Civil. AVlation, Off.
:l'To. : ' Conf~7cr.-A .--9~-D-:--7 for a lis t 01-:- Illternatio-nal j,ir
Conferences held before 1914.
Colegrove, pD. 55 fro
French Dis arr1ament Pro'Josals of l<'ebruary 1932, Chapter I,
Part 2, ;:.ection (a). See explanatory table annexed to
the French proposals.

1.1.4

1

(1 he League of Nations is to decide where this air force

will be stationed.

The ~roblem of finding a base for the air

fleet may be arranged in several ways.

The League mj.ght IJUrcbase

enough territory fron some;?OW01" to form tbe be.se, or the member
states might be willing to ceete the required terJ'i tOl';! to the
League.

Davies sugp:ef.\t four classes of territory whicb may be

used as bases for lnternational forces.
neutralize~

n ,', -} 1

'" "ct.'

c'
I.J .1c:..-l...

c....l..!.

c.
).-'

These are mandated areas,

or demilitarized zones, strategicFl geograohlcal points,
t

8. t

e t--', • 1

YOI' exsmples of Eucn areas we may cite the A,

B, and C LunQatei.:, B.nd the demilitarized zones of tiE Rinne territor-:'/', the shoros of the Dardanelles e.nd Bo :phorus, and the boundary
between Turkey, EulS';ar'iE, Bnc1 Greece.

','1orld str[lteglcal Doints

are founa. [,t Aden, Gibrel tar', 1,al tEj, Singa .lore, D,i ibouti, COl s ic8.,

1-.1onaCO, IJatvi a or 33 tonia, Hond'lu"1:' s, !'!eWfC11ndlanci, ano :,8i ti e.re
eX['Yimles of sr.u,ll 2tates whJ Gh

1ilir~bt

be ViiI} in r : to lease thei,r

territory to the Lea;:rue of l'Jatiolls as a base for their' intel'national
,,)

r'oreEls • ~
'fhe natj_onal l::ir'Grf:':ft is conrorised of two cl8.sfjes.

Tue

tonnage of the first class will be fixed at a certaln l~mit below
3
the tonl1Etge of the [Leavy ·'!oL]bing planes t;elon,i?,inF~~ to the League.
The second class includes all tbDse machines whose tonnage lS
greeter than the first cl&ss, and not as great as t11e heav)" bombLl.

ing class ~elon~ing to the League.-:

1.
;-,.,
[-.J

•

r;<

v.

f

-

I

4.

All machines belonging to the

Davies, pp. 464 ff.
Ibid, DO. 467 ff.
See also Hershey, DO. 187-91; and Article
- - -~'22 of' the Covenant of tIle League of l'ations.
Frencb Disarm8ment FroDosals of l"ebruBJ.';! 1902, Cl,apter I,
Part 2, Sections (~) and (b).
These nrovisions are clearly shown in the expJanEttory table
annexed to t'n8 :\:I'rench proposals.

I

I,

..L..LU

~

first class will be left, in all circmTIstances, at the disposal of
the Contractlng L'arties; but those of tile second class can be held
only as sub,iect to the dispos81 of the League of lJations.

It is

SDeclfic~lly

mentioned that thoy are to be usea 1n tne eventuality
1
of tbe acplication of Article 16 of tbe CovenE-ct.
At the S8.me

!'

I

I

I

,

tirne, the2e m8.chines vlill be ney-m8nently under the lnSDection of
the Leap;ue of

~:H tions

•

This second clAss of machines held at tte disposal of the
League by the member StFtes, may be used by thern onl:T in C8.se they
are suffer-ing fpom

8I)

8

ir bOl1'barQ'11ent b;.' [m 8J\P:res SOY' nation, and

in such a case it must notify the League of

i~ations

of suell actlon.

'rhu:::, it may be seen that the:::e Drovisions of tbeH'r-elich p1Ul are
~Clrinciple

br,seci 1.1':on the

of t.he differentiation of weapons; t11.at

is, the League is to be ;n'med with tile heavle2t bomblnv :Jlanes,
and the members of the League are ~;rl!ed Wl th boml)}ne: planes of a
lower to,mage.

2

'fhe F:eendL sche l l'e would p:ive the Leag'\le an In-

torn[,tion81 air F:rce whic"

would be sW),llemented by heavy bombers

held at its disposal by the momber 0t8tes.
international Dollce have st8ted that

fW

~,!any proponents of

International Air J:"orce

may be :ole to perform the o.uty of policing the world Blone, [:<Ed
that lJ.nder the control of the internntional autho:ei ty the 8irplane
may become the emis E,ar> of
hlS tOI'~r of'

r,1[n1cil~d

5u stice,

2.
3.

and for t,ne i'll'S t tllTle lfl the

it ma;! be pos sible to make the vilTi t run to the

uttermost ')[>rt8 of the et:; rth."
1.

,i

3

It'l'ench Diso.rmament .t'roDoE'8.1s of Pebruery l~.lc~, Ch8,)ter I,
Part 2, 2ection (c).
The princinle of differentl8.tion of weenons has been dlScus~;ed nbove, na,c"e 74.
Davies, p. 440 . ! ' e also states that d in the fut'tl.re the international Air foree :Clay be regarned as ttw 'rolicel'Jan'
of th:e world. II (;cbio., P. 441~

.J....J...V

The principle of differentiation is used in the second
chapter of the l-,lr-ench proposals in regard to the otner two branches
of the ,iIi tar·y s (;rvice •

In this shoT't part of their plan, the

French propose to place certain material of land anu naval forces
at the di81]088l of the Lespile of Notions, and only those Powers
who agree to do so sli8l1 .i:~ave the rirht to ,josse:::: s such materials. 1
This mster·ial is

deE~ign['ted

as batteries of j'leavy

long-ranr;;~e

artil-

lery; cB:9ital ships carrying RIms exc:,edinp; 8 inches, or of B tonnage exceeding 10,000 tons; and submarines with a certain tonnage
to be agreed upon.

GerITan writers consider that such provisions

are not only lmpracticoble, but are also aimed at Germany, SInce
her ships carr-y p;uns of 8 inches or nore.
This earmarked material

wil~

2

be used in the application

of the sanctions provided for ill Article 16 of
League of

l~ations.

'[lhis feature lS

t~e

Covenant of the

8c;

important part of t,ny suc-

cessful inter-national policing system.

It is necessary that mem-

ber StRtes of a successful world organization reno"unce their ri,ghts
to acquire new and danrrerotls weapons, and to transfer these rigb.ts
to the international authority.

!lAny infringement of this obliga-

tion on tl1hJ)art of states-members shollld be vlsited with tne most
condif'~n

punishment, for upon its honourable observance rests the

whole fabric of the international police force. R3

Only in c'se of

aggre~;E.ion may the individual Powers possess the ri[,ht to 1.:<se thh:

material held at tk°.e disPos[',l of the Lea,r::\Ue, and only them, after
due notification to tt~e Leag1),e.

1.
2.

3.

This exception sDrings from the

French Disnrnament 1-'ro1')os818 of l<'ebrtlary 1932, Char)ter II.
Schmidt &: Grabowsk:r, p. 134. 'Ehis chapter on Hinternational
il
Force and Common Action, the French Proposal glves an
intel"estinp; f'nalysis of tbe j:,'renchoroT)osals from a German viewpoint.
Davies, p. 395.

..L..L(

rif);.ht of self -def'er.ce •
The third chanter of the French proposals carries to comnletion the organization of an international pollce force.

The

first two chapters of their ~roposols may be regardea as proviJing
,i -

material and equipment for tJ}is 1'ol'ce, in adui tion to the equipffent it may :oossess.

The third chanter provldes for the establish-

ment of an international Dollce force to Drevent war, and additional
contingents of cOHrcive forces to reores:::: war and or-inn:
to the State which is a victim of aggression.

1

as~:istHnce

'rar<iieu, speaking

before the Disarmament Conference a few days after

t.t:~e2'rench

pro-

-:JOSE-Is had been submitted, voiced the :l.ntention of hJ.s country to
strew'then the Lea,Que of Natio:s.

"I

2S1..;"

;rou to heeQ tIle voice of

l"r'ance, iI i'e pleaded, "when she Hsserts that peace CI,:n never be

BS-

sured until the fabric of the League has been strenpthened in truth
[nd fact. II 2

These provisions of the

deler<ate to the Conference,

11 01)

l~lrench

scheme, cll:'i111eo another

'cht to have been proposed long ago

when the League was founded ll and ilthe Uruuyan dele,Q'ation would vote
for the prlnciple on which tDe

~'rench

pronosE.l

W8S

baseo and would

be prepared to co-operate in exe rCl111ng tile met.[lOds b:! WhlCh it
l"ip;.ht be applied. il3
The French proposals seem to envisage both a fixed international police force which is 'iperlnanently aV8J_lable vnth complete
freedom of passage to occupy in tunes 01' e:mere;enc;;r areas r hel'e a
1.

2.
3.

.b'rench Disarmament Propos 81 s of February 1932, Chapter 1. il,
~ections (1) and (~).
.
Lengue of Nations, Hecords of the Conference for' the Heduction
and Llmitation of ArIl12ments, Verbatim Hecorcis of .Plenary
lVleetings, Vol. I, pn. 62-3. (SeriesAf--~-'Ibid, Nlinute-s of th..e_GeE_e!~l C.9~2!l_is~ion, Vol. I, n. 62(:Series:C',)

threat of war has arisenl',l

and additional contingents to strengthen

this force should its nreventive power be too weak and a confllct
break out.

The stren8th of th

international Dolice force would

depend ".Don the duties it v,'ould be called upon to peI'forr)1, and
wJon the strenr\th of t

2.0

e arrnar:1.entE of' both members and non-mem-

bers of tLe Lear:1. 18
.
of l\ations.
at t.e

~ut8et,

8.1-

Such

Slnce it would have

8S

force wonlG. be very larse

8.

noselble adversaries larpe

member or non-member states, and combin8tions of these st:,tes. 2
After the strenrth of the international

po~ice

force llas be0n de-

termined, the French plan Drovldes that the LeaGue shall aI'range
for its command.

The selection of a Cornnander-in-Chief would be

a delicate task, and this imDol'tsnt nrovision is wisely left in
the hands 0:1:' the I.e fe' gue by the French. 3
The duties of thi::' Dolice force are'lrlmarily of a preventive nr ture.
arisen, a: ,,1St

it will occupy aree"s in
t.~e

hich a threat of war nas

action of the League's COlrrrllssioners ln these

areas, and utilize all other conservatory measures to nrevent war
--in short, it

wi~l

do police duty.

Should this pollce force be

unable to Drevent the outbreak of a conillct because of the
of the
~)ly

oftenain~

adaitionsl

netion, tte

contin[~ent:::

cher coercive measurer.

Contractin~

artles undertake to sup-

to aid t,he;ollce force

~h~2e

stren~th

tOj~JI't:lJe

tur-

contingents will lnsure the lnter-

1.

j:l'rench Dlsar'mament Pro'Oos8.ls of' J.,lebr:J8Y·Y 1938,)i1anter- Ill,
:fart (a). The l"rench plan speaks 01 two conLlngents, one
under .le.rt (a), 2nd one(depenaing on tiJe ::Jlace or conf'lJ.ct)
unoer Part (b). SeeminGly, the plan does not provla~ for
an internaticmal ,?olice force assebled in a cietlnlte place,
but an international Doliee torce ~ade ~D of conting(nts
heJ.d by the Vari01JS nf?tions. This view accoros witt:. 'J'ardieu's eX1)18n,c:tion of' the three classes of force at the
cLisposs 1 of the T,eapue. \ Ree League of 1'~8_tions, Hecorcis of
the Conference for t~ Heductlon ana Lirritatlon of Arma~ents, Verbatim RecorUE of ~lenary "eetines, Vol. ~, p.
.)8. (Se:ciesp~ ------.- ...- ., -,----.------.--.-

2.

Par a cood eJiscussion of tile size of an internation8.1 police
foY'ce see Davie~;, pp. 4b1 L ., and tables on pp. 746 f:t'.
~ee above, D~. J9-dl.

i'
,

l
3.

na t~ onal

police for c e a superiority of strength over

~ts

Ano ther feature of the French nlan must be pointed out .

o pponents .
The auty

o f this enlarged police force is no longer prev en t~ve :
it is now
.
1
represe~ve t
Ooming to the aid of the victim of an agBressive
countr;}T , the police force will endeavo r to sunpress the

conf'l~ct .

'1l he strene:th of t ile 2dditional contingents of ea c h state

will d 6pend upon the l-egions in which the conflie t

~s

rag~ng .

The

l<'r ench proposals des ignate thl'ee poss ible area s 0_:: hos tili t~es :
first , a conflict

outs~de

Europe ; secondly , a conflict in Europe ,

but not along the frontle r s of the member state ; ana
confl i ct in Eur ope in which the aggressor ha
with the memb e r S t ate . 2

th~rd1y,

a

a COL:rt10n frontler-

In each of thes e c ases , the size of ~he

contingent furn i shed by each state would be dete rm~ned b y the place
of conflic t, and would be greAtest when the agr:ressor had a conmon
frontier with it .

France suggested certain forces that she was pre -

pared to offer in each instance , and in case the ageressor has a
common frontier , she provided that the size of the contingent conld
be de c ided in agreement with the League .
All of these forces operating under the Leagne are t o
have complete freedom of passage , a right b~tterly criticized by
Gernlan opponents of the scheme .

3

It must be pointed out that the

Oo ,enant of the League of l\lations cont ains a slmilar prOVision , al "d
4
thoueh not in such an absolute sense as the French p l a n pro v ~ es .

1.

2.
3.
4.

Frenc h Disarmament Pro'Josals of }I'ebruary 1932 , Ohapter III ,
Sections ( l) and (2) . The words ' prevent war ' and ' re p r ess war' are used In connection with the pol~ce torce
and the contingents respectively .
Ibid , Ohapter ILl , Part (b) .
Schmidt & Grabowsky , "0 . 1 35 . ~'1Ont gelas a c cuses Franc e of wishing t o make Germany a passage- way and halting- place for
~rench armies of assistance .
See Art~cle 1 6 , Paragraph 3 o f the Oo v enant of the League of
Hations .

provlcie

!

1'01'

tlle

....
-c;1J'J,
.--

p. -l.-,',.Tl_. n.r,..", 0.1'_"

o~l""c.r
~lh.

1__ H nd

. 1 , J_nc
.
-J_UQal1d n1:1V[l 1 rna t erlo.

-

tioned in

[.m

equi t, blc llc.nncr.

Jhe provisions of

chal'uctcr; and they

~ay

t~e

third ChR)ter of the !rench plan

be equolly defended on tllS

~rou~ds

of self-

contention of cert, in Gel'fill'n "ritr.:H's tllat tL.9',)Y'OVl:Ci:J_:m. fe), f",dc it:i.on-

at

Germ~ ny is only paI,tially true.l
Fr~nco,

that borders on

and at every

It is a thrust at every nation
ag~re~~or

that boraers on any

r

oti1er'

'."1:'

tion.

'rbcor,)vis ion \'10rl;:s both Wt~ys, and looking at it from

the 0) ,'osite standnoint, i-'::; is li1.{ewise a

If the lutter nation is the

Ge~'~1l8n

thrust at

J,l:('once,

a7~ressor.

l'.iontgelas sums up hL a b.i ec tions to tll.e;rench plan :Cor
8n internotional police force in the following words:
matlon of' n fully intern8tionalized Lef3p,ue army is to be condemned

,
!

.....
-

1'r0111 the moral ~:tandpoil1t, :fu;~,th8r, ow1n[" to dJ.fficultt8:::': reg8.rCtJ.ng
accomodation ftnd supreme C'»)l"'and, and owing to the enor'!ilO1)S ex,)ense,
1•

Schmic:t t ?i'

Gr8boVl~~ l:y,

p. 135.

it is not capable of beinp: 'Out into T'rHcti~e .lf

l

He believes, as

do mos t Gerraans, that disarmament flhould Dreceu e security, while
the ¥rench hold the

view

op~osite

t~at

security should come first.

The fourth chaDter' of the French pro ')oS 2J. s contEtins provisions for the nrotection of civilian populations in the event
of a conflict.
I

~

cont~nn

'1111e use of pro;lectlles which are incendlary, or

poison r;2.ses or bRcteria, is forbidden to all air, land.,

and nav21 forces.

2

Attempts have been made from time to time to

prohibit such warfare, and in spite of the fact that nations have
solemnly agreed not to use these materials, they are ever at work
developing more de8dly gaseE'.
research comittees.

!~ll

modern gOV(0rnments have chemical

3

Bo~bardment

from the air, or by artillery, is restricted

to a certain zone in which the conflict is raging, the size of
which will be determined by the Gonference.

Only air bases

WId

emplacements of long-range artillery lying outsiQe this zone are
exceptions to this rule.
to Bir bombarClment

~l

t

~iml12r

urOV1S10n 18 made 1n regard

'onr: the coast line, with tIe

s~.me

exceptions

concerning air ba~es and art1llery eMPlacements located outside
th1s zone.
1.

2.

3.

Even within the costEll zone, air bombarciment 18 not

Sc.hmidt ;<r GrRbowsl::y, D. 130; see also, Dp. 130-1. He states
that II the mal.n ob.i ec tion is [,; mor81 one; for there can be
few men who WOLJ.ld· be re8d.y to fipht at tL1e cor'1:i1and of an
internationel authDrity egainst, it might be, their own
country."(p. 131) TheCi~il War ~ives an answer to this
ob,jection. In that struggle we see Americans fight1Ug
each other, and men in the North giving; their lives to
maint~in the Union. We may recall that Pres1dent Cleveland sent Pederal troops into Chicago in 18~4 to put down
the Pullman strike. state militia are used constantly
in c081 strikes and other dis tl1rbances, ano ~:1Ometimes
n1.en are Idlled. Par an answer to the enor'mous expense
of an international force, see Davies, DO • .578-80. liThe
cost---in terms of cash will be far less than the total
expenditures on existin.rr armaments.U(Davies, p • .1)80)
French Disarm8.ment Propossls of .l:<'ebruary 1932, Chap. IV,. Part (a).
Davies, pp. 149 ff. see also, Penner Broe 'nvay, rllh~_E2.1~,?_0d.:l
].lr~t::.fic, pp. 273 1'f.

permitted, excEmt undsr certaiD conditions laia down in Convention IX of the :_-lague,

l

and this Convention will continue to govern

all naval i)ombardment.
All there provisions are intended to lnsure a certain degree of protection to civilian
rises.

Dopulatl~nB

in C0se a conflict a-

Civilian oopulations sutfered much Quring the viorld War,

and new v/eapons of de8th, such

RS

Doison gas and bacteriolo[;icnl

agencies, are well adllPted for attaGY.:s u')on large cities.

ilrl'he

dlstlnctlon between the fighting forces and the civilian population Vloro thin during the last war;

it

Davies remiDds us,

next it will nrobablv disappear altogether. d2

tl

ln the

Even in exercislng

its police functions, the international force, the

~rench

believe,

should provide all the protection possible for the civilian Dapulations of every country.
The lS2t cbapter of the French oroposals lay down certRin conditions for the organiZation of peace.

These condltions

are ne(:;essary to the successful oDeratlon of the flrst four chaptel'S of their plan.

rrhe foremost of these is common action.

disarmament plan ct=m really be suc(?,esful, neclare the
til each nation feels that it has security.

h, un-

The problem of dis-

l.~ior

text of this Convontion, see Soule and LcCeuley, Inter--.---national Law, PD. 19?-8.(Published by 1,1. S. !::aval Institute ) ;and' Hershey, Po. 64 Ll-64?, 2nd footnotes. 'll his
Convention forbids the bombardment of unaefendeo. ports,
towns, villages, dwellinr:s, or buildings.
It permits
the bombardment of militar7 works, military or naval
estrblLpJYlEmts, deDots of arms or war mater-leI, and
workshops OJ:' Dlants which may be utJ.llzed for the needs
of hostile fle ts or armies. These may be destroyed by
bombardment if' Iocrl authorities rel' se to destroy them
within ['.. fixed ti111e, out it is necessary to p;lve aciequate
Warning followed by a reasonable time of waiting.
Davles, D. 41. See also his footnotes on the same Dage.
p

2.

l~lrerc

l'lo

armament is at pref;ent acute because no country feels th8t it has
any Dromise of safety slFJUld it reduce its armmnents. l

'1'he 'l'urklsh

delegate to the Disarma:,ent Conference held the S8me view of security, and his answer to the question was the establishment of a
world fsueration.

"I do not underestimate the importance of the

.b'renci1. delegation's nrOl)O sals , II he said.

if

1 aUmi t that i have not

hao ti"'e to study them in dctpil, but I believe I see in them a
first steD towards the

i~ternationalisation

of armies which would

lead to the abolition of nati)nal forces, since the one would be
incomoatlble with the other.

If tna t

H:

the .b'renel1 deleo:ation' s

intentic'n, this system too rna''" Drovide a means \vhich will inevltably
2
lead to total dlsarmament."
Among other considerations for the organizatlol1 of peace,
J:i'ra~lce

\jrOpo:3es com')ulsory arbitr'atiol1; clear deflnltion oi' trle ap;-

gressor; guarantees that oecis lons will be maQ'8 ra1)ial;y and that
the lnternational forces will act corresDondingly; a clear codification of tne rules of InternaLional Law; and the

i~ternational

control of tr!e execution of all agreernents concernin_g armament:::.
'l'his last clause re:,dnds us of the };'rench at tem-ots
a supervisory connnission for nationnl arrr.m."ents.

In

3

1919 to get

4

One of the most difflcult of tnese nroblems lS the d9fi1.

2.

3.
4.

;a

See Davies, D. 146. '!'rhe truth is that dlsarmamont lS at a
stacldstill, ~ma thet it v'llll never becom8 o')erE'ctl-ve so
lono' 88 it is d i.vorced froE security and s 8Jlctiol1s • il (lbld)
See"also Turkish
2tatement in respect to this question;
League 01' LatlcH1S,
8cords of tre Conference fol' the Reduction and Limitation of Arrnaments, Verbs.tun l--i.ecorGs of
Plenary iVleetin,R;s, Vol. I, p. 113. (Serle2--l~'r--------- .-League- of NaEYons~-~RecoY'cis of the Conference I'or -tlle HeduG tlon
- and Limitation of jl.rmaments, Verbatim Records of' Plenary
h.eetings, Vol. 1, D. 113. (0eries--iiT:-------- - --,-----...----~
£t'rLTlch Dis arIi1ament 1'1'0 ()osals of Februar·y 1932, Chapter· V.
See above, pD. 90 ff.

nition of the aIT~ressor, since any coe~Clve scheme will serve no
p"tJ.rpos e 1mle3 s an arrreem.ent is re8 ched which will deterFline who
is the

'~:uil ty nstion. l

'T'he best solntion to thi:s perDlexing

")roblem mi:-:dl.trJe not to la v down a fixed dei'initJ.on of an aggresSOl',

but to

~eave

the international authorlty decioe In every case
<;)

who is the nation at fault.'"
;iickham Steed,
l"ren:-;h Dlan

h1(~hly.

Encr,li:::h wr1 tel' of nr)te, ref;arCled the

PH

Its i, 'ortence to h1m lies in the fact trIst

1Iit 18 tbe first sel~ious attenHlt to state correctly tne terms of
the disarmam nt Droblem. n3
become pos sible, be.cause a

Disarmament, he further states, will
II

vlOrld-wids ')olice force en,,;enders a

feeling of safet;T from war b;T

t he l '1 kl_1. h 00 d

0

V'!eD"e;~ing

or destl'oyinr; helief in

4
l' S1JCCeSS f' 1,]L' ln
. t erDB -'[,l,nal
-'
' crune.
,
1/

rrhe chlef feature of these nrooosa18 of t e F'rencb were
to strengthen tho :!::.,eDF':ue of .(Iotions b;r Drovidin'", 1t vrith. an international air fleet and an internatinnal
oroDosals is revealed the old
1n the

~rench

~olice

force.

policy that we have

In these
studle~

lrecedinp; c;:npter:s--the '(JOlicy ot' securit;T throup,h cornmon

action.
1.

4: •

1;10r a concise account of attempts to deI'lne the at'~7r-e8sor
nat10n since the da~rs ')1' ThucJdid.es, see Davies, DT). 130142. See olso, ibid, op. 469-70. German critics ob,iect
to the French plan-of corc]c}on 8.ction beC8 i JSe of tne difficulty of defining t.b(; a "·'ressol'(E',cb.rnidt ), Grabowsky,
PD. 131-8).
The definition of the apgressor nation will
G~ discussed more fully in the followinG chapter.
=~f'r:s VTehterr:, The Out18v~r\,i of :far, lOf)-6.
He thinks the
Council' or--s-6m:e·-6ther.....11hi-i;h instsnce ff Sh011J.c1 be given the
rir'Jlt to deterrine the agr;ressor in each case, if possible by a IIqualifieC: )--ajorit;l of votes.il(p. 1(5)
Review of Reviews, 87: 4f~-6, l'ar'ch, 1933. 1l his article en. - - ti tied, "l n tel'w::,ticnal !\rmy for tbe Le8rtle of I'jations? it
i::, made 110 of the vieVls of Von ::eec'zt, Wicl~h8m ~'.te""o,
and Pierr'e Vienot--l\ German, Enr>~lL::h:ty;an, sne} l'renetnlan.
;"he Ger'man discovers a th01JS8nd thine'S wron.r, wlth D.n
internationpl arn'y.
Ibid.

The

Frenc~

Chapter VII
Disarmament Prooosals of TIovember, 1932.

I.

I

J

~
'llhe }ll"ench

Chapter VIi
l'ron08f!ls of Novembel", 1932.

Disarr~ar;!()nt

'£lhe first ]:<'rench proD03218 of lSJ32, presentee in the
12st chanter, cl"eated a lively
~l"ance,

pl"ess IDlstl"Usted

bur~t

declarin~

an imposE,ible schene which

of criticism.

Tne British

that she Was putting fOl"ward

she~ne'N

would not be accepteCi, in

order to justify hoI' own policies and perpetuate the war treaties. l
The German pres S l"ep::arded tbe Oy'o':)0821s as
csnlcisrn il ,

ii

SO nmch hYPOC1·isy and

and the Italian oress feared that such

Dro~osals

would

creRte a suoer-EtRte, and reduce membel"s of the League of Nations
to [, state of vasE'elage.
d eman d f or

.,

secur1~V.

2

Germlln 'levJSl)apers 1"2illed at tr:e Prench

3

thin8 rbout te!e 1:<ll"enchOroo08a1 for
o~aced

at tre

dis~osal

811

f"rmed rolice force to be

of the Leamle of jatlons is that it has no

crlance whatever of being accenteo..--The iiorld

'J;'_0.E1.o!,r'ov~

18 con-

V1nCeo. that an international armed 001ice force would be neither
4

efrective nor ethical--or necessal'Y"'-

David Davies, staunch ad-

vocate of a police force, l"ushed to the rescue.

';'l'he need 1s

for a realist acceotance of the principle of an internatlmal police 1'orce," he al"gued;
in the

~:lno-.Jf:lDflneSe

for their pitlful

andOolntln.~

c'_~nfliGt,

e~libition

to the wea]{nes;:;, o.t tLe League

he said,".Llb.e [(''In rer:::;on, l-lowever,

of 0usilanimity was the fact tD8t

there are at present no effective international sanctions in exLiterary Dige~:t, 112: February 20, 1932, ill.. League Police

1.

-'-'- '1'6-rc e';rw ---

2.
3.

ibid.
Ibid, 112: Anrll 9, 19~'):::;, n. 17, IINhy 'l'aroieu grleves trle
--Germ8ns. 1l
'The World Tomou'ow, L8rch 1938, n. 71, iiiiihat Bbout lnter---u8:ficmal Pol ice? it

4.

. t ence.'.,1

18

,iiith the cannon of the Far Em'.t boominf, p,lmost in their
ears, the delegates to the Disarmr:crr.;ent Confer'ence adonted only a
?

colorless Resolution weakened by reservatlons.-

Although thlS

Resolution of July 23, 1938 did not contain anj of the drastic
measures:)I-oJosed b-;,T tLe }'rencl1, it did leave a Dati) for further
discussions of their nroposals.

3

The two burning questions of

equali ty of rigllt 8 anci gllarsntess of s ecuri ty--the ·oro(Jlems of
Germany and B1rance--were not even mentioned in tJ:le liesolution. 4
It must be nointed out, however, that the Hesolution of July 23,
1932 contained the nrohibition of aerial bombardment; the quanta-

tl ve and qut;li tative limi tetlon of

It3nd.

artillery; and the estab-

lishment of Derm2,.nent internationol control.
s:,tisfied with tile Hesolution, voted

fay-

~ir9nce,

tho1).u:h un-

it, Herx-iot, dsclarlng

trlet his natlon "wot'ld not be willinr; at an:! price to shoulder
the

res~onsibility

.
for rEisinp difficultles
or f
or 'aeley. «5

During tbe SUy.1Jtler and fall of 1932, while Germany was
away from the Conference because she had been denied equality of
arrr:r:ments, li'ra::ce drew up her new prop08els in WhlCb she ofl'ered

1.
2.

....

The World Tomar-row, June, 1932, D. 189, If In defense of lnter----ilational' Police. t1
For text of this HesollJ.tlon see League of hations, Hecords of
the Conference for tne L-~eduction and Llmi tatlon of AY'maments, .l\Jlnutes of the Genere.l ComriJission, Vol. I, np. 11:531;:;6 (Serie-s-Ifr;Le-a'gUe-oTlratl~ms, 1'1;ontl~ly Smmnary, Vol •
Xli, l~O. 7, July 1~32, po. 208 ff'.;Leap'U of' Nations,
The League from Year to Year, 1931-32, pp. 34-~; and
'Internat-fon-s-r'-Conciliatio-n'Pamphlets ,- No. 28b, December
1932, pD. 506-11.
Chapter IV of the Resolution of July 23, 1919. '11hi8 chapter
-states that the Resolution does not prejudge the attitude
of the Con.ferenceto1Jl!ards other meaS1J.res ·or POll tical
proposals 8ub !:i tted by variout:) delegations.
International Conciliation Pamphlets, No. 298, 1\!8rch 1934, :9. 68.
League of l"ations, Records of Conference for trle Reduct:Lon and
"Lin~itation of Armoments, I'.1inutes of the General Commission,
Vol. I, n. 195. (Series I:') : - - - - - - - - _.,
.--------~-

e

3.

l

4.

o.

..l.G(

to admit the princiDle of juridical equE'lity contingent UDon an
,
t'lon ae
1--1'
organlza
e :;0

8_S~l)re

.
recurlty
to all. 1

These new French

propos2ls were intended to synthesize the main pr:mciDles which
had emerr:ed

durin~

ment Coni'erence.

tbe first series of meetings of the DisarrflBMassigli, French delepate to the Conference,

opened the discu8sicn of his conntry' E: nro)osaL::, and stU'nmed np
the pr:Lnciples on which they were based.
tant.

1'wo or these are impor-

"Firr t of ell, ilhe said, Uthe essential prlnciple t.hat, be-

tween dis8rmament and, the develo'oment of security throup;n the

01'-

F.;;tmization of peace, there is an indis ~oluble link .---Lastly, the
French plan is att'lned to tIle principle, which has been proposed.
to you, of equalit;l of status in

8

rep:ime ensuring security to all

States. u2
The rlemor&ndum which accolTInanied the French proposfls
contnined the Beme idea that there conld be no succesrful disarf!1a~ent

plan that dld not provide for the security of nations.

problem of disarmar'lent, accordin

(i"

The

to the French view, bas two 'parts,

a technical one Hna a Doliticpl one.

l'he J"lrst c·."ncerns actual

CJ.issrr8J,'ent, rrnd the second concerns the establishmnt of some l:<:ind
of internation81 or~8nlzation which will1rovide security ror those
nations who disarIl1.

In these two aspects of the problem of disar-

mar: lent , d8clare the French, "l)rogre s::: ml1.s t -.e In.ade on paral.Lel lines. ,,3
There is clarity of ressoning in this scheme:
1.

2.

3.

no nation ou~ht to

Internaticne.l Conciliation PaYmhlets, llo. 298, j\:arch 1934,
p. 69. liThe ef:':'ect of this was to r0V0'rse tbe oroer of
responsibilities for the success or failure of the Conference, because the good fa,i th of ]:<'rnnce beC[1111e 2D:)2,rent to all."(Ibid)
League of Nations -, Records of the Conferer:ce l'or tne l-ledlJ.cti:on
fmd Limitation of Armaments, Iinutes of the General CClmmisf;ion, Vol. II, p. 216. (Serie1:~"~E-)--Thls vohtme will~
referred to hereinrrfter as Iinutes(GC,IJ).
2ee I/,emorandl1J'1 by the ["rench Del ege-t-i 0 n-;- p .1. This l\:emorandum
is Dart of the French Disarm2.r:ent '::Y'oooscls of November
l4,L 1938 which is placed in A0pendix III of this thesls.

to disarm without the bssurance that It will flnd s8.fety In some
l
kind of internati )nal organization .
111he main obstacle to I-eal disarmament, as "9ointed out
by the delegate

fro~

Greece, is fear , and this factor in interna-

tional relations must be removed through some strong form of international orgarllzation .
be?

\vhat kind of organlzation should this

"r conceive it , " contll1ued the same delegate,

supported by three main pillars :
tion of all recourse to force; the

las an edlflce

the first , moral , the renuncia~econd ,

legal , the possibility

of sett l ing all u l fr'elences by judicial neans; the third, :political ,
a system of mutual assistance .--- All three to ·"ether are the delineation of a civilised society, that is to say, a society in which
it is prohibited to carry arms . ,,2

The same speaker declared that

in order to e~tablish this internation~l orsanization nations would
have to make sacrifices , but " the greater the value of t hat which
Vie desire to acqui!'e - --the greater mu t be the price we pay, and
that which the world is at present striving to acquire is of such
sovereign worth that there should be no hag 'ling over the price o,,3
Believlng that the French proposals contained these essential principles , the delegate from Greece , Politis , gave them his he.qrty ap proval .
The first chapter of the new French proposals states that
all Powers should endorse the principles arising out of the Pact of
Paris, and l"ecognize the fact that anJ war undertaken in breach of
this Pact is a matter of interest to them .
1.
2.
3.

Upon the breach, or

See Davies , pD . 412 ff .
1\.lnutes(GC,ri), 31st MeetinlZ, Pebrual'Y 6, 1933, p . 232 .
Ibld .

129

threat of breach, of the Pari~ Pact, all the Powers shalJ. cnncert
tosether to

r~re(

ar'e l'1ade for

t~~!8

upon wbat steps
effectlv:

~hDu~d

r,)rohib:Ltln.~"1

of

Prov:Lsion~j

(l"'_il'AC{~
__ ~

O'.f,"

")rl;Y"'ct econnmlc
.

1 .''--_ ',~
.,.i

8.:,'11:\

c;o v?rnr ,Ol1 t an6

tho polic:,! of

The

~econd

c~apter,

:£rely states that the

the

~rinciples

~~ort9st

t~e

tIle non-r2C-

other fowers in

of the

laid down 1n tbe

0ntj,~e

t~olr

~lan,

~irst

~haDter

to the oblL',c:tions devolviwi UDon then under bee Covenant, to t;.. e

to the loyal

a~nlic:tlon

of

A~ticlc

16 of toe Covenant.

LltVlllOff,

the Soviet dele~atG, criticizod these t~o cha)ters on the cro~nd

at tHe Conference; '.'lhel'eas, the second
bel'S of t

e Lefl[';ue .3: 1 e ~"OJ.'

the first chanter

0

c~"lled

in view

merel~

the j,ern-

attention to th() fact Llst

lent ions the application of sancti~ns to the ac-

~re2sor ~tste violatin~ t~G

Paris Pact, and tllat the derlnition of

the aCI:r~ressor was still an.msettled question.

In rerarci

t:)

this

difi'lcul t problem he 0.f'1'8red an e .. :·~elle nt d1"ai."t which ntteny)teu to
ciefll1e the ag;'res 801' as the ~; tate which i~') the first to take any of
the
1.

2.
3.

followin~

actions:

French Disarmament 1:'1'0 )osc!.ls of liovember 1938, Chanter I,
'::;.ectioc1s (a) and (b). l'he Paris Peace Pact, c81100 also
the ~riand-Kello~ Treaty or the Pact for the RenlUlciatlon
of V!ar, haC' been di:3 cus :::ed above, '"). F'9.
Jec above, p~. 62-4.
l'.in~!.~_~;:;'--'_Q.C_,-II)_, 31e',t r.:eetin,c, }'ebruary 6, 193;;.;, p. 235.

.LVV

...
tI

.

(a)
(b)

(c )
(d)

,.

I-

(e)

Declaration of war agai~st another state;
The lDv8sion by its armed forces of the territory
of bnother stute without declaration of war;
,
J:;ombal~din:' U~e terri tox'Y of' ,onother" ::, t8te by i ~s
land, naval or air forces ~r knowingly attackin~ the nRv~l or air forces of ano~her ~tate;
':[lho =_undin,c: in, or introductJJ)n within t;:18 f1~on
tiers of, another state of land, navfl or air
forces witrout t_':'.!e Dermission of tile Government
of ~::~lch a :~,t.9to, or- t:s infrinp;emElnt of the condi J-~iol1s of such 'Jermis cion, 'Oarticnlf'_rl'T as re~ards the duration of ~ojour~ or extension of
area;
'l'11e o[_~tablishment of' a naval bloc~,:aQe of tne
const or Dorts of snother state.tll

These proposels of the 20viet delegation formed the basis of a
report by the COYrlY!1i ttee on

::~ecu:('i ty '~uc s tions

:r'ecaJ'dinr': the defi-

ni tion of the ag:-res 201' which was later presented to the Confer?

ence.~

for Fr'ance, agreed vii th Tii tvinoff •
he remarkec, "by this

difficul-'c~-

vlhich seBl Y1 s to be ::ce,r'arClr-:d 's

"I liave always been s truck, If

of designating the aggressor,

i~su)er3ble

.---It seems to me that,

at all events when there is a concrete case, the aggressor gene 1'ally reveals himself so)lainly that,

i~

~e

really wish to

(0

so,

we can alwa-:rs n8]11e him.---LitvlrlOff has formulated oronosols which,
taken as a whole, a 1)Dl'Oach very closel:F to the actual definition
1.

2.

p

l"linutes,(GC,II), 31st Meeting, February 6,1933, ')p. 23'7-8.
---'rlils-;:!o,;iet draft contf,ined anothel' c19use listJ.n(? a
nU.ll1ber of situations of a T,olitic~jl or econo,ic nature
that should not be acce'ted as 5ustJ_fications of agc':ression. Litvinoff regarded this clEcuse as lmport8nt because of the attitude of capitalistic countries toward
his country. His fearf:1 were not wholly unjustiJ-'led,
since Paul-Boncour hlr:lself admitted t:'1at if in that list
of cases of aggression he has attemnted to olant a few
arrows in t.he-hide of t>,e c2pi talis t states. 11 (I,linutes,
(GC,II), 33rd Leeting, F'ebruary 8,193;3, -p. 262}.----See I:iinutes,(GC,II), 63rd j\Ieeting, I\lay 24, 1933, l)P, 499-502,
especiaTly"p".-:5"Ol. 'fhe GOInlni ttee also added the case in
which a country ;:~uDDorted armed bands which set out from
its own territory and invaded that of 'another country.

.Lv.L

g iven in

~he
v

French .
plan,'
t·lle mos t concre t
e ana clear defini tion--

namely, that t.he ar:r:ressor is the country that invades or attacks
any other country by sea, by l::cnd, or by air .,,1

I~iost of' the Powers

represented at the Conference found no difficulty, as the delegate fro m

Norwa~f

observed, in accepting the noints enumerated in

the first two chanters of the French plan. 2
Che.pter i l l , the longest and most important part of' the
Prench plan, outlited both poli tict?l and military arrTnp;ements for
the orf':anization of continental Europe, bB.:'·eCi U1)On acJherence to the
Geneva Protocol.~

This system is only ~racticable if a sufficient

number of important P,::mers agree to it.
i~

to defiDe the conditiuns 1n which

sh811 be entitled

to the co-operation of' tile otller

of the politicpl
each

~)ir~natory

Powers.

arran~enGnts

The fund·'mental ob:lect

In this respect, all cases of

af~resslon--attack

or 1nVa-

sion by foreir:n for'ces--ec;t"bliE',h the I'i,:ht to lr1utnal assJ.stance;
and in

or~er

to ascertain the necessary facts for the Council of

the League of I'Jations,

Com~nis8ions,

consisting of diplomatic and

military Attaches aopointed by the Council, shall be establishea
/l.

in each signatory state."

•

times, and if any Povler believes itself to be threatened or al18ges
tj~t

it has been 8tt~cked, it ma~ demand thrt these Cow1issions

gather the facts.

I·
I

1.
2.

<:.

l

~

These CO:('I1"ission8 are available at all

3.
4.

Hence, these bodie~; parta'o::e Drimarily of' a

1,~inutes,(GC,II), 30rd Ileetinp"
B'ebruary 8,193;5, p. 262.
"rbid;-'32nd lIeeting, February 7, 193~z" p. 249. See also,
--33ru ",eetinG':, Fen. 8, h)33, u. 2b3, where the 'I'urlCLsh
delegate, 'l'evfik Rustu Bey, thinks that the first
chanter will be accented unanimously.
See above, D. IOU, for 1:1 dis cu s sion of the Geneva :Protocol.
See a180 Hershey, 9D. 150-1, 471(footnote 34).
.t:<'rench Disarmament Proposals of Nove~'lber 1938, Chapter ILL,
Section A, Paragrauh 3. In regard to aggression, paragraph 1 of the sr'me section, aillilits three exceDtions to
their definition of aggression; namely, the existence of
an agl'eement to the contrary, selt-defence, and COllLrlon
action. Ca:c~es of invasion under these categories is not
aggression, states the DIan.

fact-finding nature.
Another part of the political arrangements for the
European system provided for tilt; compulsory

accept~mce

of the

General Act of Arbitration in order to insure the peaceru1 settlement of disputes between the Signatories. l Any signatory state
refusing to conform to the nrinciples of arbitration, to execute
I

arbitral awards and decisi. ons, or to t8.ke action when the Council
~

has established the fact thf:-it an international underte:king has been
violated, shall be liable to Rny measures

'~'rhich

the Gouncil shall

decide uDon; and these meaSU1'es shall be faithfully apolied by the
Contractinp Parties.
A most imoortant fepture of these political arranp;ements
is the provision that in 811 its decisions in these cases the Couneil sh811 req"uire only a majority vote.

Here is a definite attack

on the principle of unanimity, a practice w'1.ich man." critics of
the League regard as its r:reatest obstacle to effective action.

2

The

Spanish delegate voiced anproval of this part of the French proposals.

IIIn the first place, II he remarked, ill note with approval

the suggestion for moking the Council's authority more effective
and more operative by dropping the principle" of

unani~r1ity.

Sooner

or later we shall have to advance along that line, if we are anxious
1.

2.

The General Act of Arbitration was the result of a series
of' reports made by the Committee on Arbitration and ';:ecurity to the Assembly in 1928. Its ob.1~ct is to enable
states to adont standard engagements for the settlement
of disputes, and to avoid tSe develo~ment of alternate
Droceedure, which will occur is there is no agreed model.
(See )!orld .Peace !:"oundation PamnhJ.ets, Vol •. XIJ~, Ho. 1,
1929, Nine YeEirs of the League of Nations, 1920-28, PP.
202-204;-andIJeague--of-iJations-~- --Vir~l:i~~lFHe6-0-1-;d-~T _t!le
Ninth Assembly, 1928, 18th Plenary Mer)ting, Sept. 2::;,
1928) "German c'ri tics oppose the GeneraJ. Act because it
implies, they maintn In, the recor~ni tion of' the status
quo in Europe. (Schmid t fli~ Gre bowsky, '0. 10~).
Davies, p. 197; and Hershey, pp. 504-5, especlally footnote
no. 29.

•

that international law should attain to lts full stature in the
free acceptance by e9ch state of the decisions of the organised
internationr'l cOJYLduni ty.

This new ')rinci ole, which i tNould be

highly ciesirf'b Le to mn]ce universal, is contained in the continental pact proposed in the French Dlan. Hl
The

opposin~

view of the nrinciple of a majority view

Was expreSSGO by the delegate from Letherlands.

His principle

arguments were that it violRted the consticutional 1)rlnciples of
the Covenant; the decisions oi" th,e Council ,voula be bindlng on
LLembers who hed no Dart in making them; heavy obligatlons would
be placed UT)on some states by others whose oblip;ations mlr',ht be
small; and finally, that it would reverse the prlnciple of the
Oovenant which provides that ftates bearing the

gre~test

respon-

sibilitv for the maintenance of Deace should possess the greatest
influence in decisions. 2

These 1:1rguments are, in general, those

of the unanimity school.
The military arrrngements of ttle Prench plan have two
prime objectives:

first, the reduction of the offensive character

of national forces; and seconaly, the specialization of certain
militar:T elements in preparation for the rendering of mutual asSlStance. 3

Here is the ubiquitous principle of French policy--the

indissolubility of disfJrmament and security.
,;

of these objectiv8~, the Prench plan provides that the land defence

1.
2.

i.

To achleve the flrst

::;.

fulnutes,(GC,II), 31st Meeting, February 6, 1933, ~. 240.
Ibid~-~3-2-rid-E~eefin:,~,February 7, 1933,p. 246.
Article;:;
---of the Covenant of the Lea' ue of Nations provides for
a unanimous vote on decisions in the Assembly or Council, ane a ma.iority vote in either- body of the League
on matters of proceedure.
l;'rench Disarmament- Proposals of November 1932, Chapter Ill,
Section B.

forces of European PovJers 81"-8.11 be standardizen to a uniform t;me-that of'

8

n8ti:~'nfll

.

short-service army with 11;'!lited effectives.

rrhis nrovision ie:: based upon the principle of quali tatlve ctisarmaIiient, for it is ganerfllly recorrnized the t a mill tary S:1 stem composed of long-service effectives is better adapted for offensive
or aRgressive warfare, than one composed of short-service effec-

tives.

1

denes of Czechoslovakia said of this proposal, "The idea

of reducing l1'uro-tJean ar'I1S to

8.

uniform general type gnd 01' trfil1S-

rormin~

professionsl armies into short-service armies not aaanteo
2
to a sudcJGn offensive c8nnot but evoke our s~rri;pathies. II
In regard to tl:19 organization of this short- service army,

the provisions of' t e French Dl'::-- _have been sumned uo thus:
estimatin~ ef~ectives

t~e

if'v"lhen

conaitions Deculiar to each 2t~e and in

particular the ineounlities s!1d variations in the recruiting re:::ources of the
i

sin8tor~!

Po', ers

,
1"
sriOl1
d.,

of the Covenant, be bOl'ne in ,nind.

.
conformity with Article
ln

Likewise accoint should be

taken of pre-re~imental and military instruction received in POlltic[ll form8tions as well as of the effectives of ttle home police
force.,,3

.

It must be added that the short-service defensive army

of each country

J_

s not to contain but a lied ted number of long-

service err~ctives wl~ will &ct as instructors and officers; neither
sh811 it have at its di8D08::11 DOVlerf'ul nobile mateI':;.a1 of an 01'1.

2.
...,'Z.

.

Paul-Boncour mentions this fact also in his final speech on
til.e J<lrench plan:
"Profes ~ ional armies ape better suited
to rlOlDid attacl{s, to COUDS de force, to edventures, than
those [;hort-term armies -take'n:- fronlthe heart of' the notion, who are cslled uo for periods of tralning, wh? then
return to their hOlres, end who, before the~I ctom agaln become armies, ::nust be mobilised and trL,ineci. over agaln./!
(I.linutes,(GC,II), 33rd l,:eeting, February fJ, 1932" p. 2bO)
Linntes-;rGCr~-II ), 30th j eet.ing, l:<'et'rnar-;.T 3, 1933, p. G2!.
LeaP:'l1eof Nations, Lonthly Surrr:ary, Vol. XIJ., 1\;0. 11, Novem'bel', 1932, pp. 328:23:--rfJieie-is, 8n e~~ellent sUIili2:ar! of'
the l"rench n1an of' November 193::; ln tnls n1..U'1ber 01 tue
L,-ont1?-ly ~:lrnrr~r'Y' pp. 322-23.

..Lui.)

...
fensive nature, such

88

powerful artillery 8.nd t:.'nks.

These

orovisions are desirned to disrobe national armies of their affensive [jarments.
Hlon;; with this uniform
specir~llz;

plan IH'oviaes for

S

:ort-service I?rmy, the Jrench

d, unl te;.; hi escll C()ll?lt}'y COTn,Josed of

Long-service effectives armed with t.l>.eiJowerJ'ul rnaterials prohib i ted to the na tj.onHI armie::;, and each na tio,'} is to l)lace thi s
continr>;ent at the

~)e:'Elanent

d1 3':)0 s.s.l of th.e Leap:ue '):f' ':a tions.

It will lie noticed that the character of these long-service quotas
will be es sentiall-;,r nrofes:3 lonal; and in order to render speedy
aid to a state which is the victim of nn
.L •

constcntly rendy for aCulon.

ag~ression,

hll stocks of war

they will be

~aterlal

~Dart

from that needea by the snecialized cont1n~ent is to be stored
in each of the con trac t1nF; .:.: tate:::: L'.ncier interna tjJi ;al snpervision,
and if needed, it V',ilJbe ')laceu 8t the dis
111 Vlhose aid collective Rction. is t(C;!CtTl.

)OS8.~~

"I' th.e Darties

On1;/ in Ct=L3e of legitit,18te

sell'-defence shall this specialized conti1';gent, Qr these 1dlitary
stores, be ,-lsed by 2.ny country.

T.Jei'cirnate sel1'-dpfence, as de-

f'i::led by the French plan, menn;:: ilt.he repulsine at' aI-riled forces
whic~ have ontered by violence the territory of the state which is

d~~fendj_ng itself .111

-

'"

Thus, it will be noticed t>wt 1:;11'3se 9rooosals of the
::;lrenc(~ are based UDon the 'n-ine-iple of the di ffcrenti8.tion of

wea'pons, which,

i
iI

~

8.S

8 has been urGed by 'nany advocates
we have ,,:8en,

of an intel~na tiona::_ police force.

fl'he GerPlo.n d,~le (,-ate, i~adolny,

!

criticized this feature of the French plan, noting that "according
1.

2.

French Disarlim: ent Proposals of' November 1932, Chapter' ILL,
Section A, Para~raoh 1.
See above, DO. 74, 115.
l1

.tub

to the French plan, however, agrressive material would not be
really abolished but would be retained.

It would be aS2i~ned to

the national continp;ents fOr~linf': the forces of tl1e Lea.co;ue of Nations, 0r would be kent at the latter's disposal in the territory
of the former owner.

'l'he German d·le[~ation considers that this

procedure wopld render Quali tatJve disarmament illusory. II I
criticism is natural, coming as it does from a disarmed

Irhis

~tate.

11he }<'rench view, however, seems logical, since !lnations can only

disarm under conditions analogous to those which, within a nation,
have made possibi_e the disarmament of t:ne individual (;i tizen, who
has only GOl1senteci to be dis aI'meei when he no longer felt the need
for

wea~oons

because guarantees of security had been createn by

social organization and i:::lGividual defense by individual means
could be dispensed with.~2
Other nrovisions of
uniform~ty

t':~e

:8' rench scheme are tile eventual

of all the war material of the various cOl1ntries, both

that of the national and international continfl'ents; the international
supervision of the of the execution of all oblip;ations of the Signatories; and the internationRl manufacture ana supervision of war
ma terisl.

The ;::>ri va t.e manufacture of arms has been cond(:3mned not

only by the Leag-ue, but also by peace societies allover the world.
1.
G.

3.

3

l':iinutes,(GC,ll), 29th j\leetJ_n.L~, ,blebruary 2,19;'.·3,').2:21.
Intern1;tional' Conciliation Pamphlet, 1<0. 298, arch 1934,
D. 60.
This flne article by Nicolas Politis, ilt1lster
of Greece at Paris and Vice-Fresident of tilS DlSar;Ylament Conference, gives an excellent review of the work
done, or left 1.mdone, by the Disarmarrent Conference up
to the 1'811 of 1933.
Article '3 01 the Coven2._'l.t of' the Leap:ue states that the nrivate manufacture of RI'lllB and m11niti t m.s is Hopon to rr,r'ave
obiection. iI It further provides that ti"e COlJ.ncil shall
2d~ise how the evil effects of such manufacture can be
prevcmted. A Leap;ue COY'1Ynission has reoorted that private
ar1ila!llent firms h8.ve fOi,ented war scares, bribed Government
officials, suread false reports, controlled newspapers,
and formed international rings and trusts in order to increase their sales. (See Penner Brockway, 'l'he Bloody 'rraffic,
pP. 38 f1'; and rfhe Secret International, pUDrrsheo--oy tEe
Union of Democratlc'(S6ntrol~ London;Y--

..Lv {

It is indeed hi7p time that ~n end should be put to such scandals
as have been revealed by the actions of such men as Shearer and
l
Zaharofr.
It will be noticed that one 01' tne orovislons emvuerated above reveals the 0ersistent claim of the French that no d1sarmament plan is practic~lble which omits some form of supervision.
This supervision, according to the l:'rench scher:1e, will be "regular
Rnd permanent" I"nd will lIinvolve 8.n investigation at least once a
year. 1I2
In

re~ard

to the standardization of contlnental ermies,

':'~'aul-f,oncour

c18i1"ed t>at it was necessary in order to attain real

disarmament:

fliNe must have standardisption in order to have com-

parison; we rm)st have comnf1rison in order to havE reduction.--"':l
do not see how we cc.n contemplate any practical reduction of land
effectives unle~:s we carl'Y out thJ.s standardisation first. ,,3

The

provision for the standArdization of the continental short-service
armies was based uoon the idea of an equality of defensive status,
and one German critic was forced to sey of it,

II

ii novel feature

and, to a certain extent, meet:mp: CTerm8ny 18 c12 im for equality of
ri q,hts, is tht) proviso , that a uniform
nlllitary service is to be
EuroDe. 1I4

r~rndlJ.Rlly

ty~e

of army based on short

established in the whole of

The bitter pill for th.e Germans, however, was the pro-

vision in the French scheme that these arrAngements were to be
...

1.

2.
3.
4.
F

Shearer, an American, was '08id by t!:l.ree large American slli'obuildin~ coroorations--The Dethlehem Shipbuilding Co.,
I],'he }TevP)ort t!('WS Shiubuilding and Drydock Co., and the
ilmerican Brown Boverl CoP'Ooration--to prevent any ef-·
fective disarmament from coming about at the GeneVa
Nav"l Conference, 1927. (Fenner Brocl::Vlay, 'llh~J~_~_o_ody
~raffic, pD. 159-63)
Sir Basil Zaha1'o1'f, connected
W"fth -English armament firms, scoured the European continent in search of markets, and made a fortune f'l'om
the deaths of thousands. {Richard LewL'1soh, Si~._~asil
2aharoff, 'J'he .Lystery Ivian of Buro_pe, pas_§ir~.
Prench Disarmalnent Proposal s of L'lovember 1932, Chanter 11.1,
Part IV.
};linutes, (GC,II), 33rCL I.leetinp: Peb. 8, 1933, p. 260.
Schlliidt2~-Grabowsky, p. 104.

brou[;ht about by succesf:ive stBges in such a manner that neither
the forces nor the

arma~ments

ex·)endi ture of any state shall be 1n-

creLlsed, unles s the Conference 2Dnroves of such action. l
At this noint, an analYsis of the first three chapters
of the French nlan reve0ls the presence of concentric circles,
that is, the first chanter concerns all the nations of the worla;
the second, all the }lembers of tll.e League; anCl;.:;he third, all the
na tions of Eurooe.

'Ehis ci1ar<cterization of' the scheme was well

expressed by the L)elp:i8n d81eg8te, BouI'quin:
~ose

to do to imnrove the

org~nisatlon

"What does 1 t pro-

of peace?

It is at this

point that we come upon one of the in[!:enious ideas by which it is
characterised--namel;i, the concention of the so-called 'concentric
circles'.

On the 0utside there is tee universrl plan, on the in-

side there is the ':::tJrODean ')lan.

'1'he obl1gations becone stronp:er

and more definite in nroportion as the arae is narrowed.
in·.:enious idea, because it wouhl L

It 18 an

nractice 'oe imnoss 1ble to in-

duce 8.11 the nations of th,:? world to accent cert~nn obligations
to which the ;.:'tates of ~~l..n·oY)e ma;r, on the other 1:1anc5-, submit in
thGir' common interosts.

t:'or our nart, we ;':i ve our entire approval

to this method, which seems to us tne only method c8.')able of Y1eld'.)

ing nositive

results."~

Certain nations A.re loath to send their armies iiacross
tl1e seas It t

0

l:.'rench recov)nize
ass l' s t otller nat1' on"
. C> f''''o. r a,C'nv
"=, . .The
1'
•

this fact, anO the above provision makes the obligations ass1),med
corl'eSDond to the intel~ests involved.
1.
')

0.

'1'he imi)Ortance of t.rw Euro-

French Disarln[;ment Pro1.)osals of :'Jovember 1932, ChaDter 111,
Part V. Compare with the German criticism, Schmidt Ez~
Grabows }{y, D. 104.
.
. 3
0°9.
Ii!i~1:t_te~..L~GQ_~~IL, 30th tleetinF';, Peb. 3, 193 , p. 0?J

..
pean pact was

stl~es2ed

i~'ur'ope

it:!Vake up,

1

by Paul-Boncour in these challenr:r,inp; words:

Instead or askinG the iour quarters of tne [::lobe

for the p.,llarentees you need, c['n "0 11 not find them 1n;vOl.lrSelf?
When we .have nade that effort, perhcns we s1:1[;ll be .iu:c,tt{ied in
asking; others to supplement it.
plan.

1I1

'('hat ts the idea of the [I'rench

l1. logical nrr:ument indeedt

The fcYurth cbe.pter of tDe l'rench prop08f::.1s states that
naval and overseas forces cnnnot be 3ub,jecte z.L to the eont1nental
sy:::'tem that

i~-:

olJtllned in chaoter t.hree, out these 1"orces are to

be lintted and SD9Ci[lllzed for t e 1)artict,l£u' te.· )~S '.''lhich ttlOy may
be c2lled UDon to 1)erfo I'm.
of terY'i tories

G

~\UC~l

broad, defens e of t

anuoartie ipa tion 1n mer) sureE: of
pressln~

tas]cs would embrace ti:le protect1on
le'

c"ast~-;

~nutual

of Lie .tl<yme terri to ry,

8.S S U:

tellce.

Pel's iste'ltly

their idea of security, the French proposed that the re-

CLUctj.on of fleotf: should. be m8de eontinp;ent u"on sm,le kind of 1'ecional av;reement--for

111fi tance,

a 1."oo.i terranean 1:'ac t •

'This

at~ree-

ment wo~ld inc'ude certain restrictions on the use of naval bases,
an agreement on the nart of the 21gnatories to consult one another,
.
and co-operation in C8 se::-, of mutual

B:

.
2
slsbnce.

Ger~Ylan critics

object to suer. agreements, as well 8.2 to any scllwie of ci.is8.rma1""ent
based UDon prior considerations of security.

3

One of tbe chief ob5ections of the Germt3n dt 1e::8te to the

-

...

J:1'rench Dlan was that it contnined no concrete DroDosHls for d1Sar~,m~ent.4

I

~

<!:'

I

1.
2.
'L

0.

I
I

!d:.

-

This charge is not strictly true, and Paul-Boneour

Ilnutes,(GC,Il.), 33rd Leetin',;, F'eb. ~3, 1933, '0.261.
Fre..nd11):lsar-a--:;::-:-ent Proposrds of 1\JoV01i"ber 193::::, Chapter IV.
Linutes,(GG,II), r.:;9th Leeti::1g, 1"eb. 8,1933,0.881. See aLsO,
--:::-eh.rrridt & Grabo1.'[sky, D. 10!4:.
i.bid.

-L.":l:V

called attention to the fRct th8t his country's plan did provlde
for disarman'ent.

J]e DO" nted out t e

"U'OVl2 ions

of the J:<'rench plan

which called for q~alit~t1ve reductions in those catecories
sels which have been

reco~nized

ves-

oj

as the most offensive, by means of

the Qualitative rednctLm of trw c[Jaracteristics aat 'Jresent fixed
for cert,qin types of war vessels", and quantit8tive reductions of
tonnaGe

fe,Y'

LoU

~t:J'Le

Dnd small navies on a rele.tlve basis.

al;c 0 pOlnted out tLat cerblin bor!bing aircraft VB1'e t
and that dOlJ.blo reduction was to 08cur in

re[~[c:r'c3

:~:

lie

00 abolished,

to 1J:Jth the num-

ber pnd service of effective. l
The latter D!?l't of ti,e fO'urth chsDter provices tHat 811
contrac tiEr rOVlers

:)Of'· E.

es:::; irw naval 1'::'rc08 sl1r 11, wi en called u}Jon

victim of ,'n c'F"fres::ci,:m is E:ntitled.
course, j'ix the
each nation will

ternutiona1
,

",.

~ro~ortion

contri~ute

re~u1ation

The Cr)nvcntion shall, of

of vesse12 in evory cate'ory
for

thi~

DurDo~e.

whic~

This nrovision sdGS

of clvil aviutlon--the fJrst two cO;luitions

being subject'to the acce'C)tf'llCe ot the last one.' l.. Bny of' tile d:.!letate:.:.; at trIe Conference vvisheo to :. bolL'h bombing f':('om the B,lr
without

[iny

dependent sU,')uI8tioI1s, while ot.hers

as the French, only under certain conditions.
H

-

'':lSI'leO

~ato

to do '0,

of Japan vade

leno:thy statement on thh' :'ub,iect, stating 8ii1011f: othey' things
1.

"7.
d .'iee
T"
t":Lng,'l'eb~'
D. 2)-'7.
(]O11l( rtC I~)
lulnu t e~_,_~,"~,
L)Or,
.. ',', 19~;':;,
~
pa.re, .. 'rencL Disarr~al11ent ProposFls oi' .l!ovcmber, 1932,
GlJa.pters III and IV.

that /lin view of the tc'chrlicr.l ir:lprovemonts vlhi,;h vrere constantly
beinp maGe, and of the facility with which civil eircraft coula,
when ner;es::':13:,-y, be useo for rnilitt'-y DlU-nOSes, it was inconceivable

r~ore

eSDec irll'T f'omhin? from tbe

:C'

ir, no acco'-nt whould b'c:' taken of

the use to which clvil pircrEtt could be DUt in tlme of \'Jar.''II
'i'he 1-':["eneh }leld t11ico vievv 2180, anCi claiY':e6 that c8tlsfaetol'y refiul ts c::'uld be obtainec trlY-OiJ h
the

.~reAt
•

~lr

.,

0

~ower~.
a. .f . ..~,lJ.~or.le,
_,
. . . ~.

1'0

~otl~
~_', . .t

J.

iiona:!. p'TeeFlont in 1Nhich ad
c~DtlY)ent8~
""
J
"
.. L

"nu' I'lOD - con'
Jne n'l'L a 1 ,
,
L ',~..

Ct',

would nartlclnate.
In order to fully achIeve the desired end of nrohibltion
01' 8e1'lo.l l:onbardJrlGnt end the abolition of' bOI(bin€~ aiJ"cl'eft,

8.n

EUI'onean Ail' '}'r·".Dsport TJnion is provideCL for in t ne L"renr:.h plan.
'llhH: o:c ~'aniza tion'-ill cntl'w':' t

the I118naF,;err1ent 8no superVl s ion in

.b1J.rope of 'oublie [.;:.i1' tr;.D2'JOrt to

aircr2ft for military purposes.
a t'ro[·",der form,
po~'<,d.s when

rl1::tG

2

'l,r"

internationr,l body v:hicl1, Ht

'1'his sn"e 1):r:'oposa1, BlthouCh 1n

heen r'~ade b~r t:~'e 1.'renr;h in their ;,<'(;br'uar-y pro-

hey actvocated the illter-nt tlOri: 1iz[d:'HID of clvil air

'l'Ee fifth clH01'oter alE.o nrovides for t';e f'\).lJ

,_-

ccwpletion

of the intern~:,-tionfl pollce for-eo b;:/ recJuiri.ng that not only shonld
sDecL,lized tur' '.-nit::., be nlt-ced at the Clispo~~G.l of the L08:W e , l')ut
a1;::o by 2'\J.:'ve2tin!7 that a real lnternational air 101'(',0 cJhou.lc. be

I
!

~

cl~ef:;ted,
1.
n

G.

3.
'1.

and E18lntsineci Dermcnently by the Leegue of Nations. 4

1,.inutes,(GC,II), 7?th 1"ee 1 ing, June H, 19:5::" p. 631.
'rYe
"--'--Ei~'ftfsh"proposalfj were bein,F discu:...sed at this time.
French Disar:rnarnent Proposels of YOV8Y'lher 19:.")2, Cr12Dtel' V,
';ection (2).
2ee above, 'OD. III ff., eFneci2.11y note 3, pape Ill.
'1.'hi8 provis ion clears up sOrJewhat the vap;uenes~; of the i"ebruary proposals in regard to an org~n~cinterDatlonal
force.
See alcove, no. 113, 114; ano llE::, :(ootnote 1.

This internn.tionel 2ir fleet will be corn')osed of the b01'1bing air'craft WhlCh is forbidden to nptional air forc8s, thus ensuring to
the Leamle an effective
Geution.

l'he

airectly :t'rom

Der~:orlIlel

me~n8

t~!i~:

of

volunteer~l

of carr'ins its

dcc~sions

into ex-

1en.,,:ue air force will be recruited

frorrt tbe different nations on the basis

of quotas whieh will be deterr:lned by the Conference.

1

,C'uch a Le:- CT:.e e.ir force wonld be trul'V internetL)nal in
chE'racter.

It wt)1)ld be the oyly l'e81 01'ranic force at tee di8-

po sal of tlle Lears-ue, since the

lanc~ fmd

naval

continc~ents

for COTIMOn action would be held in the various countries.
provisions are wise Rnd practicable:

intendea
These

n£"tions are not reBdy to jump

with one leap to the cre~tion of a comnlete international ioree of
Lanr~e,

land, air, flnd naval units.
which left the Let1'L~e
and he paid a

~lowinr

I 8

01 -orway, criticized eny plan

eontin,r:ents ln the hands of national : ta tes,

trlbute to tne French

su~restlon

for an 01'-

"---1 regard

ganic lnternHtlonal Air force in the following words:

the idea of a force organically internetional ln cDaracter as far
more practicable and 8120
conditions.
as

H

OS

DoliticE:lly reeliseble l11der certain

In tc'e first olace,

tC-llS

;:neclali:::;ed ana 1:;' itecL forcG.

f01-ee must be c.oncelvec1. of
IYl-ce i~'rencll s\JP~r:eo:tion for D.n

2,ir f)rce seerrlS to me to i'1.1lf'11 those eonditioTIs.J".JrlY Lunit'Q;r
For a

VE;l'Y

simDle T)syclLolordecl J·Cf~:on.

It is es~ent.i2.i

thBt t~.e

l,en 'who will!le called on to lm(Jerp~o tr~'lnln[~, if neces::ary to give
theil' lives lll. L",':.e service of t>e international orGarns atlon we
[n"e naw [;tte'i·ptln;~ ta eonstruct,·must be l1Y1bueCi ;;-;ith
of international loyalty.
exe e :) IJ lJjn •
J-

1.

1')

new sHrit

;J.:hese men exiEt, r'ut tlley al'e ~;t)"ll the

1ele
r!l'l~;'t
tJ::.erefoI'e be' in In..T cI'eatinp; a nucletls aronnd
,
_,
L __

~renc~ Disarmaent ~I'oDosals of ~ovet~er 1932, Chapter V,
section (3).

.
which a more considerRble force will be able to develop little by
little according to the possibilities Rnd needs of the situat1on." 1
/

This international nsychology is not altorether a new
,~'pealcin(' of tre personnel of bis

thlnp:.

internEtional police fopce,

Davies sa-:TS, "In tllis new s1"")here, howevel-, they will not by aD:/"
mesns be the first arrivals.

hey

~ill

0iscover that their aavent

ha3 been oreceden bv thst of the ~ecret~rlat of tne Lea~ue ot Na-

tions.

'L'h12 continr-ent, con2 is ting of' about five hundr-ed persons

drawn 1'roy" ov, r f1f'ty na tionali t1es, he: s alreacty SWOY'n alleghmce
'co the new confec.ierf:'ltion of ;:tntes ann in doh)g

80

has ciisnlayeci

t.he hi.o:hes t pa tr1otism. -- -- f:l.milarl;l U::..e YJersonnel of the i:nternational polJ_ce will enjoy the

s~'me

Dosition as has been accoy·ded

n

to the 3ecr'etarl[]t at neneva--·-."~
Attent10n should aLo be c2,11eo to the provision in the
Frenell plan that tL8 personnel of this internation2.1 air force is
to be recr"i ted. :i'rom the various na tions on the bas is of a quota
:3
2::'"S teYr"l.
rI'hus, the real interna tinal character of tlle air foree
will be
~:

as~~red,

ingle country.

and it wi]] not

incl~de

too 0any nationals of any

Sucl: en 11Y'JOrtsnt feature will, as Davies observes,

tend to reduce any friction that

l!18.y

arise betvieen "!iember ,t,tes

and the international authority.
A survey of these French pro~osal8 taken
veals several. important concluslonlil.

1.
. ;2 •

3.
4.

BE

8

whole re-

It will Le noted t.t-Je.t jot is

:,"-,-lJUtes, (GO, 11), 32no. j"eetinp:, F'eb. 7, 193:::-, p. 250.
rYavie-s, -D.p. - 4,J:l-<b2. In 1925, the .secretarJ_st of the Leagu.e
consisted of about 465 persons of 34 different nation81i ties, includ1np: ':0 ':h men and women. 'rills e;roHr of
men and women constitute 8 sort of International Civil
:!,orvice. (~;.oe ~~ershey' s excellent footnote, p. 505, footnote no. 32)
We l":',ave already discussed the advantages of the, 'barer'e' formule. which woulc5 be 2.n excellent method of Q:)terl1lln1nr~ )
the quota of each countr:T. (See above, p. 77, footnote 2,
Davies, p. 444. We will recall that the suoremacy of Athens
dest~oved the Delian Confederacy.(See above, p. 4)
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basec u')on the 'n'LYlciule of regiotJal ap;reements--narticularl:y
the l:!,'Ul'ODean Tlact of' che-:Jter- three VJ11ich is the heart of the D1F.ln.
f'eul-l:3oncour called [~ttention to the fElct ttl[-'!t t11e EUrOneE'JD na-

tllG Geneva l':cotoco l_ on t.he . I'ound that lmiverEOc,l 18.[\isl8.tion was

lmpo s ~ ible, anG t ~ ,at tile };'rench nac mociified tnej_r olen to take lnto
account geogr~whical repions.
.b'ren,ch ctf'legEte, to

88Y

It is not rie:tjt then, clElli,eo tbE:

now that uni vel'seli ty is oreterable.

l

fhe Prench had attemnted to corl'ect their proDosalE in answer to
the former ar;;;1),ment S th.'~ t
En~,:lLb

tile'! Vle-..:-e utopian, but the (J'ennf'n and

delegations Vlere like tIle childl"en nlaY:Lng in tile market-

ulace--they wisneG neither to dance to the strains of univers81ity,
nor to

sin~

to the melodies of

j~gain,

~articularity.

the Frencl: 01'0'002[ls intendec not to abolish ar-

m:l:lents but to internF:tlonalize thGnl.
1-

the

Gerll'~'n,

i.,B.ny deJ.eeates, nartic1)lar"-

favoreu the abolltion oj:' ol'fr.:nsive 'weapons

maments, and ob,';ected to thi;:; part cf t ,e Prencli sclleroe.

8r-

PIlCI,

'fhe Ger-

man objection rU.ns thus:
)uroo1't to reserve tl:,e most

el'1'~Lcacious

League of Nations.
to

~Deak,

if not toe

us e of the mos t

meDDS of aeY'J.a-L boelJing warfare tor trw

Thus the

~ea'ue

~rlvile~e

then

of Yations is to mClnt8ln,
~t

lea~t

~o

tbe1reference in the

inh"11Jane lYle:ns of rl.'der'n warf, pre l',,2

ot Eel'S,
1-

(ICJW-

ever, llave Dointed, out thElt Abolition of weapons will not 8.821,'.re
1.
2.

Niinutes, (GC,II), 33rd lleeting, l"ebruar:7 S, 1933, 1'). 860.
:'::cbniidt & Grabowsky, D. 176. '[,hese objecti'Jns were made to
the February 1932 uroDosals of the Prench, but were
voiced again by }1adolnv in reference to the l~ovember
Dropos~:
l~ • (~inu
tes
, (GO, II), 29th lleeting, Februar"y 8,
. .
.
._._-_._-193~5, D. 221 j
See Ellso, Davies, 1')P. 329-35 where he
tells how he VI~uld arm his international police.
He
would hand over all poisonous gases to the international pollce force slso.(Davies, DP. 3~9-4UO)
.~-\

__

.L4b

the abolition of war, because other weaDon~ will
whic h to r;ontinue the

:)e invented with

-~'lElginp: of war. 1

Another f'eature of tho Yrench DIan, as we have noticed,
is its so-celled concentric circlo[.

This ideE gives practicality

to the proposf,l", si:::1ce it r"F,1.\E"8 the obligat:Lons assumed. corros""Clo:':1d

the
ber~;

nE~tions

t~18

in

Vlorld

i~:

clwpter one, BcreE'FontE: for 811 the mS111-

of thrc Lea,::-uG in chapter two, ["J.'.d Brreenlents

ttons of Europe in chapter

ity and

dj~~::::rm;

r:'ont

in Fllnd, thc-: B1 rencb
their disarmo0ent

~n:\'

trlne, bt!t

~'l'e

licl~ed.

to add le'[l

~12n,--stinulstion2

DCc}

'fiith thts

Uli'ot'T,

trtst wil], really bind natioDS

effectlve SOll}_tlc,n or Lns nrollen is nuLlli'ieo by

s~:~Tln(~

tt'i~'t

nEtion.

=~L'.ce

C:CY·mFn~7.

2

n~:~tJ_orwl

,
the day:::

:Jf 'Jrl1cc

'l'he T:Iorldjar onl~' "::rollc/ht ~_C'to'n'oHllnerlCe fOJ'

interDf_',loncl Gonciliation Pamn111ets,
1,",\1-,

0:(

that thc?rencb ioea ')f security, ox'

is no new ides foY'

'0:0 tllat COtmtr'y.

1.

~"Jr:LDciple

pollticel clRl1 ses to

i;::olcction or tbe T.'niteC: b;~te<:, and the ODDosition

li,'e without

[.,,11 tl'le D8-

t~lree.

tndt~:::ol\lbl--:T

1")1'0')038

fOJ:'

1:,0

;~.!;"l;l~t;~,

. o.

:2~~',

((;0,11), p. 2!~;3 fay' : r. i~;dE::il':::(G're~'t Jr'ltt>ln) view;
"f6"rEaron Alolsi'dlt[·dy) vtev;; end nn. r.:;86-3 tOY'
~~err' ~.ac:"":'ln~" 8 (Germany) view. Thern teo j tElte::: i~ not
vet wilJior to accent tne feeble oblipation2 of the
Covenant of the Len"us of NatioDs.
·)~-"-21

L

_

.

..L':tO

..
the Prench their desire for sefety.

The doctrJne of security is

reali2tic--it is bEf~ed u;"on t.he :>r:trlcl"ole tr'at [; law-abidinr: 21)irit 1:::. not EmOl~r:h in tbi~' V'!o::--lci oT J.rr.neY-J'ectJon, Pl,d trlRt in the
18st analysis 11'

f'

are ol'e:!ed bec[:!l..lse of thE:)erwl ties that 8re

attacJlOo to thC'll';.
hmicin[d

ro.o::-';~uni tie~

V:0111d l'e'"'E.rd an;;' i(lc'o to Hb,')lish

thslr ~olice torce and leral Densltie2 es childis~; yet, whenever
tJle lC;'ee is ~;ur':,:-:e2tec t:-,nt tl:e f..c:rne ~r:Lnci!le be a,)lJlled to maintaln intel-national ':n'cier, tbe
~"r8nee

;:.~;r:e

erittcB mi,':ht scoff pt it.

offers +:0 the \'forld the 'J1'o"1)02e1

:tOY-

[>n internetin81iio-

lice force to mF.il:b'ln jnternctional neEee 8nd order:
the world has refupod to consider this DY'oDossl.

tous fBr

..,

.

App endix I.
Document 17.
Official rench plan for a League of Na tions.
(printed as annex to minutes of the Cornmission)
Annex 2 to

11

inutes oftt'irst Meetinf" , Lear;ue of Nat ions
Commission .

ADOPTED BY THE FRENCH r'_IlJl~rrERIAL cm'. ISSION
FOR TH1!: LKAGUE OF' NATIOFS . l
(Translation)
I.
statement of the Principles to be tRken as Basis of the Lea£l:ue
of Nations.
The problem of the League of Nations is one which forces
itself upon the consideration of everv Go vernment.

Historically ,

the idea is a very old one, which took shape when the civilizea
st&tes assembled at the two .:iague Conferences in 1899 and 1907 .
Practic all"'!, durin@" the present war , it has been t eken UP afresh
under vario us forms by t"e Allied

Governments in their official

declarations , by President {llson in his note of December, 1916 ,
and even by our enemies in their replies to the Papal Nate of the
16th Autmst , 1917 .

It is , therefore, imlJossible to avoid the

study of the question:

it can and must be considered quite apart

from the questions which form the subject proper of the Treaty of

1.

In declaring that a Qense of justice and honor compelled

them to Carl"y on the war thrust UDon them by the aggressive ac tion of the Centr al Powers until a joint and decisive victory had
been gained , the Alli e s intend to convey that one of the results
of ttlat viCtOl-Y shou ld be (a) to protect the world in fu ture against
any recurrence of the employnent of brute force and attempts on
1.

R.

C' .
Baker , 'JoodroVl vi 1 son end dorld ~ ettlement , Vol. III ,
pp . 152- 62 . See also , D. H. Miller , The Drafting of the
Covenant , Vol. II , p • 238- 46 . (This dOClUnen t is used by
the permis sion of ~,1r . Baker)

•

t-e

_'.

1...•• "

....

<-tcion to n'.:..taL1 '.:niversal SUpr9mc.cy , end (b ) t.o

e2tub l ish the reign of justice on sure foundations throufflout the
world .
They docBll-e Llat , in order to seCUI'e conditions which wi ll exclude the ezistence of a mere dangerous truce and Guarantee r08.1
peace , it is necE.:.:.. oc.r:T to provide for tl.1E' contruc tl.1.al ::..nd . . ermanent
organization of international :;:'elations , by the constitution betw en
states, of the association to which ul1lversal public opinion has
given the n::'J'lG of "the League of Nations . 1I
8.

The object of the League of N8tlons shall not be to estab-

lish an international political '"'tate .

It shall Merely sin: at the

maintenance of peace by 8ub8tit"..ltine Right for Ui::;ht as the arbi ter of disputes .

It \'rill thlls guarante e- to all C'tates ali 1{e , ''Ihe -

thor small or [,reG.t , the exercise of thelr soverele;nty .
3.

The scope of the LeaQle of Natlons is unlversel , but , by

its vel:Y nature , it can onlJ ext811d to
give ecch other all

tho~e

guarantees

n~cessQry

nation8 which will

f a practical and legal

nature , and which , in l oyal fulfillment of their
emnly undertake

~o

~iven

word , sol-

be bound by certain rules in order to maintaln

pe:ce by respecting Rirht ,

~nd

to guarantee the free development

of their national l ife .
Oon~equentl:r ,

no nations can be admitted to the

L8",""U9

othel~

than those which are constituted as states and provided with representatives institutions such

8::"

will permit their bein E; themselves

considered r-esponsibJe for the acts of their ovm Governments .
4.

'rhe Lea.'1"ue of Nation::.. 8hall be y·epresented by an internation-

al body ,

compo~ed

of the responsible heads of Governments or of their

delegates .
This lnternational body shall hO,ve the followi'1-" powers:(1) It shc..ll orr;anize an intern_tional tribunal .
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(2)

It :::hall e:Cfect the amicable settlement of disputes be-

tween the

C"tate~

ceded, if

neces~a~:y ,

of ':h-' Lca"ue by P18ans of medtation, pre-

membe!~s

by an enqu1ry 1n the terms of the Hague Con-

vention of 1907 .
(3)

In the event of

Qn

amicable

~ettler.1

nt provlng impossible ,

it will refer the matter to the International Tribunal , if the ques tion at issue is upen to a ler:al decision; otheI".'vise it shall itself decide tm matter .
(4)

It shall Gnforce the execution of its dec1sions and th08e

of the International Tribunal; at 1ts demand every nation shall be
bOlnd, in agreement

~ith

the other nntions, to exert lts econoMic ,

naval , and military power against any recalcitrant nation .
Every nE..tion shall Ii reV/dlse be bOl_md, :J.t the demand of the

(f)

International Body , to exert , in

con~on

a cord with the other nat -

'ions , its economic, naval , and milit ...:('y power agalnst any nation
V!hlCh , not having become a member of the LeD rue of Natlons , shall
attempt , by any me=ns whatsoever , to impose its will on another
nation .
5.

The Interne.ti 'nal Tribunal shall pronounce on all questions

submitted to it , either by the International Body or by a Qtate
having ,ny dispute with another .
It shall decide and pronounce upon questions of law at issue between

~tates ,

on the basis of custom or of internatlonal convent1&ns,

as vlell as of theory and jurisprudence .
In cases of violation of such law , it shall order the necessary
reparation and sanctions .

.J..v,-,

II.
Diplomatic, L8~al, ane Economic Sanctions.
(1) Diplomatic ~anction2 •

.
The28
qU8nt

sanctio~s,

~tate

~lich

the result or

will he to Dlace the delin-

Tor a shorter or lonrer period unaer the ban of the

memb,:;l' nations, fall under th:pse heedu1F,\s:
(a)

The suspension or breakin~ off of

he diplomatic relations

existL,s up to -Ci,ct peri·od botneen sl'ch ,::tnte 1':ll1d

0

cher member

states of the Learue of l'J[tions;
(b)

1'lle withdraw8,1 of the ~xectuatup [~ranted to the cons1..1,ls of

(c)

',rho exclus ion of the ; t: te

any internatioDo.l

convent:ton~~

~LD

ques tion frOY:1 the benefl t of

to '['i'leh it m£',;r be a nal"ty.

On the other hand, certain sanctions of a lepel nature will enable the Leo', rue of'

l~a tions

J

[;'

C cordin,r::

to circumstance s, to

enforr~e

respect of the princ1:Jle,,,: '-7hich it is called ul)on to protect.
(a)

'rhus offence s cornmi tted, encourar:ed, or tolerated by one

of the mOmb')I'S

~:tates

may l'cnder it liable: to pecuniary sanctions

'rihieh will be amlied 10
in accordpnco

~ith

the general prlnciDle laid down by Article 3 of

the Haf,Uc) Convention

(b)

it by th,:::, International CO'lrt of Justice,

0:1:'

tb"" 18th Cctober, 1907,

'l'he:ce .'ire, moreovel', otho:"

vIitho",t; cntailin

r

•

senctj,o~l~

'o:l,e cH:rcct n8Clmip.:,:'y

aT

13.3;'0

~.

t)1e 1:,:',,[1s 2nd

lc,p[:,l ns.ture VJhich,

':.'()t~n:Jnsibility

of the :tate

concerned, ',:il1 eZGrt [': VGr7 Y;]8rkec) aDO jY1Y"'adist(, Hlfluence on the

s: crJ_fice8 it viill i1:1.P0;:-:0

oYlt~he

Driv~-,te

:tlltero

themselvec3 .I.'hore \'fill be no question::; of

...

,-t~

of the citizens

d.o1Jrivinr~

the

laf~t8r

of

the advantar,es or comrnon JJw, or of DunL:hin'\ them for acts for
th~'v ~-u·s'

vrhich

v!hich coni'0Y'r-;

I

rC;:;Doncibiliti,,;~:

rlS

vJell

0"-

bcnsf:i_ts, vlill doubtless

per'mit of the temporf1l"r ,'Jithdrn!81 from thE.:m

1
J\

not db'ec tl/ fmsvlGrable; l:n't that nat tonal nni ty

01

the exercise of a

faculty which, altilou.cll not indispens8blc tocxlstGnCe, nU17ertheleas
~

tends to

it.

frcillt~te

sures from this Doint

relatlnr~

Vee

susp~~~in,

of all Articles of
auJcho:rl~~

to th

protection 0:1"

~nd

cODvnntions under

trial property,

th~lt

cO:Clcluded. between
Lenp;ue of

vie'wl

~t~te,

of tho recalcitr8nt
tion::::

.f

l1r:ti')n~':

1-.!

(;xcl!:.:;ion of

t:['ies as to ':ho execl1tion
favour of th8

n;~LLY:l8.1:::;;

or

As~ociation,

conven-

und of indus-

international law

. te tes, members of the

nf'tlo(]81~

;::t1:clte from l'econrse to th(; Courts of Law in

rcp;ero.:::. subjects

c01)yrir~ht

privrt~

to to and tho othex'

82

oc" the recalcitrant

tht~

countries members

judr':rncni:s nronounced by itc' GOi.l.rts in

the :::'eizul'e cnc se(luGstrotlon 01 1"081 es-

tate or mov3blo pI'ooerty belon0'in,': to it;· n2.tiona1::: In tl18 saHt
conntrics;
v:ith

i~h.

subject;.~

'1'he

Drol'lbitlnn of r;OIl'111Crci:l relntions Ll}1d even, nature
of

he, t.' tee; belJnglcF' to the Le8'·l.1.O·)[' j\fations.

forogoin;~:

to 'be ','1i tJ~oyt nre;iudice to any lecsl s8.nctions

unpliccble

~nder

r),..O
tho _'
_.,_.i-n~-J -:',\/

_o+._._:~._

the lndlvidual whose

which the

L~a:~0

~. ',

()t

crimlnr,J. .h1.l'isCi.:Lction to

u'on law or whose actions mey have

of Netions may think well to take 1n order to se-

cure CO.Llvlction, in
thE; jUI'luilction

outr~~es

1'"11]1

c,-;~'e

it is not cmsured b::

o!""llich~hc:

U~n

crimlnr.::.l h: subject.

i.i-overnment to

•
( ':z:) 1?
c.;Jconomlc
OJ

Otl101'

sf~nction~:

c'
,~,anc

t lons.
.

efficient eO'1trol over the rccnlci trant
s~;res

c!~n

of ,"n econcmnc nature

c

be employeo by the

tete, by various mea-

'.vhich mo;! extend to placing it under an absJ}ute commerci-

I'll, inrJustrial, or finnncial bp:n.
The nrincipal me'8ur08 in Question are:
(a)

Blockade, consi3tin~ in the nrevention by rorce of any

comm",rcial
I

l

Vii tll trJe terrltOY'y of the

~}tate

in ques-

tion.

I

l

int"rcollr~::e

(b)
tr~e

~£:mbHrr;o,

i.e., ttle seizllrc and temporalY sequE:$tration, in

Dorts anCl territorial '<"('tors of the

and cargoes belonr"ins to
as also th
(c)

t~]G

delincuent~_t'

_t,[~tes, of ships

te !',nd lb: natlo r l81s,

seizure of all goods destined for such ?tate.
~~he

Prohibition of

s1Dply of raw matsrialsand foodstuffs

indisnenscble to its eC0nomic
(el)

m~~:mber

exi~tence.

Prohibition ofhc issue b-;,r 8uch~t;te of publlC loans in

the terrltories of the moobe

rt~tes;

refu3~1 to allow stock issued

els ewher'e to be quoted on ~hc ojficial!:'~xchange, '?nC! even v,TthdrawI'll of any Drevious ner-mission for tl1G quotation of the stock of
such stnte.
Trle sanctions

thm~

provided will be 8_11 Ule mol',? eft'lcacious
,11[t the mem-

Dnel their anr')11c1:;tion vrill he all the 1'101'e nromot, in

ber 2tates will have previously ar-ran~ed to orotect themselves against [my

!"l}ri::-~aL'

organlzation

~dn~ted

to l;heir pre judice,
to

f~Cllitrte

theip

't):'r

means of an econo-mic

cooper~tjon

~n0

mutual

as:..i::tnnce.
'1'hi8 rough outlim:, l':il1 show th,,,t the
be ',','i thout

'N88.Don~'

Le2,;~lle

of'

Natio~Cls

,::i th which to enforce its dec is ions,

~'nCi

vlill not
to im-

pose on flny disturbinv elements thnt IIPeace by Justice,iI the maintenrmce of' ",'hiGh 1;Jill be i b

raizon d I ~tre.
:LI.

T.lilit, c'y ~.anctions.
(1) Intcr'nDtlou:;ll :':"orceil.
~he

execution of tho ID1l1t[ry 88nctions of land or at Bea shall

be entrusted either to 8.n
.201;ve1'''' members of the

intel'natior~al

Lear~uG

force, or to one or more

of Nntions, to t:hom

2.

m~.nuf'te

in that

behnlf shall heve been riven.
1'he InternL:. tional Body 3['8.11 hr:ve at its d} sposal

2,

military

force supoliod by the vCI'iol.':::: membcl' . tr:te::: of sufi:'lcient streneth:
(1) to secure the e:z:ecntion of its c](;,c:i.sion ;:;110. th0se of th()
Intern~tion81

(:::;)

~ri~unal;

to overcomo, 111 c" C'o of neod, :ny

posed. to

t~lC

LC[C'uG

1'orce~hH~h

mcy be op-

o)"'Nations 1n lhe ovont af armed conflict.

(ii) rtrGnpth af

Intern,t1on~1

Y18tionr:l J'o:c-ce':llc f"ix the cntlnr:()nt:.::

·.·Tj~nch

~ontlngonts.

f'11..Ft be helo at its

di!'00sal.

'1'he que::;tion of "h0

limit~~tion

b81' :: -r,ates will be dealt·· i +;h

.
<

(jue~tions

a1~fectinrf:

rnint the

office~

el:~

of P!'r:vm',nts 1n

c;~;ch

of tile:: mem-·

8'o,ho1'8 •

the Lea.rue of N[!tiont'.

Each Ct· to ::hall ap-

or offic0rs ',:1'10 shall :reprcfc:ent :tt, In e. nropor-

tion to be cetoY'mlDeci l:::ter.
L'.hc. Ghief

SIll'

per-ieo. of t11('eE:'

Denuty Ghief"co of
yel)l'C"

~:t[1ff

c~hall

be 8npointE':Q :ior a

by the Interne tiot18.1 Body, from a Ii::, t

st1.b-

~~t2tes.

mitted by the member

(lV) Functions of the Permanent
It shall be Ul'::: {'ut,,r of
cLeal, llDdeJ' tho

:::U,)(;

thin": "olRtinr' to

i-

I'vis ion

f-fLS

~t8ff.

he nc,rmen nt .Lnt> rnl) tlo~'al
0;

:.l!

In t~l'n[!t ionE.l Pod v

,

ol'f'anization of t,,::: joint force:::

.~

taft' to

..

i Th evel'y-

aDU

hie even-

it "ill in partic1}.lol' be ch8.rg-

ar:reemcntith
1)08in::;;

~:ny

n[ltlonaI
rne

tl~c

10ilit[li':r sucho

imQrovem,nt:::.: it

milit~'.1'Y

1',8;'1'

oI·."nnlzation

itic~,

of c:cb :' tste, !",nCi of pro-

cieem nece:::':S8.l":T, clther J_n the lnterOJ'

J_ll

the

method of' recl'ui tLV: of the:'o:!.'ce::; oj'
fhe

I l1it,

~taff

~y

c(ln:::tj.t1)ti~)n,
o~~_ch

comqos1tion,

~~tate.

shall rcnort the result of it:::.: lnspection:::.:, either as

in:::.:tructions shall be llven lD e' ch

dance wit.h 1'u12

Cle::.i~~nscl

to 'Jrocur?,

9,~.

men~<r

Stite 111 accor-

to}' [',::~ possible, lmiform-

in concert.
The IntArnatlonal Body 2hsll be entitled, at any time, to require thn t

nec e!,

::.~lC

mC/lb(;}.'

:

t.'. te.::: introduce ::ny al tr:n'8tHlD into their

:C' 8.I"~r •

(v) CO:nUili:;nctsr-inchL:f .~'

~hall

appo lnt,

1"01'

the durn tion oj

a Comm!?ndoi -iYJ.-Cl'::H)f oi:' ':hc

the op::,ra t J_oo::. to be;

int'2rn['_t10n~o_1

I·()rCE'~:.

l1n(JCY'i~1d<:(m,

..1.:. ,

Staff shall cea::e when cirCl.1TI1stlJnces become such thet an ar'med conflict is no longer to be feared , or when the object of the milltary
operations has been attained .
In either CAse, the dcte at which the Powers ofrhe Commanderin-chief and tho General

'tat f shall cease shall be fl "red by a de -

cision of the International Body .

IV .
Scope anCl F'unc tions of the International Body .
Public opinion among civilized nations , which regards The Hague
Conference as a step towa rd s the recognition Rne, R)pli(;stjnJ:l of t1:0
prjnciple of justice and equity as guarantees of the security of
E:tates e.nd the well- being of thelr peoples, h: unanimously demanding a

fr~sh

effort in tbe same direction .

Although it has

ar-

s~en

bitration applied in cases of ever-- increaClinr: impol'tance , 2nd likewise the creation of an international judicial orge.nization and the
institution o'f a system of enqulry e.nd mediation, it still considers a.s indispensable the establishment of more concrete gue.rantees ,
in order that peace may be secured by the reign of organi zed justice .
The question thus arises of the institution of a permanent international Body to carry lnto effect the real alms of the League. of
Nations .
Thel'e is no question of makln g the League of Nations a super tete or even a Confederation .

..ny such idea is rendered impossi-

ble by respect for tbe Eovereignty of states , by the diversity of
natlonal traditions fnd of political and judicial standards, by
the di:'ferences ln

Sy~tem8

of administratlon and op'Josltion of

of' econOL1 ic lntcro::ts; but publlc opinion among the free nations
would be disappointed if the r suIt of the present crisis

we~e

not

to be the lnstltution of

n

Intern~tion&l

Body capable of contri-

buting,by constant vlgilpnce Bnd the exerClse of sufficient authorlty, to the malntenance of pesce .
In conformity with the statement of principles adonted by the
Commis Slon on the 18th January , this Body , constituted in the for-m
of an International Council , vvil derive its authorlty from the re cl')rocal undertakinr:s [o.ven by e8ch of the memb r natlons to use its
economic , navrl , cnd militcry power in conjlllctlon with
members of the

Lea~ue

~he

other

agalnst any nation contravening the Covenant

of tl:e Lea<:,:ue .
(i) 1\ aintenElllce of Peace Between the Member Nations .
'l'he Councll shall devise t:lnd apply all means for the prevention of lnternational dlsputes .
To this intent-1.

1he International Council shall maintain and develop the

Internatlonal logal lnsti tutions created at rrhe Hague and call for
lnternational declsions to sUPDlement them as may be required .
2.

'llhe International Council shall,

~i ther

at the demand of

the partles or at the lnstance of a third . t8te , effect an amicable
settlement of differences menacing Deace between the member states ;
in default of Rny such demand , (It shall be bound to take the inltiative as regards such settlement . )
3.

It shall, ln t he flrst place , proceed either by means of

cood offlces , and of mediation (preceded , If necessary , by an enquiry in the terms of the 1<'lrs t Hague Convention of 1907) , or by
reminding the disputant

~t2tes

that the permanent Court is o.pen to

them .
4.

Sholud no amicable settlement be thus obtalned , the Inter-

..L

,I (

nation[l l C01lncil shall consider ,,:hether the question is of a legal
nature, in 1'!hich cp se it shal] order the dlsputant s t tes to submi t the iro difference to the Court of International Jurisdlc tion ,
which lS competent to deal :li th the matter ln the terms of

~

ectlal

IV of the First Hague Convention; ln default of a compromlse belng
effected by agreement betw c en the -partles , the Court of The Hague
shall be competent to draw up such compromise by

€

xtenslon of Art -

icle !)3 of the scid Conventlon;
5.

The International Council shall ens ure the execution of the

decislons of the International Court , lf necessary , by resorting
to the apDllcatlon of diplomntic , le gal , economic , and milltar y
sanctions .
6.

Should the International Council consider

th~t

the matter

is not of a nptu re to be finally settled by a legal de c lsion , lt
shall d_eal with the question direct .
It shall in the flrst lnstance attempt to promote an allllcable
settlement , [nd , should it not itself be successful ln so dOlng ,
it shall define the terms ac c ording to ,hlCh the dlspute shall be
settled in a manne r Wh lCh shal l respect the ri f'° hts of each state
ano the maintenence of peace .
ThlS declslon shall be notlfled to the s tates concerned , lt
being intimnted to them that as from such dwte no dlspute eXlsts
betwoen th e conte ctant 3trtes , but between the entlrety of the
member

~ tates

:nd the state WhlCh , by refusing to accept such fie -

• 'clslon , Vio l ates the veroy prlnclples of the Lea ""ue .

:'hould the

s t a te concerned refuse to accept the declsion after havln g been
summoned to do so , the International Council shall

notlf~

to it

the COerClve meas'res of a diDlomatic , leg['l , economic , or military

---

.J

nature to be tnken agalnst it within a speclfled

tim~

(ii) Defence agalnst Non- Member S tates •
.. hould a non- m mber state attempt to impose lts will on any membe :. 0tr te upon any pl'etext '. hatsoev r' , the International Council ,
shail, el'ter havlng employed all posslble means of conciliation ,
decide upon the

~teps

to be taken

~nd

shall cause all legal, dlP -

lomatic, [nd military a ction at the dlsposal of member

~tates

to

be employed apainst such State .
(iii) PrecFlutionary Measures against the Spread of any
Conflic t between Non- ' ,ember ~ tates .
Should conflict threaten to break out between two natlons who
a1"'e not members of the League of Nations , the Internatlonal Council shall be bound to prevent Flny risk of its extension in such a
manner RS to concern member

tates , and to use a ll means in its

power to arrive at a peaceful settlement .

v.
Composition of the Intern8tional Council , ana of the Permanent
De l egation .
'Ehe International Council representinr; all the nations subscribln g to the Covenant for ee curing peace by organized legislation
shall be constituted as follows :1.

Each member State shall be represented by the head of its

Government , or by a representative of such Government having sufficient power to bind the liabllity of hlS state .

2.

A plenary meetinp: of the International Council alone shall

be empowerd to decide questions comln p" within its jurisdlction .
It shall mRke knu wn the

ruliD ~s

fiven in the case . of disputes

between ft, tes , nnd , should any such St2 te refuse to accept the

ruling , 1 t shall cause the (cor·y·esnonding) sanctlons to be carried
lnto ef1ect by the go v errunents of the member states .
3.

'l'he Internatlonal Councll shall h Id its ordinary meetlI1g

once r year .

The d.te ~ nd pI ce of the followlne meeting shal l be

set led at each such meetlng .
4.

The members of the International Council shall agree inter se

concernlnp the appointmpnt of mrmbers of the Permanent Delegation
which shall, between the meetlngs , r'eceive all communications des tlned for the sa id COl.mc tl , prep? re its reports , etc ., keep 1 ts
archlves ln safe custody ,

nd , in cases of emergency, send out not-

l c es to members of the Council &no propose the calling of a special
meeting ,
5.

'fhe Permanant

Delegation shall conS1S t of Ib members .

'l'helr ter·m of office shall be

years , and they shall be eligi-

ble for reelection .

6.

rl'he International COUIloil shull define the powers of its

Perman nt De l egation .
7.

The Int rnational Council shal l call. an extraordinary

meeti. g at the su~gestion of

he Permanent Delegation ( see paragraph

4 hereof) , or at the request of one or more of the member states .
June 8 , 1918 .

r

Appendix II .

Offic.ial ::ulhb(;r! Conference D. ·56
Geneva, February 5th , 1932 .
Propos 1s Of Th~~ rench Deleeation. l
The Goverrunent of t.he Republic , conscious of the gravlty
of the problem to be solved, is convinced that , in accordance with
previous work of the League of Nations , the Conference should deal
with this problem as a part of general policy _
This is all the more lmnortant since it me,e ts at a time
of economic and moral tension, 'l. t a time of general disturbance and
unea~iness ,

when events emphasi8e the absolute neces81ty of a bet-

ter organlsation in a tormented vlorld .
The Uoverrunent of the Republic is anxious to honour the
promise contained in its memorandum of ,Tuly 15th, 1931 , and to reply to the repeated appe al s made by tl e Le8.gue of Nations, notabl y in the resolution of the Assembly of 1927 .

It intends thus to

fulfil a double duty .
It assumes that, on the basis of the draft Convention
of 1930, action will be taken with the leDst possible delay .
Further , it presents herewith proposals for placing
civil a.viation and bo abing aircr&ft , and also certain material of
land and naval forces , at the disp o s al of the LeaVle of Nations~!for the creation of a preventive and repressive international force;
(: 01' , in the case of the accession of Stt, tes non- members of the
League of Nations , of vrhich several have tak6n part in tlhe
worK of the Preparatory Co~~i3sion , at the disposal of the
interna tional authori ty '~hich would be constl tuted to ensure their co - operation . '
"
1 . See LeatTUe 0f Nations; Conference for the deduction and
Llmitation of Armaments, Conference Docmuents Vol . I,
pp . 113-116, Geneva 1932 .

r

J

.!..o.!..

for tbc l)oli tic~;l conCi tion:c u·,) 0
L=-;~;tly ,

rul~L

for new

prnvi~lnr

1

VThich stlch meIClsur

fo~

I.

1--,

~

GE.\

depend; end,

nrct?ction of civil

~opula-

~.

G 10~1.

Propc~al~

I.

to Placo Civil Avistion Gnd Bon~inr ~ircr8St at the
~i2po:.3l of the Len·.ll
nf ~ntinns.

f!:u' wi t,;in the te-v·r i tory of

Int8rn2.tionc.2.i.~:t·i(::1

1.

belli.r~erent

c0l1ntriE'3 Qffr::r tho

r::ivil _.. ir 'l':::'CYlsport
o r- Gc~rt \:~~, 0, b ~~T t ].~ i;" Le r "lIe.

0-"

l

:~hi~

--

intsrnationc.lisntion, already stu6ieu by C0rtain Gov-

accl'l'dl:mce \'1i th th:::,. c,J11di ~iOl:',

fixed in pO.l'!::\ "raphs (b),

hereafter) or to employ rnachinCc's cspnbli2 ofmilitL'J'Y
El.F::

-

a:~cr8c-

[1 ..

e.

(c) and (d)
']'h",! :n18xi-

unL:d(;;n tonnn/;o of authorised FlY'Craft \Jill he to t.h1s end Hnd

in accoruHnce ',;'lith the advice of theip experts, liu1.iten by I·,he ()ontr8ctln~ partiJ~ to x tons for

cubic metres

(b)

fOT'

aeroDl~ncs,

Xl

for seaplanes ann

Xl I

cUrigiblos.

The creatinn of an international civil eir transport service

entrusted to contlnentul, inter-continental or inter-colonial or~an-

~~+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

.loi::::

.

isations, to operp.te oil' transport under the ausptces of the LeRf,Ue
of hotj.on::::, 'Nhich f;!lono \'.'ill h ve the ri rellt to build and to use machines of

[~ro2tGr

tonnege than that indicated :m the preceding para-

p;raph.
T11'2 l'i!':ht ot C!'c'lte line~ "between Pv:: hOYl)r:; count:ey 8n('j colo-

(c)
nial

T)l'o;Jontin;" particultJY' intoret:t for one or more of

tel'l"itoeio~

the ContN,c C1.ng 9r:Y'tL. s, provided al':l[,ys thet they lJ.ndertake to bear
the costs, if requested to do so by

t~e

Lea[ue of Nations, and that

they submit to the Leu:'ue for its approvf:,l the number, the type
and the unladen
(d)

tonna~e

of the machines to be uEed.

The fair distribution, accordins to their C8.Daclty, betw0en

the oviation :'..ndustri'2s of' the different cOlmtries, of order::: for
material for internationpl civil aviation, in accordance with conditions to be fixed in en arulexed convention.
(e)

The exclusive, ryormanent and inalienable

Le2.ou8 of

~l['tionf:

Civil Air

~ervice.

(f)

ri~ht

for the'

+:;0 requisition all machines fo]~ the InternR.tional

l'ho eUDrantee of the

l~ontr8ctjnc

.l:'artJ.es not to place 8.n em-

bargo on muchines belonp:ing to the Inter-national Clvil
ana not to : .; eque~i tr[' tG

t'~let~,

L1I'

::,ervice

but to L cili ts te the LOa,(::lle' s right

of requisltion by all means in their power.
This internationalispti)n of civil &viation is the necessary condition of the proposals which follow.
2.

IJimitation of Borl1bins Aircraft.

'}'he Droblem to be solv8d

h~:

s two osnects of equal impor-

tance.
On

-

t~e

one hand, it i2

nece~2ary

th~t,

lD

order to carry

out its preventive and, if need be, itG reoressive action agalDst
Wf'1r, the League of Nations should dispose of a superiority in air
atrength.

~----\~------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~

i "..

On ":he other

h~md,

in~:dmissible

it would be

for

8.

2tElte

8u1'fe1'i:0. 0 : froIT! an air bomb[.'rdme11t, in viol:Jt1on of the rules lald
down 111 Chapter 7 below, not to reta1n the full use of all its air
strength in order to reply to this

fla~rant

act of

In oroer to reconc lIe thes e two 11eoe2:: 1 t

a-~ression.

the Govern-

ie~.,

ment of the Hepublic IJro"008e:::::
(a)

The contractin(;

parti::;~;

undertake not to

l'et~nn,

or not to

build 1n tbe future for their m1litary air forces, machines having
an unl:·:den tonna.r.:e exceedinr: a limt t to be fixed by t11.0) contracting parties in consultrtion with their experts, ?t y
plane::.."

yl

t~n2

for aero-

tons for seaplEnes fmd 111 cubic :metres for dirigibles.

;'"achines of tonnau:e above this lir1i t
constitution of an internptional

\"J

ill be set

milit~ry

c~: ioe

air force.

fop the

Consequestly,

they will be transferred by those contractinr; p!;,.rtie8 who own them
when the: Convention come2 Ulto force, to t.,18 Lear:ue of' Nat10ns which
will deCide whe"e they have to be sk tioned and will or.,gani3e the
command of the Interno tional Air 1,i'orce.
(b)

in the milit~ry air forcee of the different ~t8teB, two cat-

egories must be distinguished:
(1)

tiachinJs which will be left, in all cit'cmn8t8nces,

at the d1sposnl of the Mil1tary Air Forces, and the unladen tonna~e

f +

,
I

of whichwill be dec ided b:T t~~"J c ntrac tinr. Dsrties arter c.:msul tat ion

~~

"11 th

for

thell' exp"rts
sOr'_Y)18ne~'

(2)

[]TId

2rlci
Z I'

'::il1 not sxc':oed z tons
cubic metres

fOl'

f'OI'

ao1'oo18ne8,

Z1

tons

dil'ir·ible:::,;

Lachins8 the unl~Qen tonnarre of WhlCh comes wlthin

the limit~ y ~nQ Z Rnd which will conform ~ith the rules of para~raph
i

\'
!

II

(c)

-

The lncl~sion of ForoplBnes, the unlnuen tonnaITe of which

coms:=:: bee'll/,en z and y tons, in t!1e .fir

•

J....

'orces they nY'e entitled. to

posses::', is only authol'ized to tho~:e contrBctin;T parties VIho under-

I

I,...

(c) below.

•

~t

take to pIRce them

the disposel of the League in the eventuali-

ty of the B-')')licetion of ],1'tlc1e 16 of the Covenant and of connnon
Nati~n2.

I:ction by the League of

lhes8 machines

~ill

be permanent-

ly under the insnection of' ',;he LeAr"Ue.
(d)

Any contrsctinp" Darty su:ci'erinv, from an nir bombardment in

violation of Chapter V below, on the sole condition that it notifie::.: tho Le8!"ue 01' Nations, "Jill be entitled inLliediately to use all
its air forces
Dosal 01' the

inBll1din~

Le~),"ue

those machines earmarked to be at the dis-

of NAtions.

'1lhe above provisions,

whil~!

'rhe contractinr': party will also,

ensuring to thE? Loague its super-

iori ty of aiy' strength, Y'esul t in 1 imi tiner: bombing aircr'a1't as refl::,rds nwnber, Dower Hno
II.

Pro~ospls

u~-:e.

to Place Certain MBterial of Land and Naval Forces
at the Di~mosal of the Lea'-lle of Nations •

rrhe snme nroblem

rL;ef' in tlB

sase of certain lano and

l1;:]val material aE' arises in the case of bombing aircr81t.

'1,'11e ,French

delegation offers a slmilar solution--namely:
(a)

Only those

Po~ers

which undertake to Dlsce them at the dis-

posal of the Lea'ue of Nations in tho event of the
Article 16 of i-,he

C~)venpnt

have the ri['ht to

Do~sess

(b)

In

t}H~

!Jno of common

8C tion

aDpllc~tion

of

by the Len <'Ue shall

::mch mE'::.teriels;

cnse of a;,0:re32,ion contr81'Y to ttle rulf32 lai(1 dovm

in Cha~ter
V of the D,resent
prooosals, the sald ~owers, siter not.t
'
ifYlnr,~ the LeI; ,,:ue of Nations, will l"ecovc::r the full ri["ht to dispose

-

of all such means of defence;
(c)

-

The materlol comi~~ under the present sectian includes:
Batteries of heavy long-range artill~ry;
Capi t81 shim:' cf):;:'ryino.; p:uns exc':::edinc~ 8 ulches or of a
tonnnpe exc~edi~g 10,000 (W.f.) tons;
Submarines \7i th a tonnage exceedil1~ n tons.

III.

OraRtion of 8n International

~orce.

'J1he object of the third 1,'r3nch proposal is to set up
on befalf of the Lep'ue of Nptions and anart from the measures
provided in Chcpters 1 and 2:

Wi'll"

1nternation~1

(1)

An

polJce force to prevent war;

(2)

A first contlnpent of coercionary forces to repress

pna to briEr: immedi[lte assistance to [:my

c:t~,te

vlctlm of agg-

ression.
the police force will be permanently available vii th complet~

ea)

freedom of' pa sage to occupy in times of emerguncy areas vihere a
threet of war has

[~risen,

~nd

to

of the League of' Nl'ltions on the

as~'L:.,t

~:!Dot,

the action of commissioners

':'nd 2lso to contribute to all

conserv2tory mep sures 1.":i thin the sco;)e of the Convention to i"nprove
the 111e2.nS of Preventinp: 'Pier rnd of Article II of' the

Le8.~ue

Covenant.
ThlS police force will be mnde up of contineents furnished
e~ch

by
ed.

of the contrRctinp,

.i;"r~nce

pI divlsion

pprti8~::;

in a proportion to be determin-

is nrenored to contribute
e:'1d

8

mixed brlPade, a llght nav-

a l'nixed [:roun of reconnalSS2,nce

E nex llr~nter

a1r-

craf't.
'.rhe Leae:ue of

l~!:tions

international pollce force

\:ill ar'ranve £'Ol' the command of the

~na

will be entitled to lnspect its

component elements.•
(b)

The flrst contingent of cOGrcionary forces would, in con-

formi ty vd th t.ho undertakings to be as, lined by contractlD?: parties,
be madE) up or elements of ~~trenp:th varying accordint~: to th(O? regions conc!.;rned.
These undertf=,klnr;s entered into by ::tctes tOY/Brds the
League of Nations would obllge them to come to the help of any

State victim of acression with forces of definite strength constantly available.

The contracting parties would have the opt1on
t_:~e

creasin!': thls contribution on

o~

in-

recommendation of the Council of

the L' ngue (l'arafl:rl:-lDh 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant) or, in the
event of ag;'res" ion, vii th a viev, to applyinp regional conventions
of mutual as s 18 trnce somin.":

'iIi

thin the scope of the Covenant.

1be undertak1ngS of the

v~rious

~t8tes

would differ accor-

ding to the place of the conflict--a conflict concerning another
contin~nt

from thst to

~hich

the'tRte belonfs; a conflict concer-

nine; the continent to 1/:hich the:

t~

te beloni7s;

D

confl1c t

the agp-re2. sor h8 s a common frontier '.:'i th t1:)8 contrac tJ.np;
Fr~nce

i2

DreD~I'ed

.c

to te.

to undertake tIle following contributions:

In the c;:se of c. c'Jni'lict outside
gocie, a light naval divif',ion,
for InncL warfare without

in iIlhich

2-

"~uJ:'o

a mixeu bri-

mixed group of aJ.pcraft, material

per~~nnel,

I"or- a. c'YClflic t in

J~uro,)e:

eno mun1tions;

oe: 8. division of all arms, a nav-

al division, a mixed grout) of a1::'crRft, material tor' 18.nd war-fare
with personnel, !?no munitions;
lilor a conflict 1nmro:je in ::ihich :-,ho ar'f7ressor has a
common fronti,,:;]:" with F'r:::nce the c -nt1ncents prr)vided for in the
proceding

Darp~raph,

~nd,

v1hich INould be dec ided in

in addition, forces, the strenfth of
e;~

ch c f~2,e in

ap~reomE:nt

with the Le ['eue.

tractin,rr, parties l[lhieh DOf:sess tanks or simil[:r arm01U'eQ imple-

-

ments,

82

well

from them to

28

th~,;;

hORVY rield 8rtillory, undertakf

to contribute

for-ces ",'neb will be plE,ced f:"t tbe ciisy)osal of

the Les PlJ.0 under the c·'ndi t ions :r1'cntionod e.bove.
In the2e vRrious

eventunIiti~E

the undertakings of each

::;tHte would. only become o"eretive if' the forces thUE pIEced at any

,

~------------------------------------------------------------------------------

moment at t.ho disposal of the League reached a minimum total to
be determined,

8n~

if thore were equitable proDortlon between the
prL1.ci~Rl

contributions ot the
IV.
In
:::

of t.h()

'tDteE'.

Frotecti'n of ';lvilian PODv18tions.

pdditi~n

to the urecedin N provisions, the Government
the

:epublicproT)o,c:e~~

of the followinr; rules 1Hhich

8dopti~ln

Can be Rdonted unconditionally:

projectiles

~hich

are specifically lncendiary or vhich contaln poi-

songases or b8cterL3 iE fOl'bidden, '::hats'! r
(b)

the objectlve.

lmy bombrrdmont eithE:r from the, ail- or by artlllery is 1'or-

bieb.en ot

[l

~)f

di!C'tn!1ce

more

th~~n

x kllometl'es from tne tront Ilne

only exceptions admitted to this r-ule concer-n

'L'.i:18

the bombo.r-dlll";nt of [iir b8ses useo. by bellicerents or
ments of
(c)
of

long-ran~e

Alon? the
depth of x

8.

artillery.

0:(

•

he emplace-

rrtil10ry.

COf:l~~t

nil' boy:'bol'dmcnt

kilomEtrc~s

i~'

exceDt on a b"

i'orbidc)en
b~u'es

In this zone of:' x kilomet:C'es air

and

behi:~d
r)Q

a zone

botteriE'Js of

bomb~1.rc.lment

is not per-

mitted GXCeDt uncLeI' +1'e C')Edttions 1['].<1 do':m by Convt'mtion IX o1'l'he
Ha{:ue
in~

1'01'

D.Ct~~l1'

nflvn.l Ilrtillery

accordinr to the

cace~

'.'!lth

OJ:'

'Nithout

:~)l'ellmln81'Y

H';l.rn-

llJntionsd In Articlo 2 of the sald

~on-

ventlon.
(d)

.l.':~0

use of nnvE:.l 2rtill I'Y viill contJnuc: to be

(~overned

by

theorovlsion:c of (Jonvention IX of 'fhol·:ar:ue.
(0)
Dre~;

~ny fln~r8nt

violation of one of Lhe rules st;tGd lD the

ent chaoter ':ril1 bo rc r'r r'cicC U2

f;t:cte ,SUil t~T thereof

hu:~

:.-'esortsd to

ticle 16 of the Covenant of

...

~hG

~rlma
·'."JfcY'

Loc~le

faclc eV2denco
witllln the meEninn: of Ar-

of Nations •

..I..UQ

v.

Conditions for the Organisation of Peace.

The (j0vel-nment of the Hepublic is fully aware that the
above propos 8.L:

vrll ich alone permit 8.nd

guarantee their successful OPC!'flt.ion.
subst~'.ntial

It affirms once mor-e thf:t no

redllct10n of

arnarr,(;nts CD.n be brour;llt about by empiriesl rno tec.hnicecl mS£1ils •
.. hoev:;r

desire~

the me/:,l.ns.

the end--end t,11e Gnd is

e~;se[)tiEl--must

8lso desire

'Tlhere lr1UE:t be a chronre of method; in futuY'e we must seek

in common 2.ctiont:.hf.t

securit~{

voured to abstain from its own
'I'his

l~'.

V!l'lCh each no.tJ.on hr.s hj.thel'to Encleafo~ce

t-he v,,'r:r spirit of

tality to its sti'ulations, which,

alone.
tbe~ovenent.

~v~r

','e TIlllst elvs vi-

since we began to discuss

of lepst resistQnce.
'1']le nrte',-; ent Conf'r:"j:onco offE>r2 the be t op(1ortnni ty thpt

NatiorlS

POS

ses ~)il: r executive authority cnd e. L08.r:uo of 1\12tions pa-

ralysed by the
France

htlf;

uncorr:l)romh~inl"

8ttJ,tuCie of

n8.tJont~l

s~ovEl'ei!,:nty.

Ina.el.e her cbolce.

sho\..1,lCl m.'·ks tllOil';::.
i~'h(;

mer

su1's s vd than tv. nlch tho 8.bovo proC)oS8ls vlonlci be

inef:( cc t iva and even unthtnlcQble l'lCl nde OJ'lOne;E. t oth c3l'S cornpu.l ~ory

dity of thE CSclf.ion of tho 3uthority controllinp

.....

law, which

i~

ano pnct2;

"11C:

aereements

concornin~

~he

lntcrnstional

still insufficiontly nl'ocise, but tho Dorm8rrnt and

the inte1"Ywtionr:l control of i-be 8x()cutlon oj' 1:-111
. rm2mcnts.

These provisionsi In

re~~rd

to which the French 0eleGotion

r'esc'r-ve2 the r'ic.lJt to n'akc concrete propos[ds

~'.re

::n integI'al part

~.-----------------------------------------------------------------

..l..U;:7

I

.1

of the enquiries c8.rried OFt b:v the Lea}Tlle of Nattons durhw the
last twelve yearE.

_uch
\:J1,U'US

2.

8

hll the

~ol~tion

o~

tho necessary solution are

would be not only an iruortant step to-

f';enel'fl.l unci ccntrac tUf.:.l llIri ta tion

their' reductlon, but 81:::'0 a
De[~.ce

ele~0ntE

r~reit

o~

prmanlents enc tow8rds

aCiVance In tl.ie OT'I:enisEtion of

•
As the proposed orgfn128tion

the execution of tho undertaklnrs

~ould

~hich.

hsve to be general,

the various Power9 would

declare themselves resdy to accent vlill be held in cuspcnse until
the rstif'ication of the

fin~l

ConvEntion hy all the contracting

'I'h'j Goverm:ymt of the l:eDubJ, ic furnished

Hi

i tt-' LlemoP8n-

d1JID of July lRth, 19:':'1, end in thE: Lmnexes to t.ha t T\;e11l0Nmdum proc1se details of the modificction of' its a1.'·mI?I1Knts [end the reductions
which it

IlLS

~bOl'tt

already lJl'oup:ht

of Article 8 of

of i

ts~

ovm accorCi, in execution

he LE8~~o Covenant, since it c~rne lnto force Bnd

since tho concll'12ion of the Loc.'rno Ae;reen1(:'nts.
fhese r8ductions,
on the existinr order' of
are a

p10d~e

~hlCh

thin:~:~;

tbe Dolltical conditlons based

hrve rE'ndered po::,sible to France,

of her determinstion not only to fix them by treety,

but also, once co-onerRtion has taken tbe nl~ce of isolrtion, to
endef-Jvolu' to ["chieve further reductions on the linE< of the p1'esent proDo::'alc: ~: nel of th8 flJnd:TI1cntal Pllf:'rantecs to

DO'

ce whlch

these proposals wou16 ensure.

~

dO.

I
I

-,._----------------------------------

-'-tV

1,nnex.

Civil Ilircrd't

t

T'lil
i .:....':':."..."'".,:.,_.l..
<) 1~·U
l' ir'~-' r"d't
:_.
__
(,, __

Bombinp machines capable of
carryinf gre~t lo~df, set aside for the Internptional
Air Force; not allowed for n
nationAl aircrnft.
y----------------------------------y
InternatlOn&l
i{ir Trrnsport
Servlce

National aircrcft plrced at
the disposal of the League in
the eventuallty of thB &uo11cation of Article 16 of the
Oovenant.

Z----------------------------------2
Military aircrRft left, in
all cj_rcuIl1.stsnces, ['It the disposal of the contractinv partieD.
x-----~----------------------X

Pri.v8te Aircrl:,ft.

Note--X, Y rna

...

~?,

to be determined by the Conference •

Ao:r;)6ndJ x III.

Official !:u>lbor:_
:'J'.:."'»
Geneva, November 14th,

D.

l~

Memorandum by the .J:i'rench Deleg[l tion.
In putting forwnr6 the

propo~81s

.•

1~32.

l

contalneo in the pre-

sent memor8ndum, tho }l'rench delePBtion lays no claim to direct the
work of tl:e Conference lnto entll-ely new channels,

Having endea-

voured to interpret the lesson to be drawn from the discussions
which hE'Ve been pursued at Geneva for the lE!st eight months Bnd
adhering to the resol1.1.tions already a.dopted, it hopes th8.t a large
number of delegations will recognise the expre2sion of thelr own
views in the proP03als ,phich it is putting for·warcJ, anci that the
Conference, after

8tudyinF~

this text, Iffill find tl:ereln a system

which, combined with previousoroPosBls anCl partlcularly with
those of President Hoover, will enable it to bring its task rapadly to

B

successful conclusion.
J:<'rom the debates which have been g01l1{' on Slnce February

2nd, 1932, certain lessons may be drawn.
It is now l'ealised the.t tithe reduction of national B.rmaments to the lowest point consistent with

n~tional

safety ano the

enforcement by common action of inter-national obligations" cannot
be hoped for 1]nles3 account is taken,

a~

provided in

the Covenant, of' the r;eo graDhic~Jl s i tua t ion

f~n(:

;~rticle

8 of

s"ec 18.1 c :-moi tions

of each ::;bote .qno. even of each contL:lOnt.

-

It is [:\180 :V'E:'a:Ll::::8d t'hf,t -r,he Dossibllity of a reduction
of armp,ments i'e, clo:'.ely bOlJ.n(!
the conditions of

1.

••

~'ee

~3ecllritv

U')

in the minos of (iovernments with

which exist or which m2.y be crcated.

Le:'ue of N8.tion2;
Confer-ence for trw hednction c.nd
Limitation of ArmE;ments, Conference _y.osnJ.lnents,
IX. l)isermalllEnt 192i2. IX. 58 •

l.'re

At eVEry

st~~e

not onl ~J

1'01'

of the debates, th12 notion of security, conceivea

the adv8ntar:e of one or several countries, but in the

interests

or

revealeo i

t~'elf

all, has re-aope'red.
to be

pOJ

Thus the problem before us has

i tlcel af much

8

s technic nl; in -I-,he sphere

of disnrmament a,116 in tho'sphere of security pror:ress must be made
on parallel lines.
lith this conclusion is connected another, widch on the
occasion of the discussions aroused by President Hoover's proposals r:et "'jl th unnnim01:s anprovl"l--n2-Yllely, that t:tJe task 1)1hich lie2,
before the Conferenceconsists in increasinp the compar2tive power
of the defence

throur~h

decreases in the power' of the attack.!Jith

this end ln vievi, reduc tion~c; of effec tl ve f: ena quanti tEeti ve 8_nd
cO~1temD18ted.

qualltatJVe rGdl::.ctlons of mr:terialhEv(;:; been

Consid-

ered from the aspect of material alone, ti:1E're appe:o,red to be a dan~er

that the

came to be

~roblern

~rove

w0uld

cO~lsidJ:-'red,

insol~ble;

then,

the dii'ficul ty ["rose of

r'equir-em,nt:::: rnC; us 8 c, •

The :2'rench dele 0', t ion is

Conference, if' it i.:.: to succeor.:!,
probleri1

a

E'ti:;

C

particul~r

'::holc.

~_t

type of

~DtcriGI

L::

n111l;h

mll~'
le,:.'~

t not

he~-

etfectlves

con?)2rin(~
haE~

types of milit:::ry or'!"8n:,-sption, e8ch of \"hich

~h8n

different

Jt,,: ovm ;:peci81
CODvl~~cecl

thE' t

the

i b:!te to examine the

im)ort2,nt to en n uiJ'6 Whether

cen facltitate argression th8n to ae-

in given polltlosl c'naitions would make a policy of argression more
oif'1'ic1)_l t.

,-

;hh 11,,:::: heen c18termineti,

the area consiCered
wJ.

.,

C:n(~e

th thL:

ill

b~

the dlff82'cnt
,

decrees h2ve to be

brou~ht

p

rmic f' of

into line

lhile the French Govel-nment h2..s objected

-':;0

the conditions

in which the claim for equali t~T of ri hts has been put forward ,
while it does not recog..YJ.ise the force of the legf-ll arguments on
which this claim is based , and 'Nhi le it persis ts In the belief that
any solution involving J'e - armament would be ur.ecceptsbl e as being
contrary to the very purpose of the

onference , it has neve r denied

th::lt the problom was amon£" the political problems brou.zht up before
the Conference, as was stated by the French Prime • inister on July
22nd , 1 932 , in the General eommission .
every

con~idcnce

that it3

propos~ls

The French delegation has

would permit of an equltqble

solution of this problem in the interests of general peace by the
progresrive equalisation of the millt2..ry st· tus of the various
countrie s and by an equal participation in the burdens and advantaG~~

o~he

organisation of cortnnon action , all question of re-

armament being ruled out .
Such being the complexi ~:T <:ll1d mul tiplici ty ot the .questions which are before the Conference , the French Government considers that it would be vain to endeavour to solve them ell here and
now by means of a plan

ofuniv~rs~l

application .

Tt therefore pro-

poses that--subject to the adoption of a Generar OonvE·ntlon defining for all the Powers theil" obligations as r-eeal·ds limitation, l'eduction and supervision of land , sea .and air armarnents- -provision
should be made for an or{"anis .tion for Europe capable of solving
the problem of the reduction of armaments in that continent both il

-

its political and in its tecn.nicrl aspects .

The arrangements to be

concluded will fl'C the reciprocal measures , whether more extensive
or more definite , regarding limitation, reduction 8Bd sunervision ,
which the

~tates

participatinG in thlS ol"ganisstion will accept as

J

l.' (q,

a counterpart for mutual obll ,tions III

t~e

matter of security nnd

In relation \;i th the conditions peculiar to Europe and to each one
of them .
The Prench Governmeltt hopes that tl-lis European system

-

will

anD€~r ,

to the Powers 1Jhich will not belong to it , to be of

sufficiently areat general importance , from the point of viAw of
the consolidation of peace , for them to render its

a~plication

pos -

sible by agreeine , for their part , to give full effect to the guarantees arising out of the pact8 by which they are already bound :
th,e Pact of Paris or the Covenant of the League of Nations .

ith-

out this acceptance the plan would be impracticc.ble .
Accordingly , the French
mit to the General

dele~ation

has the honour to sub -

Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of

l'marnents the following proposals which form an indivisible whole .
PROPOClAL n

•

Chapter I .
All the Powers taldng part in the work of the Conference
ehall be called upon to establish in an effectlve manner the following prlnciples , Which are generally recognised to be a necessary
c onsequence of the Pact for the Renunciation of 'ilja r :
(a)

.. my war undertaken in breach of the Paris Pact is a matter

of lntereEt to all the Powers and shall be reearded as a breach of
the obligations
(b)
P~ct ,

a ~ sumed

towards each one of them;

In thA event of a breach or threat of breach of the Paris

,

the said Powers shall conse rt together as pr0mptly as ;:>ossi-

'ble wlth a view to anpealing to public opinion and agreeing upon
the steps to be taken ;
( c)

In applicption of the P.ct of Paris outlRwing war , any breach

of thot Pect shall involve the 1)rohibition of dir,ect or indirect ec-

ers

2hsl~

undertake to adont the

nece~2ary mer2ure~

to

m~ke

that

prohibition iInmoCliately e:Cfsc t 1 ve;
(d)

~h2

~~i~

Powers shall declare

thei~

determination not to re-

cognlse any de i'acto situation brought ab01J.t in

(~OYlsequ(:;:ace

of the

Chapter I i .
The

appllc~tion

of the prlncip12s laid down in the prev-

iOU8 chapter will make it Dossible to five full effect to the oblir

~,

p;1?tions d.evolvin," U'Jon the ~,ie111b()rs of the L'9~!n:ue of J.~8.tions under

ity

~it~

thc

principls~

of tho

~ovenant:

the

~en8ral

Convention on

Means of Preventincr 'i!ar, t112 Convention for F'inanci>:;l Assistsnce.
~ronce COCGidc~s

the effectiv8 ~~d loyal applIcation of

l,rttcl"? 16 of th.:; Covenant as an essentj_nl element of the plan whe
has

VI0 rkec1

out.

received a f}_r::",t reali2:~tion in the Locarno 'l'reptie2--which it must
be understood mu::;t not bs n.ffceted b·,r any or th~3 prOVisions of ",ho

angement~.

.,'hS:.: orr.:[cni28tion entaiL:: in 1::.'18 fir-:::t plDce tht?il' acc-

e"Ptance by a suffieient number of Power~;, rel?2cI'd beii10' hf,d to thelr
ne ,,;eo e:ra'ohical 'i02 i tion, in order j-h['t the seclJ.l'ity of
'
eaeh of them :::hOlll:1 be ensured J.n all circn.n12tl:'nces.
.Gction A.
The fundf1110ntal object of the political arronrements will
importancG

-.

be to define the conditions in which each of the :tates forming part

p

1.76

of the Euro-oeon orp;anisl,tion will be entitlea to the co-operation
contractin~

of the other

1.

Irhe~:>

stctes.

ar-ran,uenents will es tablish tIle ri?ht to assistance

when a terri tory undeI' ttl,,, auth::-l"i t~,! of one of 1:J18 SiCTI2,tory Powers
is attacked or invsded by

forei~n

fordes.

An a gression as

t~lS

defined cannot be taken to include certain cpses such as the existance of on agreewent to the contrary, the cese of self-defence(i.e.,
the

repulsin,o~

of ay-med forces which hnvG untered b:r vlolence the

territory of tho

~'t8te

which is

defendJ.nE'~

itself), ::"no action under-

tfJken in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant of the Leap:ue of
N&tions or specially authorised for any

o~hGr

reFson by the Council

or lissembly of the LeaGue.

2.

fhe object of the assistance will be to put an end to the

ression, anu to

cre~te

f~cto

a de

situation which will allow of a

fair settlement of the conseQuences of the
3.

The Council:)£, the Lea'ue of

l~ations

a~fression.

1Nill elecide that assis-

tance shall be riven on simply ascertalni1.,fY that o.n attack nr invasion
~

ha~j

ta1\:E:!n plBce.
In order to

f~cilitnte

any steps that may be necessary to

ascertain ":he facts, there ShDII be

e~3tabli2hed

j.n e, ch of the sign-

atory states a co:nlIni~:sion consistin,,,: of' diplomatic
t81'Y, naval
'~

~mci

ail' attaches

8c(~redited

8 c';ents

j,ny~:

mili-

to the Government of that

stf'te, the members of this commission belug lal)Dl)j.nted
1)1' tbe Le2f;ue of Ns tions.

~:cnd

b,yi~,he

Conncil

tu tE' '.'!hich bel ieve:c, itself to be

threatened or aIle pes thGt it has been attacked may demand that the
necessary meS8nl'eS be taken to o~,tG.blish the ff:cts.
4.

'l'he peacei'1':1 :ettlement of disputes bet'ween 2tates which have

siGned ~~he EU.roDean 8.f'r"ement will be ensured b.\T

he compulsory

1'1'1

accession of tho2e states to the General Act of Arbitration.

,

l~

::'hould one of tho si;o:natories refuse to conform to the methods for the pepceful Gettlement of disputes, or to execute an Rrbitrpl RTIa~d or judicial decision, or to take neces88ry action when
the Council of the

Le~~ue

each of ,n internation&.l
the

-el8. tter

taken.

hRs established th8t there has been a brundert;~]dn,:,

to the Council, 'hlCh will

the other party rrill submit
(I

ec ieie '[[hat steps 8.re to be

'l'he contracting £lovIers will lend assi.stance i"1 cal'ryine: the

deCision lnto effoct.
5.

In the case:::: considered above, the Council's declsions will be

tpken by a majority vote.
6.

To enable firAt-aid to be

~iven

without delay to any 2tate en-

titled to the assistance nrovided for in

par~~raohs

2, 3 and 4 above,

the contracting Powers will arree to the specialisation of portions
of their military forces undor the conditions laid down in

~ection

B below.
Oorre~Donding

above, bhere will be

~ilitpry

an equality of o.ofensive
(1)

~~:odllci:1p

~~ection B.
to Lhe political arr0ngements in:ection A

~;b

arrangements aiminIT, on the basis of

tus, at:

tbe offensive sharactor of the

n~!.tional

forces in

accordance with the princioL, lalet down In the 1,m:rlc8n proposal
of June 22nd last;
(r'::)

::;oeci.'?lisincr

cert~nn

elemfCmts ',''lith a vi(::)\v toche most urgent

operations involved in ti'YE'} common Rction provided foY' in -oera[:;raph
1 of Article 8 r;nCl nerc,'renh 2 of 11.Y'ticle 16 of the Covenant of the

Lea ("ue of NI' tion3.
I.
(a)

The land

tiers of the

force~\

E',t~)tes

8e,::')

igned

fay·

the defence of the home fron-

of continental Burooe will be roduced to a uni-

ed effectives--not adapted to a sudden offensive.

.b'or
phs (b),
ed,

r~e

l

th:L~~

(c) rnd (d)

t~low,

said rorce2 will be
~heir

,

nurnOf,e, under the conditions <iefined in paragrass

~nd

when those conditions are fulfill-

ar~anised

on the following bases:

effectives snu Doriod of tra1nins shall be fixed so

as to secure their defensive sharacter, in
visiom~

lS,

111

c~nformity

with the pro-

of iu·ticle 8 of the (Jovonant of the Lee_r.ue of Nations--that
such a way as to ensure the national security of each state,

t8klnc account of its f~eographical situation and circumstances.

In

part1culfcir, the numerical limitation of the short-service effectives
will he

~daoted

to the inequplities Bnd variations of the resources

of recruitment of the v8riotHl

si<:~n8_tory

Povlers; the same will apply

to the period of tra1nin~, ~hich will have to include, in a form to
be determ1ned, the time snent in nre-rcpimental traininc or 1n military traininp received, for examole, in political organisf~tions.
(b)

.P.Dar·t from tbe snecialh:ed elements for COrm:'1on 8_ct1on referr- .

eO. to 1n p8ravraoh 11, no contractin~ Dsrty will be able to reta1n
in the forces a:c,slgned for i;llc defence)£' its home territory units
consisting of professional effectives or soldiers serving lonGer
than the Doriod fi::::od for i ts
(c)
i

~

natioD[~l

army.

Tiw prc)fessionel or lone-service eftcctlves

soecial1stf AnG

c2dre~")

(lllstrnctors,

of the national armies referred to in para-

graph (a) will be limited on comrnOI1 bases and in relnti:m to the
effectives of those armies.
(d)

The effoctiv8s of' home iJol-ce forces of

fl,

military character,

more especially those living 1n barracks, will be llrnited on a basis
of calcu18tion common to all

Sign~ltol'y

?tates.

[;ny excess over the

flf':<XL'e Y'o,-lll tHIC f'rorn those calculations must bo set off by an equivalent reduction in the effectives defined in parapranh (c).

'"'T":~.

;

(e)

,
1

,

There shall be prohibited, for the national armies of the

contracting Powers, ct least all powerful mobile material, especi2~)

ally such
tion~

l,'J~;uld

~-m

fncilitnte

attack on nE'rm2nent fortificaIt is quite obv-

(powerful firtill':lry ane po'nerful tanks).
t~e

ious that

General Convention will have to be e2tablished in

conformity wlth

~he~e

restrictionf

o~

material and with the pro-

visions vhich follow.

,,

II.
~ach

(a)

of .he contracting Powers will plDce permanently at

~~

~2tions,

the disposnl or the League of

~,

t

action, a smoll nllmber of specialised
servin~

as a contingent for joint
unit~

a rolptivelv 10DF term and Drovided

m8.teri[~ls

consit.'ting of troops
~ith

the powerful

nrohlbited for tlle natlonal armiecc:.

I

of Nations, ana 8ccordinp to plans drawn uo by D

J

be entitled in the conditiom contemplatsc.i in

In order to be oble,

tt)E) L,,'8c 'ue

I cc;

~~t

the fi2"st call from the LeaD)ue
dele~atlon

of

Permanent / dvie or'y Gommi::: s ion, to ';Jl'oviae the sneecly

t
if

hhe~-;e

0peciHll~od

~,ectl:)n A

2.bov8,

contltl.'l'ent:,,; ':Jill be kept constantly YE-'!3dy for

~
.~

~

•

'.

a.ction, 8n'- ' i l l be fot'meo on ,-iimilar lines.

'j'f18 CODvent;ion Vlill

stipulatethc; quOt2 to be contributed by

_ t[~t(3

SCCrl

for such

p1..1.l'-

nose.
(b)

i1.Dcrt

1'ron ;he normnl armament 0)' trw contini';ents contemp-

.~

,

""'.

•

,

national

'*

f

lated abovs, rny mobile l?nd

~

a:':'~li'2S

contGlr:Dl~ b-3C!

of the can trac tinp

c~t,;

m~terial

which is prohlblted for the

in . action I 'uill be storecJ l11 each

te 8 unCi or inter-nR t

ion~'l

,-,noey'vis ion.

stocks will, if necessary, be nlaced at the disDosal

oj

l'hese

the part-

ies in aid of which collective action is taken.
(c)

Any

contractln~

party

enp8~ed

in

le~itimate

self-defence,

as deflned In the political arrangements in Section A above , will
regaln the free use of the c0ntln ent malntalneQ by it and of the
stocks of materials in its territory .
_II.

In all the contracting PoweY's, war' materials , both those
of the natlonal defenslve armies

nd those 01' the contingents for

common action, will g radually be maQe Ulllform, +'1el1- manufacture
being internationally sunervised and

or~anlsed .

IV .
rr'here will. b e organlsed among the contractlng Powers a
I-egular and permanent supervislon of the execution of their obligptions in l'ege-r-d to their armanents .

This supervision wlll In-

volve en lnvestle tion at le s t once a year .

v
rr1 'le geneI'" I or anisat10n--to be establlshed vii thin a
perlod to b0

fixed--beln~

staF,e~

8uccessive

f lts

defined on the foregoing bases, the
e~tablishment

an,,,,ements being made for any of ,he

will be settled, all arr-

arties concerned to be given

at any tll e the neces q l'Y safee;uards in regard to e1'fectlvE and
t c v pl-e of the forcos to be compared , 'lnd to ensure that there
lS no lncreuse of

force ~

or expenditure o.n armaments for [:ny state,

apart from any exceptions duly justified 'lno. accepted b:"" tre
Conference .
Chapter IV.
Naval -nd
rectly

......
"

a

C ,)

OVE:;rs~a

forces are eVlQently

tinentn.l . . yste:n of the

cind

~et 0Pt

'J+ :::J...,. octe' o.iabove.

They stand primarily in relation, on t '1.e one ha.nd, to the
special nE-eds for the pro tection of she t9rrl torie::: foY' vb ich certain

Power~

are responsible overseas , as well as for the defence of

t.le co a:... ts -:>f :;he home country or colonles • nd

0'

t: 1e

CO'11lll

mic

ion

by sea, _.1d

n t 11e

0

ther lL-nd

~o

the naval or mil i tc.o.ry forces of

such Powers as may not be Dartiec to the

rr nfem0n s proposed

in Chapter III .
"'hat will not ma1re it any
the lnterdependence of the

eneral

les~

necef:'sary to l'1aintalD

ystem of milita y reductions

adopted on the Euronean continent and of' th
and

OVE.l'S

a arm:::..ments .
Oversea forces should strictly ,

ea and

llYi1itation of sea

speciali~ed

the~efore ,

be calculat-

for the pcrtlcul[r tasks incumbent upon them;

the resultlng limltations shall be flxed by the General
~S

regards naval

forcb~ ,

Conventi~

the so l tions to be contemplat -

ed , whether in connection with security or ln connection wlth the
limitation elnd reduction of

armamenJ:;~ ,

neces sarily find

<.

place

wi thin a general frm ework applyinr; equally to all maritime Powers .
But the conclusion at the Jashington Conference of the PeciPic
Agreern nt '"hich made possible the sirnature of the N!Olva1 Treaty of
1922 has clearly sho,1n the advantaf[e of rep;iona.1 lmder'standlngs ot!.
a political chal'Ecter" for L.he purpose of facillt ting the reduc tion of firhtinr, fleets .

If such

whose scope was Ilmlted to certain

wa~

the effect of 3n agreement

r~~trictions

on the use of nav-

al basGs and a si 'p1e undertakine on the part of the slgnatories
to consult one another, lt is reasocable to sup

o~e

that very much

larger reductions of tonnage would be faci l itated by aereements organising , Hith all the necessary stipu1atlons of detail, 'the co -op el" tion of fleets in case[ analogol'3 to thoS"e conte nnlated ln Sec tion A of Chapter III.

'1'his applies in particular to the C<18e of

t::e conclusion of . . . Hediterl"anean Pact between the naval Powers
concerned .

•

I •

HOl,'!ever this ma;:T be , it is in accordance with the splri t
of the Hoover pr-oposals that, in the case of naval armaments as in
that of

l~_nd

armaments , the principal red'ctlOl1e should be effected

in those categories of vessels which have been r8cognised as the

.

most offensive by means of the qualitative reduction of the characteristics at present fixed for certain
As

regard~,

type~

of war vessels .

quantati ve reductions , slDce, under the ter-ms

of tr-'e Hoove r proposal , lithe naval armaments have grown up ln mut,

,

ual relation to one another fl

,

it will be deslrable to iliook for

"real and posltive" reductions of tonnage , while leaving this rel ativ~ty

as it st8nds .
Consequently , subject to a speclal system applicable to

fleets whose aggregate tonnage does not exceed 100 , 000 tons, the

.

Ulllform percentage of reduction to be accepted should

ap~ly

to the

aggregate tonnages declared in 1931 by the different naval Power s
in reply to the questionnaire of the Council of the League as to
the position of thelr armaments .
It is unnecessary , from the standpomnt of armaments , to
distinguish , in the
clalised forces .

c~se

of naval forces , between general and spe -

But , for the purpose of supplementing at sea the

land action provided for in Chanter III, Sectlon B, II ,

ev~ry

con-

tracting Po'.... er possess ing naval forces shall, ',!hen called upon by
the Le "'ue of Notions , supply tht:) emergency asslstance to which
any ,-tate which is a victim of aggression would be entitled under
tIle conditions laid down ln Chapter III ,

~ection

A.

5uch assls -

tance shall lnclude a certain proportion of vessels of every cat egory , that proportion being stipulated beforehand in the Conven4>
tion .

.LOv

Chanter V.
It is

c18~r

that, like the naval 10rces, the air forces

I~

cannot oe di.Y·ectly affected l;v
lined L1 Chanter III.

2,

continental system IjJ{e that out-

Never·theless, in the matter of reduction of

air armaments it would now aD'Je,'·:Y' possible to take a most important
step forward within the framework of the Gel?-,-,ral Convention, i::1.
view of the f'pct thot the Conference,

Rctin~

on the proposals put

before it for- qualitative dlsarmr,ment (to vrhj.ch were added. the proposal~;

23rd

of Presioent Hoover), Drovic'J.ed in its resol ' ]til)l1 of

la~.t

~Tuly

for the totGl nrohibition of bo;':b;';'l'cment from the air,

sub J ec t to spea ial
millt~rv

Aviation.

defined,

~hon

P:U3

rantees of

2

ec IH-i I-x in connection

10T

l th non-

the time comes, In a regional system, vhich can be

meete C;V('?l1 mor-C! efL'ectlve ll1':tle

C'E'O

of the aiT',

~lt

all ttlO

p:e[~t

8ir Pov,-ers of ,-"urope--continental r no YFm-cont:nental--a;:ree to

C)nseOl]()~ltl-',

posed In tl-:ce cu';.,rt

1n additJ_on to the nrovlsions already pro-

'~onventlOl1

J:1'renc h delep:fo tlon proDo::,:- s thc'
(1)

of U1e

Pr'eDar~:tory

followir~g

lUI bmrbr: rctment fror~ tlle

8

Commission, the

body of measure s:

iY' ~hall be Dro11.ibl ted e.nO. bomb-

ing aircraft :_hall be abolished under the concli ticms for J·,hich the
resolution
(2)

of July 22"1"0 provldes;

~ne nece8~ory

nrovlsions for this puroose shall be settled

in nrincinls by the General Convention; but these will be supplemented by a speclal arrangement with

re~urd

to the air,

qpplicab~

to ,::uI'o1)e alono, rOG8rdine points which 00 not fOl'm pi y-t ot
general agreement --In

...

D~

tho

rticl)l:}", concel'ninr: tho establlshncnt of

1.t54

a lI'c;urope[m Air transport Union ll , whieh will entrust the management and sUT)ervision in Europe of Dublie air-transport to an inter""\',

national body, ana will ensure the application of a system of safegunrc", ap,aJ..nst the use of civil aircrrft for milita:r·y purposes;
~ )
( '-',

.,.

'1'be i.rnportanee of the

wi th the air it!

i.e

obli~ations

aSSl)JDeQ ll1 connection

0 Yl'e' t, Gnd the consequence s of their violation

woulo be so serious, thst it appecrs essential to plve the
:.1' Nations,
r,

8

t 8.ny

1'8

tr; J.n

;~'uroDe,

Leaf~e

a Dowurful me8.ns of action cap-

able of immediate lntervention as necessity arises to guarantee the
exec11.tion of

t<~e

obll['fl tion:o! in ques tion.

: . pec ial ised air 'Jnl ts,

as in the Cf!.f:e of :he land arny, possessing more powe'·flJl macbj.nes
and

mor(~

DOV!el'ful equipm(:nt than t.i:-le orcJinary air unl ts, will be

able to place sdequate meenf; of action at the disposal of the League.
Uoinv still further in this cEtegory 'Jf ideas, certain
delegetions,

incl~]dinp:

the French

delef3[~tion,

hove Ellreaciy sUE':ee2t-

be set up and main tained per-mrnE'ntl;: by the I,ea,(':ue of Nations.
The provislon

~aterial~for

01'

the force rill be mnde

abolttion elf boubinf,'; airCl-dt in

e~eiGr

by the

he ciff('rent nationsl e.ir forces,

these 2irer, J.'t beiHr: handed ov·:r- 'e,o tbe L8[lp:ue in

a~cordance

vd. th

executory roe ('l.J.la tions to be dravrn

1.1.'1).

direct

of different nationalities in

recruitlr~

ac.cord: nee ,;'d th

rl

from

volunte~r8

c.

tC\f'f v1ill be provided by

quota eyE tern to he laici down.

In con81u810n, be it noted afresh th2t the sever-al parts
of thl2 pl;n c0n;:titute ono Indivisible whold.

~'Xl:mlinatlon

hrs

shown it to be bUioo, integrally on the apulir:2.tion of [,he Pact of
Paris and of the Convenant of '.he L08.8.1.9
the l,;ronch liovernment has declared

j

r)f

!'a t lons,

1'1'0]'(

\'1hich

ts doctrine to be deri vecL.

H35

'Ilhis plan crm only be carried out by star~es, et;ch of these etages
being justified cnd natll.rolly introduced by the experj_ence gained
in the previou2 ones.

This meBn~ that its success will depend on

the prOF;ress of the c'lYlfjdonce '[.'hieh must Grov; 11.p between peo})les
end on tho loyplty with which it

i~

carried

o~t.

It presupposes

the concontraticn of etfOl't2 :: l1c! i-he cetE.'rmin8tlon to overcome the
inevltable difficulties
itivo fctioH to

f~

~nd

not to sacrifice

t~le

cil0 neg,' tions or cY'J.ticisms.

rerllties of pos-

-
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